2.6.1. Power struggle: domination and hegemony
As aforementioned, this section examines a central notion in this study, which is social change and how this can be advocated or resisted through discourses. In order to understand this in depth, it is better to review some of the central propositions in the motivation for social change, such as power struggle. Fairclough (2013) draws on Gramsci’s work on the structure of power operating after the First World War in Western capitalist societies and his theory of power. Gramsci differentiates between two components of political power, which together give rise to the dominant class in such
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societies (Fairclough, 2013). To elaborate, the first component is ‘domination’, which is an understanding of power as practised publicly and candidly by states in order to have control over social groups, even if this requires oppression and coercion. The other component is ‘hegemony’, which aims at ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ (Forgacs, 1988: 235-249). What follows, then, is that while domination is more public and explicit, hegemony operates in more private domains such as education, family, work, leisure and so on (Fairclough, 2013). Consistent with this, it is possible to view the state in Gramsci’s theory as consisting of two societies simultaneously: a ‘political society’ as the public domain of domination and a ‘civil society’ as the private domain of hegemony.
While Gramsci’s theory of power is originally based on his examination of Western capitalist societies, this conception can also be applied to Saudi society, a Middle Eastern Muslim society. Both of these societies, the political and the civil, can be traced in the context at hand. Clearly, political society is exhibited in the authority and officials of the Saudi government, who are labelled as decision makers later in the data analysis chapters. Civil society, which attempts to maintain that certain cultural and moral norms are promoted by members of that society, can be described as conservative, as exemplified in the body of CPVPV (Commission for Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) and its defenders, all of whom are mostly labelled in the analysis as opponents. Despite the fact that the CPVPV is a governmental body, it is still possible to present it in such a way since there have been a number of cases where disagreements were found between this body and other higher institutions of government. This way of categorising the CPVPV is also possible because in the absence of other formal ideological parties within Saudi society, the CPVPV and its defenders can be presented as one homogenous ideological group whose members can be perceived as the ones in charge of civil society. This example from the data at hand reveals that Gramsci’s original distinction is neither incompatible with Saudi society nor inherently polarised. Instead, it is possible to view the relationship between political and ethical states as inclusive, with the first incorporating the second as they work in combination to maintain power in the interests of the dominant group.
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2.6.2. The inevitability of change, small or big
Does the previous discussion signify that such a power distribution cannot be changed or resisted? The answer to this question is no, since it is never the case that a certain ideology can have supremacy forever, nor can it be accepted by all. Moscovici (1981: 183) uses the term ‘thinking society’ to account for the fact that some groups, and individuals within these groups, cannot be completely and submissively controlled by one single dominant ideology. Drawing on the ‘thinking society’ notion, Castro & Batel (2008: 478) highlight ‘the agency of social beings’, as they are capable of being constantly involved not just in the reproduction of social representations but also in transforming them accordingly. Keeping in mind the dynamicity of discourses discussed earlier in this chapter, interfering with the social order to induce social change is possible. Such intervention does not negate stability; on the contrary, societies are dynamic enough to comprise what Castro and Batel refer to as the ‘paradox of change’. In this paradox, societies can be characterised with stability to a notable degree, yet still have the capacity to accommodate innovation. Such a paradox can be an indicator that change does not have to be drastic or revolutionary; instead, social change sometimes takes subtle forms. This can be exemplified by the discussion conducted earlier about positive discourse analysis and its proactive role in bringing about desired change subtly.
2.6.3. Discourse as a vehicle for maintaining status quo or inducing change
The discussion about subtle or revolutionary social change directs attention to the various factors involved in bringing about such change, which directly affect its severity or subtlety. Moscovici (2000), especially in his earlier works, originally views the scientific system as being in charge of proposing innovations within society. This is, definitely, only one of the variable systems in this regard. For example, another alternative is the religious system and a clear case for this goes back to around fourteen centuries ago when Islam was first introduced to the Arabian Peninsula, thus changing the social and ethical norms of the region. Similarly, other studies examine how the legal system can be used to aid social change (see for example Castro and Batel, 2008). However, it is important to35
point out that regardless of the system in charge of inducing change, discourse (as will be highlighted in the next section) plays a major role in producing change.
