An overview of the political economy of Pakistan over the years shows us how Pakistan’s elites consolidated their hold over the wealth, power and resources of the country, leaving the bare minimum for the lower sections of the society. In comparison to other countries, where rapid growth of the economy also leads to a decline in poverty and a better distribution of income, Pakistan faces the dilemma that rapid economic growth does not necessarily lead to a decline in the incidence of poverty and is accompanied by greater income inequalities as well as social disparities. The pattern in which the growth takes place is as important as the rate of growth, because these patterns of development strategies can have a significant impact on the poverty and income distribution levels of the country.
139Paul R. Brass, ed., “Democracy and Political Participation in India,” in Asia, Case Studies in the Social Sciences:
A Guide for Teaching, ed. Myron L. Cohen, Columbia Project On Asia in the Core Curriculum (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 282-97, accessed May 30, 2016, http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/26503868.html.
140Philip Oldenburg, India, Pakistan, and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths (Milton Park,
55 William Easterly (2001) states that the problem in the political economy of Pakistan is that of “growth without development”. The growth models of political economy and public policy exist within a context of prevalent inequality in which elite incentives involve an underinvestment in the development of human capital. Easterly says that even though Pakistan has enjoyed a respectable per capita growth during the 1950-99 period and has a class of high-achieving elites, its performance still falls short for its level of income, on most political and social indicators, like gender equality, corruption, health, education, sanitation etc.141 The long list of welfare programs
aimed to rectify such social lags, have mostly met with failures. Even though there was impressive economic growth in Pakistan at certain times, the country failed to achieve social and institutional development, due to the domination of elites at all levels of the politico-economic state structures.142
This brings us to the question: does a welfare state even exist in Pakistan? In Ignacy Sachs article on welfare state in poor countries (1971), he says that the GNP of a poor country relative to that of a developed country does not indicate its potentiality for welfare development.143 This means that the performance of welfare indicators cannot be evaluated by the same standards in a developing country as compared to a developed country. However, at the same time, the implications of the domestic political regimes and political economy in welfare state development cannot be ignored.
Asaf Hussain (1976) attempts to analyze the structure of political power in Pakistan, by assessing how power is exercised and transferred within a integrated system of elites existing together (Addendum 4)144, which comprises a mechanism in which the power is concentrated within its
own circles. This sphere of power, influence and interaction exist within six groups of elites, which comprise of industrial elites, military elites, bureaucratic elites, religious elites, professional elites and the land-owning elites. The most central junction of control and power is
141 William Easterly, “The Political Economy of Growth Without Development: A Case Study of
Pakistan,” Development Research Group, World Bank (2001): pg. 1, accessed May 30,
2016, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56afbfd58a65e261b705f1f9/t/56b5008be707eb42e2e70915/1454702733 515/caseofpakistan.pdf.
142 Ibid., pg. 1-5.
143 Ignacy Sachs, “A Welfare State for Poor Countries,” Economic and Political Weekly 6, no. 3/5 (1971): 367-70,
accessed May 30, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4381557.
56 held by the governing elites, while the rest is occupied by the non-governing elites. Therefore, political and economic activity almost entirely becomes the reserve of the elites, while the masses and middle sectors are sidelined.
Over the course of Pakistan’s history, we see an intensification of the power of military elites through direct or indirect control of governance. In her book Military INC, Ayesha Siddiqa (2007) explains how the military has played a central role in defining the politico-economic power structures in the country. The echelons of military authorities strive for profit-making and use their institution as a tool for increasing their economic power, by ensuring that they have certain financial autonomy and political influence. There exist many channels through which the military monopolizes and consolidates national resources. Siddiqa defines the concept of Milbus145, which is military capital for their welfare and is not recorded as part of the defense budget and involves transfer of resources from the public sector to private individuals that are connected to the armed forces.146 This shows the level of military penetration in the political and economic state systems.
In an authoritarian political system like in Pakistan, the underdeveloped economy is susceptible to military exploitation, such that the military forms political and economic relationships that would provide them with maximum economic returns. Furthermore, in such a state, the armed forces have power to encourage policies and investments that would be most beneficial to their own interests.147 This involves the military forming a close association with other weaker elite groups, in the process of seeking more benefits. Thus, the armed forces forms a sort of patronage over other elite groups, creating a patron-client relationship, to ensure that it can channel further political and economic resources for itself through the support of these weaker elite groups. 148 It shows an elite system that concentrates power and resources at the top, leading to disparity that leaves behind little for the lower sections of society.
145 Milbus is a term that refers to the economic activities falling under the influence of the armed forces,
regardless of whether they are controlled by the defense ministries or the various branches of armed forces or specific units or individual officers.
146 Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy (London: Pluto Press, 2007), pg. 2,
accessed May 30, 2016, http://swb.eblib.com/patron/fullrecord.aspx?p=3386666.
147 Ibid., pg. 3. 148 Ibid., pg. 4.
57 This created a politico-economic system in which the distribution of productive assets was highly skewed in favor of the six groups of elites, which led to a widening economic disparity and inequitable distribution of welfare benefits between different social classes of people, as well as regional disparity between regions and provinces. Kardar (1987) points out that the ensuing socio-economic disparities, thus, lead to a perpetuation of poverty involving a highly inequitable distribution of income and assets, the implications of which could include illiteracy, lack of housing and sanitation facilities, malnutrition etc.149 We will now look at the process of
democratic development, or lack thereof, in Pakistan over the years.