Within the general context describe above, one can identify two fronts of technological penetration into military organizations in Central Africa: through the acquisition of weapons systems and through administrative and headquarters need of performance enhancers. In this respect, the different military branches—army, air force, navy, and other specific branches—are penetrated by technology due to mission requirements. In Chad, North Cameroon, and the CAR for example, a specific type of light 4x4 Toyota-pickup-like vehicle has proven to be the best vector for troop transportation and deployment. These vehicles also fit the need to cover large areas with a short intervention time and small teams of four to six soldiers. Initially designed and introduced in the region for the commercial purpose of goods transportation across the desert, the vehicle caught the attention of the military for its performance and cost. The
use of Global Positioning System (GPS) devices became necessary when these armies were confronted with vehicle losses as they traveled further in the desert and unmapped areas.
As in many other cases, operational requirements provide the leading principle guiding the acquisition of new technologies such as communications, command and control, surveillance, offensive systems, and defensive systems. This mode of technological evolution in militaries capabilities generally comes with various forms of knowledge transfer. Usually, countries at war or with urgent needs are not prepared to master the knowledge behind weapon system and rely on third party (local or foreign contractor) for maintenance. All that is needed is the minimum knowledge required for the system to operate. Conversely, those countries in relative stability have more time to learn and master the basics of weapon systems they acquire, including first-and second- level maintenance, providing personnel with expertise rare in the subregion and profitable for the nation in other economic sectors.
From a more tactical military operations standpoint, the possession of an innovative weapon system has proven crucial to the issue of conflict in the subregion. The side with efficient and cheaper weaponry is likely to sustain its campaign and impose a stalemate on its adversary, forcing him to the negotiation table or to retreat and accept defeat. This was the case in Chad in February 2008, when the forces loyal to the government repelled a rebel assault on the capital city with the support of two helicopters and air-surveillance information.111 This was also the case in Cameroon in 1994, when an outnumbered unit of Cameroonian forces was able to stop the advance of Nigerian forces on the Bakassi Peninsula with high-precision artillery fire, imposing a stalemate in a conflict that was finally arbitrated by the International Court of Justice.112
111
“Battle of N'Djamena (2008),” Wikipedia, September 9, 2011, accessed August 5, 2012, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_N%27Djamena_%282008%29.
112
Ntemfac AN Nchwete Ofege, “Oil Politics Around the Bakassi Peninsula,” PostWatch Magazine, May 22, 2005, accessed August 5, 2012,
Technology, through new weapon systems, enhances logistics and telecommunications systems, and plays the role of force multiplier, providing the state, which is generally in a disadvantaged position, the superiority needed to overcome its foes.
On another front, technology in Central Africa penetrates militaries through their administrations and headquarters. Indeed, in all these decision places, there is the progressive use of information technology to help improve the situational awareness of forces, gather intelligence, and improve the managerial system of human and logistic resources. Opinions have progressively shifted from seeing computer systems as sources of leaks in an organization ill of secrecy, to sources of efficiency in dealing with huge amounts of data (personnel, money, and material). The urgent desire for results has simply surpassed the apprehension about technological weakness.
The national gendarmerie, a paramilitary police corps inherited from the French colonists and spread through all the countries of the Central African region, provides a police function for the rural and border population, and also in urban centers, acting jointly with regular police forces. They have been continuously submitted to security challenges of various natures. The introduction of information technology in their daily tasks is considered one of their major evolutions in the past decade, providing them with the ability to improve emergency response and quality of service. Again on this front, but not as much as for weapons systems, technology is not acquired with the knowhow that goes with it. Central African militaries are more often end users of commercial, off-the- shelf (COTS) equipment than of professional and purposely designed devices—at least in the early stages.
Although information technologies are used to foster good performance in administrations, the whole system remains driven by old concepts and doctrine. There is not yet a reliance on technological assets to determine the way ahead. The impact of technology on military affairs in Central Africa is more likely to be considered indirect, supportive instead of driving. Indeed, none of the military in the region can claim to have a superior basis of technological potential. Nonetheless, decision makers are now relying on new technologies to provide specific solutions in the geographical and economic
environment. For example, the BIR special forces in Cameroon have come to use technology like broadband wireless communication to operate in the southwest, where there was no other available affordable solution. The service was put in place in the form of a private business company offering information technology services to a population in a remote and enclosed area, with Special Forces the first and major client.