Restricciones al ejercicio de la libertad de empresa del socio único

0 - Introduction

This chapter is the last to focus on Hesiod without Homer, and will deal with the philosophical qualities ascribed to the poet. As in chapter 3, philosophy is to be understood here as covering thought and speculation on natural philosophy, the way to acquire knowledge, and the relation between language and truth (for the sake of convenience, ethics was treated separately in chapter 5). In chapter 3 we have seen that Hesiod and Homer together were generally not regarded as philosophers in this more limited sense. As a team, they are not appropriated by individual thinkers or specific schools of thought to propagate specific ideas.

When Hesiod is alone, things are very different. From its earliest reception onwards, the Greeks regarded the Theogony as a textbook of great philosophical import (comparable to the

Works and Days in the field of ethics).1 Its relevance to cosmology and physics was realized immediately, and early thinkers from Anaximander to Empedocles saw Hesiod as their predecessor on the path to the great theory of everything. But we should note beforehand that it was not just the bare fact that Hesiod had described the cosmos that made him so appealing to later philosophers; of considerably greater importance (at least to the history of Hesiod’s reception) was the way he was believed to have done so: meticulously collecting as many data as possible, searching for the smallest building-blocks of the world, and explaining the total of reality through the sum of its constituent parts. Hesiod, as we will see, was thus credited not only with a world view that could be called philosophical, but with a genuinely philosophical method as well. It is one of the main theses of this chapter that this was the reason that Hesiod, when the interest in natural philosophy had waned somewhat, remained greatly relevant to thinkers in the classical period and beyond.

This chapter is organized into three sections. The first section will present an overview of Hesiod’s reputation as a natural philosopher, given shape by thinkers from Anaximenes to the Stoics. Its main goal is to establish Hesiod’s image as a philosopher combining a cosmic scope with a preoccupation with elements. Section 2 is devoted to a discussion of the

1

reception of Hesiod’s Dichterweihe, the introductory scene from the Theogony which many philosophers interpreted as a statement on epistemology, and an indication of the poet- philosopher’s methodology. We will see how recipients adopted the topos of revelation to elucidate their own philosophical method, comparing and contrasting their method to those of previous thinkers. Finally, in the third section, we will see how Hesiod’s reputation as a speaker of truth and a thinker of elements made him useful to certain philosophers exploring the correspondence between language and reality, and the capacity of language to convey truth.

1 - Natural Philosophy

There is a trend, in both ancient and modern doxography, to rank Hesiod among the earliest philosophers. In modern scholarship, Snell claimed that Hesiod’s Götterwelt testifies to serious philosophical speculation, Fränkel wrote that ‘the history of Greek philosophy as literature begins not with Anaximander but with Hesiod’, and Wade-Gery called Hesiod the first presocratic.2 Such qualifications, even in some more extreme forms (in which Hesiod is turned into a culture hero ushering in mankind from the out-dated world of mythos into the modern one of logos),3 are by no means extraordinary. Hesiod is nowadays almost universally regarded as a formidable thinker sometimes tied to archaic modes of expression but otherwise way ahead of his time: he is defining, organizing, classifying, conceptualizing; systematic, rational, abstract, intellectual, analytical, even scientific.4 This particular view of the poet is in fact one of the very few constants in modern Hesiodic scholarship.

2

Snell (1955) 65-82 (esp. 78 ‘Vorläufer der Philosophen’), Fränkel (1975) 515 speaking of ‘profound ontological speculations’, Wade-Gery (1949) 81.

3

See Kirk (1970) 226-251 discussing the modern concept of the ‘Hesiodic Revolution’ (247, and concluding that Hesiod was a great organizer of the mythical tradition, but not the first); cf. e.g. Burn (1936) 73 who describes Hesiod as ‘a worthy member of the band of Greek thinkers (…), a true forerunner of those Ionians who almost in one stroke cut away from their lives the whole mass of the old irrational terrors of ‘natural man’.’

