The public expect engineers and legislators to ensure that hazards are reduced to levels that are "tolerable", "acceptable" and "justifiable". These terms are subjective, they depend on the public perception of the risks posed by these hazards. The perception of risk will always be subjective, it will never be uniform throughout society. This makes the quantification of risk, i.e. it's numerical estimation, extremely important.
The control of hazards is carried out by a combination of self regulation and state regulation. Obviously the law can only concern itself with those hazards that are under the control of humans. This combination of self and state regulation was first envisaged by Robens (1972). He described a system where employers are free to make their own rules and safety codes, rather than relying on the state to make them. The Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) incorporates the spirit o f self regulation although it does include much regulatory detail and many absolute requirements. Marshall states that it is the impossibility of reducing chemical processes to a common pattern that makes self regulation the only practical basis for control in the chemical and process industries. Recombinant DNA technology is regulated by a combination of prescription (Regulations enforced by the HSE) and self management (the interpretation of engineering practice). Employers tend to prefer the prescriptive approach which allows them to follow instructions rather than make decisions.
Often there is a discrepancy between the public's appraisal of the level of risk of injury to individuals/society from a hazard and the level assessed by risk analysis specialists. Lee (1981) suggests that the publics' perceptions are often irrational, although Marshall disagrees, stating that any discrepancy between the two views is more likely to be due to a lack of technical understanding on which to base an opinion. This discrepancy is quantitative not qualitative, both the public and scientists agree that a risk exists, it is just the size of the probability that does not match. There are often differences in the public's evaluation of a risk, depending on whether it is personal or public safety at risk.
The public seem unaware of the benefits that they get from some hazardous processes. For example, many hazardous processes produce household products, such as detergents. The public generally perceive the risk involved in using motor
Chapter One: Introduction
cars to be lower than the actual risk. This is because they value the advantages afforded to them by road transport, and voluntarily accept the risk when they travel by car. The benefit that the public receives from the chemical industry, and for that matter biotechnology is unappreciated. Obviously different people find different levels of risk acceptable. For example, some people go hanggliding or rock climbing, both involving high levels of risk, but expect much lower levels o f risk when travelling on public transport. There is a big difference between the size of the risk that the public will accept voluntarily and the size of those that are forced upon them. Kletz (1974) suggests that if an operation has an average failure rate of less than 1 0'^.person" ^ .year" ^, the risk should be accepted, and money should not
be spent on its reduction. This is equivalent to the following situation: If all the sources for death are removed from the world, except that from a particular activity, all the people exposed to that risk would have an average lifetime of
1 0,0 0 0 , 0 0 0 years.
A Harris Poll conducted by the Office of Technology Assessment in the USA (1987) found that most Americans believed that the eventual benefits of new technology will outweigh the associated risks. However the poll found that there is substantial concern about the environmental risks of genetically manipulated organisms (GMOs), plants and animals. The public realises that these are unreasonable and exaggerated fears of biotechnology, but also real risks and a need for strict regulation.
In 1993 the European Commission published a "Eurobarometer" report which found that, of the people interviewed, 48% believe that biotechnology/genetic engineering "will improve our way of life in the next 20 years". The opposite was thought by 15% of the people. Interestingly, where a significant difference was found, the term "genetic engineering" was less well known and had a more negative connotation than the term "biotechnology".
The Eurobarometer survey found a massive demand for governmental control of the various applications of biotechnology/genetic engineering. Although the research itself was though to be worthwhile and should be encouraged. Since the last survey (1991) support for the different applications analysed has dropped slightly. In Germany this drop is particularly pronounced. The risk associated with these applications has remained stationary and the demand for control has
Chapter One: Introduction
The survey found that there is no clear link between cause (knowledge) and effect (optimism). The people questioned made a realistic evaluation o f their own knowledge, however, he majority found the questions asked of them complicated and had, in fact, got the answers wrong.
Slovic, Fishoff and Lichtenstein (1985) created a psychometric factor called 'dread risk', which correlated with the degree to which people wish to see risks reduced and strict regulation enforced. The dread risk for biotechnology was less than that for nuclear disaster but well above that for toxic chemicals, air pollutants, smoking and motorbikes. Goldberg and Denison (1990) suggest two reasons for people perceiving the risks involved in biotechnology as having highly undesirable qualities. These are that scientists do not agree on the hazards involved in biotechnology and that most people do not understand genetics. The public does understand that microorganisms reproduce, disperse and are associated with disease.