One of the major challenges in studying collaborative approaches is the difficulty in
differentiating “collaboration” from other participatory approaches (Innes and Booher 2010). There is an increasing amount of conceptual overlap amongst different fields (e.g., adaptive co- management, community based natural resource management, stakeholder participation)
(Plummer and FitzGibbon 2004). Acknowledging these diverse roots, the characteristics outlined in the introduction – broad inclusion, face-to-face deliberation, knowledge and resource sharing, equitable participation, and consensus-focus – are common characteristics in literature on collaborative environmental problem solving. All of these characteristics are shaped by power as exercised throughout the policy cycle, and the following theory structures analysis of state roles in collaboration through a power lens.
A neopluralist perspective is used to describe the nature and interaction of the state relative to other actors in collaborative processes. Neopluralism interprets policy-making as a function of competition and co-operation amongst nominally self-interested actors with varying priorities, resources, capacities, and values. Policy participants represent “a range of individual and
The state occupies a central role with respect to making policy and mediating interests, while simultaneously acting as an interest group with its own fragmented factions, goals, biases and motivations (Cerny 2010; McFarland 2004).
Neopluralism recognizes that economic actors are able to operate from a privileged position with respect to environmental policy making (Brooks and Stritch 1991; McFarland 2004). This privileged position, while not absolute (Macdonald 2007), is a function of interdependence between business and government (Brooks and Stritch 1991; Hessing, et al. 2005). While democratic governments have historically depended on business for economic benefits such as jobs and growth, they are increasingly looking to the private sector for information production, environmental monitoring, and mobilization of finances (Falkner 2008; Hessing, et al. 2005; Newell 2005). The fundamental role played by business in capitalist economies means that business is usually viewed as a legitimate actor insofar as firms generally follow accepted rules of behavior, and the broader public consent to the role that business is playing (Beetham 2013).
Regulatory relationships between government and industry enable elite-level access to decision-makers and facilitate lobbying (Ribot and Peluso 2003). Significant financial resources facilitate lobbying, funding of scientific or policy research, and threats of legal action (Falkner 2008). Influential firms can forestall or subvert government regulation through private rule setting, certification schemes or corporate social responsibility initiatives (Auld and Gulbrandsen 2013; Clapp and Meckling 2013). For global economic interests, including the kinds of multi- national natural resource industry firms featured in this study, this privilege includes the ability to operate across borders and exert substantial influence on governments, private, and civil actors at scales from the local to the global (Cerny 2010). For modern democratic societies, capitalist socioeconomic structures and neoliberal trends toward decentralization shape the degree to which governments are willing and able to engage in restrictive environmental policy making (Brooks and Stritch 1991; Hessing, et al. 2005).
Neopluralism describes the relationship between actors influencing policy making, and the institutions and ideas that define the capitalist socioeconomic structure within which decision- making takes places. However, how the state undertakes policy-making itself can be modeled in a number of different ways (e.g., public choice, institutional-ideological models). Howlett and Ramesh’s (1995) five stage policy cycle model, presented in Figure 3.1, provides a relatively simple framework for organizing analysis of the actions and motivations of the state relative to collaboration through a power lens. This framework is useful in studying highly complex policy contexts by disaggregating the policy process into discrete analytical stages (Hessing, et al.
2005). While the model has been criticized for requiring a relatively transparent decision-making arena for analysis, the specific focus on both visible and hidden power in this study mitigates this limitation. Effective use of policy cycles must also explicitly account for the ideas and institutions that define the policy context, in this case characterized by neopluralism and business privilege, in order to provide a complete analysis of empirical policy making. The use of this model by other studies addressing business and environmental policy making provides a basis for the generation of both insights and comparisons (e.g., Hessing, et al. 2005; Macdonald 2007).
