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In the introduction to this chapter, it was stated that the Ilkitoip age-set ruled Loita as the governing age-set during the main period of my fieldwork research. They dominated the political scene of Loita at the time and the firestick youngsters of the Ilkitoip were the Iromboi (right-hand) and the Iltumusika (left-hand) circumcision-groups. The first warriors from the Iromboi circumcision-group were circumcised in December 1995 and the age-group closed its warriorhood with the celebration of their eunoto ceremony about nine years later in February 2005. Shortly after this ceremony, the first warriors for the next circumcision-group, the Iltumusika, were circumcised. Their eunoto cere- mony was celebrated more recently, in April 2012. Note that the warriorhood of the Iromboi was slightly longer (nine years) than that of the Iltumusika (seven years). My main PhD fieldwork period fell roughly halfway between the warriorhood of the Il- tumusika, which is why their firestick elders, the Ilkitoip, had already completed about 75% of their political term.

This analysis of the political landscape in Loita during fieldwork takes the long-term age-set angle favoured by Spencer. However, there is another dimension to the reading of the state of affairs that breaks the Ilkitoip age-set up into its circumcision-groups and the right-left duality becomes relevant. This is a more detailed description in the sense that it looks at circumcision-group dynamics rather than at age-set dynamics. When viewed from this angle, my fieldwork period did not fall in the middle of the political term of the Ilkitoip age-set but rather in a transitional period. And this changes the whole picture. Although from an age-set view, authority was indisputably exercised by one age-group (the Ilkitoip age-set) that suggests peace and harmony in the political domain, from a circumcision-group view it was a period of tension as the two circumci- sion-groups that formed the Ilkitoip were jostling for power and control of the section’s affairs.

The Ilkitoip age-set is composed of the right-hand-side Ilkiseeyia circumcision-group and the left-hand-side Irandai. There is a general tendency for the right-hand side of an age-set to kindle the first fire for a new right-hand-side circumcision-group and the left- hand-side firestick elders for a left-hand-side circumcision-group (Mol 1996: 331-332). In this case, elders of the Ilkiseeyia kindled fire for the Iromboi and the Irandai for the Iltumusika. This means that there is a closer firestick relationship between the Ilkiseeyia elders and the Iromboi youngsters and between the Irandai elders and the Iltumusika youngsters. Although the first individual warriors of the Iltumusika were circumcised in 2005, shortly after the eunoto of their predecessors, the official initiation of their cir- cumcision-group only happened during the enkipaata ceremony in August 2008. The enkipaata ceremony of the Iltumusika not only marked the official birth of this new circumcision-group but was also a turning point for their closest firestick elders, the Irandai. It is at this point that the Irandai elders assumed their collective role as firestick elders. And it is also from this point on that they started to be part of the political scene of Loita. In this sense, my fieldwork period fell in a transition period. It covered about four years from early 2005 when the Iromboi closed their warriorhood and their closest firestick elders, the Ilkiseeyia, officially ended their political term in mid-2008 when the Irandai officially inaugurated the Iltumusika circumcision-group that heralded the be- ginning of their political leadership.

As the Iromboi opened the way for a new circumcision-group to become warriors with the celebration of their eunoto ceremony, the enkipaata ceremony of this new cir- cumcision-group four years later triggered the gradual entry of their firestick elders into the political scene of Loita alongside the firestick elders of the right-hand-side Iromboi to take over political leadership from the latter. This transition period was composed of two smaller but linked transitions. The first pertains to the warriorhood domain that, as a ripple effect, introduces a change in the political domain. It is marked by ceremonies and characterized by a relatively smooth and swift handover of warriorhood; the second is a processual, overlapping and informal (i.e. not marked by a ceremony) passage to political leadership.4

In practice, however, the right-hand side of an age-set tends to overshadow the left- hand side in terms of political leadership.5 _{Right-hand-side elders have a longer political} term because their youngsters have a slightly longer warriorhood. They also claim and retain control of the political scene during the transition period identified above. So while the Iromboi had already handed over the warrior scene to the following circumci- sion-group, their firestick elders, the Ilkiseeyia, still prevailed on the political scene. This reduces the time left for the left-hand-side elders as the governing circumcision- group. As a consequence, the latter generally fail to deliver weighty leaders, while right- hand-side elders have the time to develop strong and experienced leaders. Some leaders of the right-hand side manage to retain power and authority until the eunoto of their left- hand-side youngsters, and sometimes beyond. An example is the age-group chief of the

4 _{Spencer (1988: 218) makes a similar observation: ‘The precise transfer of power from one age-set of}

elders to the next is not as clear-cut as the transfer of privileges from one age-group of moran to the next’.