Drawing on the work of Lacan on the main structures of discourse and how these structures have enough psychological effect on people to eventually produce social change, Bracher (1993: 53) refers to four essential social effects of discourses: ‘(1) educating/ indoctrinating; (2) governing/ commanding; (3) desiring/ protesting; (4) analysing/ transforming/ revolutionizing’. Taking into consideration the aforementioned discussion on political and ethical states, it is likely that the first and second effects often fall under the control of the dominant group. It is the case that civil and ethical states often utilise discourses relevant to domains like education and law enforcement to legitimise their practices. The third and fourth effects can be associated more with the dominated group, and the discourse under examination in this thesis can be seen as exhibiting both effects.
This should not mean that each group might not occasionally use effects associated with the other group; it just means that there is a general pattern of falling this way. For example, some dominated groups might not have access to education or indoctrination and appear to use protest or revolution more often. Nevertheless, in order to problematise their case, they might need to use a certain amount of education, which could be another area of struggle as they attempt to take over a domain controlled by the dominant group. Keeping this in mind, it is possible to highlight two features of such effects/changes. First, they are complex and interrelated at a number of levels, potentially blurring the distinctions presented in the previous paragraph. Second, in all of these effects, both maintaining stability and creating innovation are induced by the ability to initiate action, i.e. agency. That said, the following section will examine cases of agency on each side and how they are interrelated with discourse.
On the part of the dominant class, for instance, Fairclough (1992: 201) discusses the ‘technologisation’ of discourse in which there is intervention in the discursive and social order to ensure that a given hegemony is introduced and constructed efficiently in favour
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of the dominant group. Such a process of intervention might take the form of interviewing, teaching, counselling and so on. In addition – and in contrast – to the technologisation process, Fairclough also introduced the notion of the ‘democratization’ of discourse, which refers to the process of ‘the removal of inequalities and asymmetries in the discursive and linguistic rights, obligations and prestige of groups of people’ (1992: 201). As such, the democratisation of discourse requires agency on the part of the dominated group, or at least those sympathising with the injustice experienced by them. In that sense, the democratisation of discourse is consistent with CDA as it attempts to rectify any inequalities. A well-known example of the success of discourse democratisation in promoting change is the change in patient-doctor medical interviews (Fairclough, 1992).
In recent years, however, some areas of gender inequality in discourse have remained among the most salient and public cases calling for democratisation, and the discussion in the previous paragraphs can be used to exemplify this. Gender asymmetries in discursive and social practice, although still in need of being denaturalised through social change, continue to be disregarded. This intensifies the need for agency on the part of women and whoever is willing to defend their causes. Such agency can take the form of resistance, which as established earlier is not necessarily associated with revolution or radical change. Agency also means that whoever is involved in it should be patient and not be discouraged by any gaps between what they hope for in their particular context and what is actually taking place. In their examination of the difficulties of generalising new norms in a given society, Castro and Batel (2008) employ discursive strategies to pin these difficulties down. They highlight the fact that even when change is aided by the legal introduction of new policies, this alteration in law does not immediately transform ideas and practice (Lima, 2004). This reasserts the existence of a gap between norms and practice and the difficulties involved in transforming ‘prescriptive norms’, stating what the case should be, into ‘descriptive norms’ describing how these cases are really happening (Castro and Batel, 2008: 476). In sum, then, social change cannot happen overnight nor can it be expected to take place smoothly, whether or not it is aided by a normative system. Nevertheless, persistent resistance and the gradual negotiation of
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ideological constructions supporting change within discourse serve to bridge such gaps or alter the realities of the status quo one step at a time. While this applies to diverse discourses, online/digital discourse in particular can be quite influential in this regard. The next section will explore some basic concepts relevant to online/digital discourse while presenting a few relevant studies.