4.1. ANÁLISIS E INTERPRETACIÓN DE LOS RESULTADOS
4.1.3. Resultados de la encuesta aplicada a los docentes
Cairo, the capital city of Egypt, hosting approximately one quarter of the country’s 73 million inhabitants according to a census of 2006115 is often praised for its cosmopolitan character. Indeed, the city has attracted diverse populations and hosts “many different faces, nationalities, traditions, languages, and cultures.”116
Since the turn of the twentieth century, the country has hosted refugee populations of varied nationalities and ethnic backgrounds.117As of April 2013, 17,809 asylum seekers and 72,790 refugees were registered with UNHCR, the majority originating from Syria, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Iraq,
115Ibid.; David Sims, Marion Séjourné, The Dynamics of Per-urban Areas around Greater Cairo: A Preliminary
Reconnaissance (Washingtion, D.C.: World Bank, 2008).
116Al-Sharmani and Grabska, “African Refugees and Diasporic Struggles,” 455. 117Grabska, “Marginalization in Urban Spaces,” 288.
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Ethiopia and Eritrea.118 However, especially with the arrival of refugees from Syria and their rising registration with UNHCR, the numbers are likely to increase. In mid-2013, the number of asylum seekers and refugees registered with UNHCR stood already at 18,307 and 183,398 respectively.119According to UNHCR’s planning figures, the total number of people of concern is expected to rise to 229,700 by December 2015.120 While these are, of course, only estimations, it illustrates a growing pressure on the organization with regards to financial requirements and the fulfillment of its commitments.
Nonetheless, the actual number of people living in Cairo who fled conflict and persecution is actually unknown, as not everyone who is in need of protection is registered with UNHCR. Approximately 500,000 refugees and migrants from African and Middle Eastern countries are assumed to reside in Egypt,121 estimations that were made before the influx of Syrians whose number the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimated to be between 250,000 and 300,000 in 2013.122 Grabska and Jacobsen both point out that the vast majority of rejected asylum seekers stay in the country after their file has been closed.123 Furthermore, UNHCR does not provide for the approximately 70,000 Palestinian refugees living in the country.124 While not all might find themselves in a situation which requires them to receive protection and/or assistance, the numbers of those in need of one or both are probably higher than those accounted for by UNHCR.
118UNHCR, “UNHCR Egypt Fact Sheet.”
119UNHCR, “Egypt,” UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486356# 120UNHCR, “UNHCR Global Appeal 2014-2015.”
121Zehra Rizvi, “Shifting Sands: Risk and Resilience among Refugee Youth in Cairo,” Women’sRefugee
Commission (New York, 2012).
122Joel Gulhane, “Syrian refugees in Post-Morsi Egypt,” DailyNews Egypt, September 3, 2013,http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/09/03/syrian-refugees-in-post-morsi-egypt/.
123Grabska, “Marginalization in Urban Spaces;” Grabska, “Who Asked the Anyways?;” Jacobsen, “Refugees in Urban Area.”
124Oroub Al-Abed, “Palestinians in Egypt: An Investigation of Livelihood and Coping Strategies” (working paper no. 3, Forced Migration and Refugee Studies, American University in Cairo, 2003); Michael Kagan, “Shared Responsibility in a New Egypt. A Strategy for Refugee Protection,” Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, American University in Cairo, 2011, 9.