4

Cf. e.g. Sellschop (1934) 99-101 (despite Hesiod’s Gebundenheit an die epische Formel he is still on the way to philosophische Begriffssprache), 104 (Hesiod’s Intellektualismus sets the tone for Greek philosophy); Diller 1946 (Hesiod rejects coincidence in favour of nature’s Gezetzmässigkeit); Baldry (1952) 91 saying Hesiod was not only a farmer-poet, but a thinker as well; Angier (1964) 329 on Hesiod’s ‘organizing and classifying mind’; Sinclair (1966) xxvii Hesiod ‘deserves to be considered as a poet and philosopher’; Philips (1973) on Hesiod’s ‘speculation’ and ‘abstract reasoning’ (300) and his conflicting roles as philosopher and story-teller (302); Most (1991) 86 on Hesiod’s ‘selective, analytic approach’; Bowie 1993 (21) characterizing Hesiod’s poetry as ‘philosophical’; Clay (2003) 50 suggests Hesiod is a presocratic because ‘he too seems obsessed with the question of beginnings’. Rowe (1983a) presents a slightly different view since he qualifies Hesiod’s thinking as ‘unscientific’ rather than ‘pre-scientific’ (135).

In antiquity, Hesiod is often called a philosopher, but rather implicitly than explicitly;5 his classification as such is perhaps more obvious from his association with ‘real’ philosophers. Plato, for instance, compares him to Parmenides, and so does Aristotle, who also associates Hesiod with ‘the first natural philosophers’ (oiJ prw`toi fusiologhvsante~);6 both Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius put Hesiod next to Parmenides, Xenophanes and Empedocles.7 Interestingly enough, Homer, despite his great reputation as a philosopher in antiquity, is often absent from ancient ‘lists’ of the earliest philosophers; there are, at any rate, no

instances of Hesiod and Homer together being ranked among the presocratics - as a team, they can be wise men, authorities on ethics, sophists even, but not natural philosophers. This is perhaps a first indication that the subject of natural philosophy could be used to distinguish Hesiod from Homer.8 Incidentally, this distinction from Homer can also be witnessed in modern scholarship.9

This section deals with the ancient concept of Hesiod as a natural philosopher. I will first demonstrate how the earliest Greek thinkers on science and cosmogony created a Hesiod after their own image, by examining the passages they borrowed from and the way they interpreted their source text. I will then proceed to investigate how this picture of Hesiodic physics influenced later conceptions of the poet as a natural philosopher (in fact, the post-classical views of Hesiod on this particular subject are remarkably similar to those of the earlier period). The subject of Hesiod’s influence on later physiology is a vast subject on which much has been said and written. The overview presented here must therefore necessarily be selective and sketchy, highlighting only those characteristics of Hesiod-the-natural- philosopher that were useful to other areas of philosophy - the most interesting part of this chapter, described in sections 2 and 3.

5

Nowhere in antiquity, at least so far as I know, is Hesiod explicitly called a filovsofo~; he is said to have spoken ‘most philosophically’ (pavnu filosovfw~) in the scholia (SWD 130-131 and 130a, and less directly 286, cf. Aphthonius Progymn. 1.66 Walz; Nicolaus Progymn. 1.281 Walz). Plutarch claims that Hesiod demonstrates ‘a better understanding than some philosophers’ (ejnivwn filosovfwn bevltion dianohqeiv~, Mor. 433E), and Sextus Empiricus explicitly bans Hesiod from the field of filosofiva (Pyrrh. 3.123).

6

Pl. Smp. 178b; Arist. Metaph. 984b and Cael. 298b.

7

Plu. Mor. 402E, 756F and 927E; D.L. 9.22.

8

See Clay (1992) 138, who notes the same ‘segregation’ (though on the basis of little evidence). See also Lamberton (1986) 28 who suggests that Homer does not belong to Aristotle’s class of ‘Hesiod and his school and all the theologians’ (Metaph. 1000a9).