Figure 3.1: The policy cycle model (after Howlett and Ramesh 1995)
In the first stage of the policy cycle model, the problem is defined and the agenda is set. In the process, the range of solutions that will be available to address the now defined problem is constrained (Hessing, et al. 2005). In the second stage, potential solutions, or policy options, are fleshed out. A particular course of action, or inaction, is selected from the range of options in the third stage. Policy implementation takes place fourth, followed by an evaluation phase. The model represents an idealized, rational cycle. However, in application, it is iterative and often short-circuited or interrupted by the irrational actions of policy actors (Howlett and Ramesh 1995). As a model of political process, it is also fundamentally defined by power (as per Dahl 1957; Lukes 2005).
Studying power in political processes involves adopting perspectives from a diverse and often contested literature. This study follows Haugaard and Clegg (2009) in viewing different
perspectives on power not as contradictory, but as different ways of viewing social phenomena, dependent upon the context under study. Lukes’ (2005) three dimensions of power are often used to study environmental policy making processes (e.g., Falkner 2008; Fuchs 2007) because they are particularly effective at describing political contexts where power decides “what is known, what is emphasized and who prevails” (Zeitoun and Allan 2008:9).
Lukes (2005) provides a domination-based description of power as the ability of one actor to prevail over others in achieving desired goals in contested political settings. Power is
interpreted as a fluid, multi-dimensional relationships between actors or groups, not a quantity that can be possessed (Baldwin 1989; Lukes 2005). The framework used by Lukes (2005) describes power through conceptually overlapping instrumental, structural and discursive dimensions that reveal different ways that power can be interpreted, exerted, and addressed.
The first dimension, instrumental power, reveals influence by examining the overt and measureable use of force, or of financial, technical and social resources, in competition with others (Dahl 1957; Lukes 2005). Instrumental power is relatively easy to study in the context of collaboration because it manifests as clearly observable expressions of direct influence.
Structural power, the second dimension, reflects the socioeconomic and political context within which decisions and actions are embedded. It is primarily concerned with how political agendas are set (Lukes 2005). Emphasis is placed on those actions and decisions that constrain or remove certain issues from public consideration, usually to the benefit of dominant, hegemonic interests (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). Even absent visible action by “powerful” actors, dominant structural conditions can privilege these interests, for example, when governments independently make business-friendly decisions in order to promote jobs and economic growth. Structural perceptions of power also highlight the absence, or effective absence, of potentially important actors because of a lack of capacity to effectively participate, or a lack of trust in the ability of a process to address their goals (Gaventa 1980; Lukes 2005). Decisions with respect to the purpose, problem frame and location of collaboration in the political process are frequently decided by the state (Koontz, et al. 2004) and thus strongly implicate governments in the mediation and exercise of structural power.
The final dimension, discursive power, focuses on the ability of actors to shape social norms, values and identities in ways that favour their interests (Lukes 2005). For example, access to financial resources can allow an actor to actively exert power by purchasing advertising that reinforces specific values and ideas (Fuchs 2007). Dominant cultural framings, without added effort on the part of the powerful, may also prevent actors from recognizing that a given outcome
will be harmful to their wellbeing or interest, or that they will be able to make a difference to outcomes (Freudenburg 2005; Gaventa 1980). Due to its subversive nature, discursive power can be very difficult to study empirically, requiring time-intensive discourse analysis methodologies (e.g., Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). However, there are some examples that are relatively easy to identify and these were used for identification of discursive power in the conceptual framework.
Table 3.1 presents this framework, organized into a format suitable for a power theory- based examination of state actions, decisions and motivations relative to collaborative processes addressing water. Lukes (2005) three dimensions of power were first used to organize analysis (Column 1). Theory on collaboration, neopluralism and business involvement in environmental policy making was then used to populate a list of indicators for identifying power in collaborative approaches to water governance (Column 2). These indicators were applied and refined through inductive coding and analysis. As noted by Lukes (2005), there is frequently overlap between categories and interpretation is inherently subjective. These issues are addressed throughout the text where appropriate. Theory on political process and policy cycles was used as an organizing framework for the presentation of results in Section 3.4.