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Refugees often end up competing for the same resources and space with the Egyptian poor and have to cope with insecure livelihood conditions, exclusionary policies, and high levels of xenophobia and racism. Hence, the reverse of the medal of Egypt’s alleged cosmopolitan character is marginalization of refugees which according to Grabska means “economic, cultural, legal, political, and social inequality and exclusion, a state of ‘being underprivileged and excluded’.”125
Egypt is signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter UN Refugee Convention), the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (hereafter OAU Refugee Convention) and several international human rights treaties.126 However, Egypt has never created institutional structures for the implementation of its obligations and it placed reservations on several articles of the 1951 Refugee Convention, including restrictions on access to public education, work and social services, consequently enabling the Egyptian Government to exclude refugees from basic rights to which Egyptian nationals are entitled.127
While Decree No. 24 of 1992 entitles refugee children to state-public schooling, the decree “is not implemented on a regular and a large-scale basis.”128
Moreover, a structurally overburdened Egyptian school system and high administrative obstacles make an entry highly difficult. Access to work is equally restricted. Under Law No. 12 of 2003 and Ministerial Decree No. 136 of 2003 (amended by Decree No. 227 of 2004), refugees face the same rules with regards to obtaining work permits as any other foreigner. Difficult bureaucratic procedures, high administrative costs, and lack of willingness of employers make it practically impossible for refugees to obtain work permits.129 Moreover, regardless of their
125Grabska, “Marginalization in Urban Spaces,” 290. 126Grabska, ‘Who Asked Them Anyways?,” 10, 16.
127Al-Sharmani and Grabska, “African Refugees and Diasporic Struggles,” 459; Grabska, “Who Asked Them Anyways?,” 11.
128Al-Sharmani, “Refugees in Egypt,” 9.
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length of residence in the country, foreigners are not entitled to citizenship, except for women who are married to an Egyptian male and children born to an Egyptian parent.130
Egypt has abdicated most responsibilities concerning refugees and asylum seekers to the UNHCR, including “[a]ll aspects if registration, documentation of refugee status determination.”131
The fact that Egypt lacks any comprehensive asylum procedures and institutions132 reveals the unwillingness of the government to officially deal with refugees. With no specialized governmental services for refugees, refugees have to depend on NGOs, charity-based and international organizations for assistance and support. The landscape of organizations which provide some kind of service to refugees (e.g. legal aid, education, social support, health care) is scarce and can, consequently, often only serve those most in need.133
Compared to other countries in the Middle East, refugees are less in danger of detention or deportation, are less likely to become victims of police harassment and racially motivated assaults and are more likely to find employment in the informal sector.134In many respects, Cairo provides opportunities for refugees, offering “a fluid and thus safer urban space within which refugees can live and pursue their livelihood.”135
Still, in the last couple of years, refugees have been finding themselves in “a protection crisis”136
according to Kagan. Incidents of deportation occurred since 2005 after years of relative security of non- refoulement. Relationships of trust between UNHCR and the refugee populations have been strained since the deadly dispersal of Sudanese protesters in 2005 and subsequent incidents of
130Government of Egypt, “Nationality,”
Passport, Emigration and Nationality Administration, Ministry of Interior, n.d.,
http://www.moiegypt.gov.eg/English/Departments+Sites/Immegration/Nationality/GrantingEgyptianNationality
131Michael Kagan, “‘We Live in a Country of UNHCR’: The UN Surrogate State and Refugee Policy in the Middle East.” (research paper no. 201, New Issues in Refugee Research, UNHCR, Geneva, 2007), 13. 132Al-Sharmani, “Refugees in Egypt;” Grabska, “Who Asked Them Anyways.”
133UNHCR, Referral Guide for Refugees and Refugee Service Providers (Cairo: UNHCR Regional Office Cairo, 2011).
134 Ibid.
135Al Sharmani and Grabska, “African Refugees and Diasporic Struggles,” 462. 136Kagan, “Shares Responsibilities,” 4.
