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RESOLUCIONES SEAR (ARSI)

In document MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN ISIDRO (página 180-193)

The concept of DPMs evolved from concepts such as peace operations, complex peace operations and multi-dimensional peacekeeping. The UN, in most cases, still uses the expression peace operations as a generic term that addresses the entire continuum of peace missions. This includes aspects such as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, as well as peacebuilding. Furthermore, the term complex peace operations refers to the inclusion of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations into one mandate as authorised by the UNSC (UN, 1999:8). Despite the differences that exit in terms of what is understood with these concepts, they were/are all still based on a linear approach to peace missions – following an essentially phased approach in which peacekeeping must be concluded, before peacebuilding can commence.

However, those who support the concept of DPMs do not follow the traditional time-line in terms of the stages of peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The concept of DPMs is defined as a post-conflict reconstruction intervention that aims to achieve sustainable levels of human security through a combination of interventions aimed at accelerating capacity-building and socio-economic development, which would ultimately result in the dismantling of war economies and conflict systems, and replacing them with globally competitive peace economies (Madlala-Routledge, 2004a:23). The concept of DPMs proposes that these stages be combined or integrated in order to address the non-linear and inter-related nature of complex emergencies, rather than being approached as separate, but related concepts of a linear process. On an operational level this means that post-conflict reconstruction interventions operate in synergy with peacekeeping and peace enforcement. According to Gueli et al (2006c:21), the application of a systems-approach to address conflict will enable decision-makers to effectively identify the most important activities and relationships in a manner that is useful for the development of policy to ensure sustainable development and peace on the African continent. This demands that the characteristic delay between security and development in UN and AU operations is diminished and that, in fact, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations should be collapsed and integrated into one mutually reinforcing process (Madlala-Roudledge, 2004b:3).

DPMs are based on the premise that engaging in development and reconstruction efforts as soon as possible, even when conflict is still continuing in some areas/regions of the theatre of operations, could contribute toward securing peace and obtaining long-term political order and sustained economic development (Gueli et al, 2006a:7). Solomon (2001:220) points out that the challenge for peacemakers is to “engage in peacemaking between belligerents while at the same time making efforts towards reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation. Although the prospect of rebuilding in the face of destructive forces might seem like a contradiction, the complex interaction between the diverse variables can make this possible”. Although the intention with the implementation of DPMs is essentially to „bring development closer to security‟ and that this essentially implies the deployment of civilian peacebuilders and peace workers in the midst of conflict, it is clear that civilians cannot be expected to constantly operate in the face of ongoing violence. The cornerstone of the DPMs approach is to replace ad hoc institutions and approaches with a permanent capacity endowed with sufficient authority to bring all relevant public and private agencies on board when a crisis emerges with a view to facilitating a greater depth of coordination between the diverse military and civilian agencies involved in a peace mission (Gueli et al, 2006c:19).

Fundamentally, DPMs calls for an approach that entails quicker mobilisation of reconstruction and development resources and embarking on these initiatives parallel to and in unison with security efforts. The development of this type of capacity will require better inter-departmental cooperation and strong political leadership, partnering with the private sector to develop appropriate reconstruction platforms and technologies (Gueli et al, 2006c:19). The concept of DPMs is thus intended to provide decision-makers with a framework in which the challenges related to the security-development nexus can be addressed simultaneously – thus decreasing the risk that a country would fall back into a protracted conflict situation.

It is clear that role-players and belligerents who have vested interests in the continuation of conflict and disorder, need to be effectively dealt with. However, to simply separate these actors through ceasefires is insufficient, as they often make use of global commodity markets to trade resources for weapons that in turn, are utilised to secure access to and control valuable commodities. “Possible courses of action, although these entail taking considerable risks, would be to recapture key commercial targets, deny warring parties access to their major sources of sustainability, as well as to capture or remove warlords. Of necessity, this level of outside coercion will involve much more than conventional military power, but also the active participation and tight integration of specialised military units, as well as intelligence and police services” (Gueli et al, 2006c:71).

Essentially, the concept of DPMs is rooted in the following assumptions (Gueli et al, 2006c:22):

speed and momentum do matter in peace missions;

effective peace missions require integrated efforts;

security and development are intimately linked (however, the one is not necessarily a precursor for the other);

launching development and reconstruction work as soon as possible (even when conflict is continuing) can be a major incentive for peace;

the window of opportunity to avert a return to conflict is very narrow; and effective targeting of this „window‟ or „reconstruction gap‟ requires that civilian reconstruction experts deploy alongside security forces.

DPMs should therefore be defined not only as peace interventions, but in effect, as

„reconstruction interventions‟ that aim to achieve sustainable levels of human security through a combination of initiatives by the military and civilian components that is aimed at accelerating capacity-building and socio-economic development.

An important feature of DPMs is that it does not distinguish between peacekeeping and peacebuilding as sequential processes, but that these processes should be executed simultaneously. This view implies that peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding are thus integrated into one process. This would mean that post-conflict reconstruction practitioners and resources are deployed alongside peacekeepers irrespective of the existence of cease-fire agreements (Madlala-Routledge and Liebenberg, 2004:128). This implies that the military must establish a „window of opportunity‟ for peacebuilding personnel in environments where the mix between conflict and peace is likely to shift back and forth. For civilians, it implies taking risks in order to ensure the provision of basic services and repair damage to critical infrastructure at the earliest possible stages of the mission – thus enhancing the overall credibility, legitimacy and sustainability of the mission (Gueli et al, 2006c:9).