5 _{This may be related to the higher status of right-hand-side circumcision-groups over their left-hand-}

right-hand-side Ilkiseeyia, who asserted his authority and influenced the choice of the age-group chief for the Iltumusika youngsters. This was actually a choice that pertained more to the left-hand-side Irandai elders, and particularly their age-group chief. The issue became a tug-of-war between the two age-group chiefs and appears to have been won by the (right-hand-side) Ilkiseeyia age-group chief. It can thus be seen that it is particularly the right-hand-side circumcision-group of the Ilkitoip age-set, the Ilkiseeyia, that more often than not controls social, political and ritual matters in Loita. Loita politics was characterized by this state of affairs during my fieldwork period.

Change and continuity

What we have seen so far is that the age-group system organizes men into circumcision- groups (that successively occupy the various age-grades of the age-group ceremonial cycle as they mature) and age-sets, and that this framework allocates political leadership to the age-group that are the firestick elders of the warriors at the time. In other words, it is during the warriorhood of their firestick youngsters that firestick elders are considered to be the governing age-group of the section. This analysis is based on the situation I encountered during my fieldwork. However, it is important to realize that the age-group system is not a self-contained system that replicates itself in perpetuity without any form of change or transformation. It is, like all other social institutions discussed in this thesis, a historically produced phenomenon.

Changed circumstances, new encounters and interventions of all sorts have moulded and transformed the Maasai age-group system over the years. Waller (1988: 109-111) briefly describes the effects of the pre-colonial Disaster on the age-group system. Of particular importance in this chapter, however, is the question of whether and how changes in the age-group system have modified the way political leadership and authori- ty is regulated and distributed in Maasai society. Waller (2010), who focuses on the Purko but gives some Loita examples, discusses this in a chapter on colonial state inter- ventions targeting warriorhood. He describes how changing policy targeting the practice of cattle-raiding and the formation of manyatas had an effect on the workings of the age-group system and how, in the process, power relations between warriors, elders and colonial administrators were restructured.6 _{Both Maasai elders and colonial administra-} tors shared concerns about what they regarded as undisciplined warriors: ‘[e]lders were more concerned with disobedience and lack of respect, whereas the colonial administra- tion focused on raiding as a particularly outmoded feature of murranhood [warriorhood] that merited stern punishment’ (Ibid.: 137). As a result, state interventions to control warriors were often supported by Maasai elders. The gradual marginalization of warri- orhood that ensued not only strengthened the authority of the state but also bolstered the authority of the (firestick) elders and, possibly, also enhanced the institution of the gov- erning age-group.

The idea that the notion of a governing age-group might have been a colonial inven- tion finds support in Spencer (1988), whose research was conducted in 1976-1977 after the colonial period. He briefly describes what he considered to be a new practice, hav-

ing noted that the positions of PA chief and assistant PA chief among the Matapato Maasai were often filled by firestick elders who were in their political prime (Ibid.: 215- 216).7 _{He also indicated that the firestick elders even ‘claim a right to these appoint-} ments as the age-set who “rule the country”’ (Ibid.: 215). Spencer gathered that the claim to rule and the claim to state appointments were a ‘recent innovation’ that might have emerged out of articulation with the state and particularly the willingness of state officials ‘to accept that there is one “ruling” age-set in principle for new appointments’ (Ibid.).

Based on the contemporary observation that most PA chiefs and their assistants in Loita derive from the age-group that are firestick elders of the warriors at the time, it appears that this practice developed in Loita as well. It has even been extended to in- clude councillors and development leaders. The pattern is clear but there are, of course, exceptions.

In some instances, men in official leadership positions belong to a younger or an old- er age-group. The younger leaders have to constantly prove themselves in the eyes of the community, as they are not considered ready for leadership because they are not yet ‘full elders’. Paralleling Spencer’s ‘premature elders’ (1988: 80-82), they could be called ‘premature leaders’. A good example is the Morijo Loita councillor who served two consecutive terms and, ironically, lost his seat as councillor when his age-group finally became the governing age-group in Loita. As a premature leader he had to con- tend with members of the governing age-group proper who were not pleased with his leadership position. In all the cases I have encountered, premature leaders had personal qualities (often a combination of formal schooling, a mastery of the English and Swahili languages, work experience outside Loita, charisma, personal leadership talents and, importantly, political skills) that made them stand out from others and that compensated for their youth. It also helps if their families have a good reputation and their fathers were strong leaders before them. On the other hand, there were also cases of ‘overdue’ leaders. These were men, often double authorities, belonging to older age-groups who were simply able to cling to power after their political term had ended, remaining strong leaders and retaining a sizable following. An example is Kone (see Chapters 4 & 5).

Conclusion: leaders, political authority