9

See, e.g. Gigon (1945) 13-21, who opposes ‘Hesiodic truth’ to ‘Homeric myth’ and thus begins his book on the origins of Greek philosophy with Hesiod, and Jaeger (1947) 9-11, who calls Hesiod a precursor of philosophy and then explains why Homer cannot be classified as such. But perhaps this distinction is somewhat outdated: it seems that the importance of Homer as a precursor of natural philosophy is more and more recognized (see for instance how Homer is included among ‘the forerunners of mythical cosmogony’ in Kirk-Raven-Schofield (1983), right next to Hesiod, while Homer is absent from Diels-Kranz, who include Hesiod).

The first recipients of Hesiodic cosmogony were the Milesians.10 Anaximander postulated the Apeiron (‘Infinite’) as the ultimate origin, from which the hot and cold came to be, creating ‘a kind of sphere of flame’ around the air surrounding the earth; then, the flame ‘was broken off’ into circles of fire which made up the heavenly bodies. Anaximenes believed air to have produced earth through a process of condensation; from the earth then arose a rarefied form of air called fire, creating the ‘sun and moon and remaining heavenly bodies’.11 Cornford argued for a strong Hesiodic influence on the Milesian cosmogonies,12 and pointed to several striking similarities in their proposed sequence of cosmogonical events: first there is primal unity, followed by separation, and this process enables the separated opposites to interact and generate more life. The opening of the primal gap also causes light to enter, and then pieces of the earth break off to form the stars. The sequence then ends with the separation of the dry land from the sea. Stokes further developed and somewhat modified Cornford’s ideas in two influential articles.13 He convincingly argued that Anaximenes, though later than Anaximander, actually follows Hesiod more closely.14 More importantly, however, he complemented Cornford’s findings with an investigation of the primary entities proposed by the three thinkers: Chaos, Apeiron and Air. Many of their characteristics were found to correspond: immense size, internal motion, divinity, and (probably) homogeneity. These similarities were often noted and further elaborated by later scholars.15

Three relevant points emerge. The first and rather obvious one is that it is indeed Hesiod rather than Homer to whom the earliest cosmologists turn,16 and to the Theogony rather than to the Works and Days.17 The second is that Anaximander and Anaximenes apparently thought of Hesiod as a natural philosopher, that is, as someone engaged in the same enterprise as they were: according to the principle of assimilation, they downplayed differences and focused on what (they believed that) they and Hesiod had in common. This is perhaps less

10

I will only discuss Anaximander and Anaximenes because almost nothing is left of the Thales’ cosmogony. For the same reason, I leave out theogonists like Acusilaus, Orpheus and Pherecydes.

11

DK 12 A 10 (Anaximander) and DK 13 A 6 (Anaximenes), following the interpretation of Kirk-Raven- Schofield (1983). 12 Cornford (1950) and (1952) 187-201. 13 Stokes (1962) and (1963). 14

In fact, Stokes in general makes a better case for the connection between Hesiod and Anaximenes (which he proves beyond any doubt, cf. Wöhrle 1993 14) than that between Hesiod and Anaximander.

15

See e.g. Clay (1992), who discerns in both Hesiod and Anaximander a tendency to present the primeval state of the world in all its confusion as an inverted projection of the well-differentiated present state of affairs. See Wöhrle (1993) 11-19 on Anaximenes and Hesiod.

16

Some of the Milesians’ ideas, most notably the symmetrical shape of the cosmos, could be derived from Homer as well (cf. Il. 8.16). Moreover, Anaximander is called an expert on Homer by Xenophon (Smp. 3.6).

17

Anaximander may have been inspired by the WD’s description of Hephaestus creating Pandora from earth and water when he claimed man originated from a combination of earth and water, heated to a certain temperature (DK 12 A 30, see Guthrie 1957 55 speaking of ‘the ‘Pandora’ theory’).