The military component of peace missions should thus be augmented with civilian reconstruction elements as early as possible. The concept of DPMs proposes ways for policy-makers to plan and organise for civil-military operations that bridge the traditional „gap‟ between peacekeeping and peacebuilding and to mainstream developmental principles into conflict prevention and resolution. Colonel Garland Williams, who commanded a US Army Engineering Battalion in Kosovo and helped to direct NATO reconstruction efforts in Bosnia, argues that the „reconstruction gap‟

that is sometimes experienced between the peacekeeping and peacebuilding phases of the peace mission, often leads to renewed outbreaks of violence among

belligerents. He emphasises the notion that “all efforts should be made to blitz the country‟s infrastructure repair and reconstruction efforts sooner rather than later during peace missions” (Williams, 2005:xiii). Failure to do so will lengthen the deployment times of peacekeepers, and will mean that the international community‟s efforts will continue to be reactive rather than preventive.

The underlying causes of conflict are complex. In answer to this, DPMs can be utilised, in theory, to establish sustainable human development through the integrated application of security and developmental efforts. As a result, after the military intervention, right after the cessation of hostilities in a protracted conflict, a peace support operation‟s host nation typically finds itself in a precarious position:

not only must it reconstitute its governmental and administrative apparatus, but it must also rebuild much of its basic infrastructure that was destroyed during the conflict: roads must be rebuilt, public utilities must be restored and land mines must be removed. If these issues are not effectively addressed, such a chaotic situation can easily sustain the conditions and garner resentments that led to the conflict in the first place.

However, although the theoretical foundation of the concept of DPMs is easy to understand, it remains very difficult to implement: the maintenance of safe and secure environments for peacebuilding cannot solely rest on the deployment of military peacekeepers, but should also include civilian experts that can fast-track the reconstruction of essential services and ensure a seamless transition from short-term responses to long-term assistance. According to Gueli et al (2006c:3), what distinguishes this sort of civilian capacity from humanitarian aid is that it begins immediately at the cessation of major combat operations, and it goes beyond saving lives to providing the foundation of reconstruction.

The above coincides with the view of the former UNSG, Kofi Annan, who noted in 1998 that peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be simultaneous activities used in combination, and as complements to one another (Annan, 1998:8). This is why it is essential to have a multi-lateral systems-approach towards solving conflict, which will contribute to more integrated and co-ordinated actions in establishing peace.

This notion is supported by Barungi and Mbugua (2005:31) who point out that

“experience from across Africa show that there is a need to broaden the intervention strategy from peacekeeping and security agreements to Post Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) activities that address the root causes of conflict, confidence-building measures between divided parties and people, and changing the pervasive culture of violence and conflict”.

According to Gueli et al (2006c:31), several specific issues need to be addressed in order to effectively conduct DPMs:

the ability and feasibility of embedding systems-thinking methods, tools and techniques in the policy arenas in order to develop viable and sustainable responses to conflict, specifically the need to model and simulate conflict as part of an integrated decision-support system;

translating a systems-based understanding of conflict into a strategic framework, policies, doctrine and appropriate structures;

identifying and mobilising the technical implementation requirements relating to funding, institutional structures, skills, capacity and inter-operability;

mobilisation of support for the implementation of DPMs interventions by the international community with special reference to the UN, AU and other regional structures;

providing the means to accelerate short-term capacity-building, service delivery, equitable re-distribution of natural resources in accordance with long-term development goals in an unstable, volatile and non-consensual environment;

the feasibility of deploying civilian reconstruction capacity alongside the military forces in hostile environments;

operationalise development approaches into security efforts in such a way as to advance the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals;

defining the requirements of a suitable conflict transformation, conflict termination and exit strategies; and

accurately assess Africa‟s capacity to implement DPMs in support of its own strategic objectives.

The above-mentioned issues are all very complex and diverse, and it has become evident that the only manner in which these issues can be integrated and executed in a meaningful way, is to apply a systems-thinking approach by means of which all the aspects can be integrated in a meaningful way.

The rationale for the adoption of a DPMs approach is that it would replace existing ad hoc institutions and disjointed approaches with a permanent capacity that is endowed with sufficient authority to bring all the relevant public and private agencies, including the military, on board and under control when a crises emerges.

DPMs can effectively be utilised to attain greater depth of co-ordination between diverse military and civilian agencies involved in peace missions (Gueli et al, 2006c:1). The development of this sort of capacity will require better

inter-departmental cooperation and strong political leadership, partnering with the private sector to develop appropriate reconstruction platforms and technologies. The notion of more active involvement by the private sector in reconstruction activities during peace missions was also confirmed in a report by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), in which they assessed the trends and challenges of multidimensional and integrated peace operations. This report stresses the fact that the private sector in Africa should take proactive stance on providing critical infrastructure and enhancing service delivery in conflict affected states. In this regard, “the development of a private-public partnership is critical for the realisation of developmental peacebuilding” (DFA, 2007:11).

In document MUNICIPALIDAD DE SAN ISIDRO (página 180-193)

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