obvious than it seems: it is worth emphasizing that the Theogony is actually about gods, and not about condensating elements, vortexes of water or circular bits of fire breaking off from the earth. Nevertheless, where Hesiod says Chaos, they see a first principle; where Hesiod says Gaia, they understand ‘earth’. This is allegory in its strictest sense, i.e. reading something else than it actually says.18 This almost escapes our notice since Hesiodic theogony is so remarkably close to Milesian cosmogony - the leaps of interpretation are relatively small and easy,19 especially when compared to the allegorization of Homer: Theagenes, for instance, explained the Iliad’s theomachy as the interaction of elements, Pherecydes perhaps interpreted Homer’s Zeus and Hera as god and matter, and Metrodorus explained Homer’s heroes as parts of the universe, and his gods as parts of the body.20 It may very well be that the ease of physical allegorization of Hesiod facilitated that of Homer, which is more elaborate and more sophisticated; it may also be that the obviousness of Hesiod’s supposedly ‘real’ message caused more interpretive effort to be spent on Homer.21 The third point relevant to us is that the early cosmologists’ interest in Hesiod focuses almost exclusively on three things: Chaos, Eros, and his (supposed) theory of elements - that is, presumably, what they believed to be most cosmological or physical about him.

These three points are so relevant because they return in later cosmological or more generally physical accounts influenced by Hesiod: these refer mainly to the Theogony, unabashedly understand this poem allegorically, and focus on Chaos (as a receptacle or the ‘void’), Eros (as a unifying force binding principles often regarded as opposites), and the elements (as the constituents of the visible world).

The cosmological thinking of Parmenides and Empedocles serves as a good example. Parmenides’ first principles are light and night (DK B 8.53-61), referring to the opposition between Erebus / Night and Aether / Day in Theogony 123-125.22 The prominent position of Eros in Parmenides’ cosmogony (‘She [perhaps the goddess of necessity] created Eros first of all the gods’, DK B 13) is the most obvious of all borrowings from Hesiod, and was already

18

In terms of Long, ‘weak allegory’ (see ch. 2, p. 52 n.8). It is impossible to know if Hesiod actually intended Chaos etc. to be taken allegorically (‘strong allegory’, so Sihvola 1989 95 Hesiod ‘clearly and intentionally presented his myths as allegorical examples illustrating his main message, they were not intended as literal truths’).

19

Cf. Cornford (1950) 96 on Th. 116-132: ‘the veil of mythological language is so thin as to be quite transparent.’

20

Tate (1927) and (1929), Richardson (1975).

21

Cf. Tate (1934) 105: ‘The attempt of Hesiod to be more didactic than Homer merely encouraged the notion that Homer intended to be as didactic as he’.

22

Parmenides may have had Th. 282 in mind (‘the shining stars with which the heaven is garlanded’) when he described the stars as ‘garlands’ or ‘rings’ of fire; see Kirk-Raven-Schofield (1983) 258-259 on DK 28 A 37.

recognized as such in Plato’s times (Symposium 178b).23 Similarly, in the cosmology of Empedocles, which is ‘in broad outlines still dominated by Hesiod’,24 the cosmic force of ‘Love’ (Filiva) evidently recalls Hesiod’s Eros, while its opposite, ‘Strife’ (Nei`ko~), has a constructive and destructive power perhaps partly derived from Eris’ dual nature in the Works and Days.25 Furthermore, the four basic elements governed by Empedocles’ principles are conceived as ‘roots’ (rJizwvmata) divine in nature,26 just as the most important constituents of Hesiod’s universe (earth, sea, heaven) are all gods and have their ‘roots’, too (rJivzai,

Theogony 728).27 We should perhaps also mention the positive evaluation of Strife in Heraclitus, who in fr. 80 says e[ri~ is the same as divkh. Similarly, there may be a Hesiodic justice of transgression and punishment underlying Anaximander’s view of the interaction of the elements as well, as they ‘pay penalty and retribution to each other for their injustice according to the assessment of Time’.28

Of the three ‘Hesiodic’ concepts of cosmology (Chaos, Eros, and the elements), Chaos seems to have been the most interesting to the Greeks, and the most prominently Hesiodic; there is an immense mountain in the commemogram of the Theogony, centered around verse 116 (‘In truth, first of all Chaos came to be’). I will focus, therefore, on the afterlife of Chaos, and then turn only very briefly to Eros and the elements.

The first thing that should be said about Chaos is that it was a widespread and very popular notion.29 There are, for instance, two references to it in Old Comedy: Epicharmus has one of

23

See Dolin (1962), Schwabl (1963), Pellikaan-Engel (1974) and Most (2007) 280-284 for more elaborate comparisons between Hesiod and Parmenides with regard to content. See also Böhme (1986) 35-85 for an extended enumeration of poetic parallels in general (including Hesiod and Homer); his list, however impressive, suffers from serious flaws (cf. Heitsch 1988). Scholars disagree on whether the Th. or the Od. was Parmenides’ primary source text. According to Jaeger (1947) 92 Parmenides’ ‘epic is by no means so closely akin to Homer as it is to Hesiod’s Theogony’, but Mourelatos (1970) concluded that ‘the relation with Hesiod is strongest at the level of import and overall structure, but weakest at the level of verbal detail’ (34). Some other scholars taking Homer as Parmenides’ primary model are Havelock (1958), whose argument to take Parmenides’ kouros as a copy of Odysseus is stretched too far to be credible, and Vos (1963). Deichgräber (1958) defended the extreme (and untenable) view that Hesiod was the only real Vorbild for Parmenides, who wished to oppose ‘alles Homerische und Homerisierende’ (652). Robbiano (2005) 35-66 takes up a most sensible middle position and takes both Hesiod and Homer and other predecessors (such as Xenophanes) as creating a context against which Parmenides’ poem should be understood.

24

Hershbell (1970) 157; cf. Schwabl (1957).

25

WD 11-42; see Inwood (2001) 49 and 23 n.48. Empedocles, like Hesiod, believed that in his age the power of (bad) Strife was increasing (see DK 31 B 20, 22, and 30).

26

DK 31 B 6 and Wright (1981) 22 on the divinity of Empedocles’ roots; Inwood (2001) 34-42 raises the possibility that Love and Strife are more divine than the basic elements.

27

Cf. Stokes (1962) 30-32 interpreting Hesiod’s phgaiv in Tartarus in terms of cosmogony. See for more similarities between Hesiod and Empedocles Hershbell (1970) and Schwabl (1957), and ch. 5, pp. 144-146).

28

DK 12 B 1: didovnai ga;r aujta; divkhn kai; tivsin ajllhvloi~ th`~ ajdikiva~ kata; th;n tou` crovnou tavxin (transl. Kirk-Raven-Schofield 1983). Diller (1946) first saw the connection; see also Gagarin (1973) and (1974a).

29

Cf. Plu. Mor. 678F (speaking of Th. 116): ‘this line of Hesiod is amazingly popular’ (eujdokimei` de; qaumastw`~ kai; JHsivodo~ eijpwvn).

his characters doubt the primacy of Chaos as ‘it would possess nothing from which or to which it might first come forth’,30 and Aristophanes makes the cosmogony of the birds begin with ‘Chaos, Night, black Erebus and broad Tartarus’.31 The concept is thus obviously mainstream enough to be parodied, in classical times and later; this is shown by Plutarch, who applies the ancient cosmic wisdom to something as trivial as a party: there too, it is necessary to have some ‘room and place’ (cwvran kai; tovpon), for it is an insult to the guests to fill up the room in Anaxagorean fashion.32 However mainstream, Chaos remained closely tied to Hesiod: Callimachus, referring to Hesiod at the beginning of the Aetia, speaks of the inspiration-scene and then immediately mentions the birth of Chaos - apparently something that strongly ‘defines’ Hesiod.33

That Chaos was a concept well-known, popular, truly Hesiodic, and generally taken to mean ‘void’ is all confirmed by Aristotle. See, for instance, this passage from the Physics:

o{ti me;n ou\n ejstiv ti oJ tovpo~ para; ta; swvmata, kai; pa`n sw`ma aijsqhto;n ejn tovpw/,

dia; touvtwn a[n ti~ uJpolavboi: dovxeie d’ a]n kai; JHsivodo~ ojrqw`~ levgein poihvsa~

prw`ton to; cavo~. levgei gou`n ‘pavntwn me;n prwvtista cavo~ gevnet’, aujta;r e[peita

gai`’ eujruvsterno~’, wJ~ devon prw`ton uJpavrxai cwvran toi`~ ou\si, dia; to; nomivzein,