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protests and occasional violence.137 Human trafficking routes through the Sinai to Israel have increased the perception of refugees as a security threat and the development of Sudanese youth gangs constitutes a source of insecurity from within the refugee communities.138 Moreover, the recent socio-political, ideological and emotionally-laden conflicts that started with the ouster of the former President Hosni Mubarak in the beginning of 2011 and the frequent violent clashes between the state and different parts of society since then have made the security situation for refugees more volatile.139
3.1.1 UNHCR Cairo’s Urban Refugee Policies –Protection Crisis, Limited Assistance & Community Outreach
Since the Memorandum of 1954, Egypt has transferred all major responsibilities towards refugees to the UNHCR.140 This makes UNHCR’s urban refugee policy important to look at. For 45 years, the organization lacked any formal policy concerning refugees living in urban environments. In 1997, UNHCR released its first urban policy.141 The published document was, however, criticized by numerous human rights advocates and scholars as criminalizing and anachronistic as it did not correspond with the reality of urban areas having become major hubs for refugees. Indeed, UNHCR’s own Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit (EPAU) issued similar critique.142 With its publication of UNHCR Policy on Refugee
137
Al-Sharmani and Katarzyna Grabska, “African Refugees and Diasporic Struggles;” Kagan, ‘Shared Responsibilities.”
138Kagan, ‘Shared Responsibilities.”
139For an analysis of the Egyptian Revolution in January-February 2011 and in the beginnings of ‘Arab Spring’ in other countries I can refer to the following report: Amnesty International, “State of Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: January to Mid-April 2011,” Amnesty International Reports (Amnesty International, 2011). For a chronology of political events in Egypt between March 2011-March 2014 see: “Timeline: Three years of Egypt's political procedures,” AhramOnline, March 18,
2014,http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/96993.aspx. 140
Kagan,“Shared Responsibility.”
141UNHCR, “Policy on Refugees in Urban Areas” (UNHCR, Geneva, December 1997).
142Sarah Dryden-Peterson, “‘I Find Myself as Someone Who is in the Forest’: Urban Refugees as Agents of Social Change in Kampala, Uganda,” Journal of Refugee Studies 13, no. 3 (2006); Naoko Obi and Jeff Crisp, “UNHCR - Evaluation of UNHCR's Policy on Refugees in Urban Areas: A Case Study Review of New Delhi,” (UNHCR, Geneva, 2002); Stefan Sperl, “UNHCR - Evaluation of UNHCR's Policy on Refugees in Urban Areas: A Case Study Review of Cairo” (UNHCR, Geneva, 2002); Jeff, Crisp, Jane Janz, José Riera, and Shahira
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Protections and Solutions in Urban Areas in 2009 (hereafter 2009 Urban Refugee Policy), the UNHCR revised its position towards urban refugees, breaking from its previous camp bias and acknowledging that the “mega-trend”143
of urbanization worldwide also incorporates refugee movements.144 Verdirame and Pobjoy highlight three basic aspects that constitute a contrast to the old policy: refugees are right holders; urban areas are legitimate locations for refugees; and UNHCR’s mandated responsibilities include the protection of refugees in urban areas.145
In contrast to its predecessor, the 2009 Urban Refugee Policy mentions UNHCR’s commitment to reach out to refugee communities and to build relationships with refugees. It provides, for instance, for regular visits of neighborhoods were refugees live as well as special consideration of the needs of refugee women and girls.146 The latter component stresses the importance of incorporating its community outreach and communications efforts into “a broader strategy to establish a constructive dialogue and positive partnership with refugees in urban areas.”147
The 2009 Urban Refugee Policy, however, does not make any explicit reference to CBOs.
The UNHCR Cairo office operates “one of the largest and oldest urban refugee programmes.”148
It is currently situated in 6th of October, a satellite town of the greater urban area of Cairo and, hence, far away from most refugees’ residential areas. Besides asylum procedures, UNHCR provides some other services through implementing partners, such as health care through Caritas and scholarship programs for schools through the Catholic Relief
Samy, “Surviving in the City: A review of UNHCR’s Operation for Iraqi Refugees in Urban Areas of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria” (Policy Development and Evaluation Service, Geneva, 2009); Verdirame, Guglielmo, and Jason M. Pobjoy.“End of Refugee Camps?” (paper no. 29/2013, Legal Studies Research Paper Series,
University of Cambridge, 2013).
143UNHCR, “UNHCR Policy on Refugee Protections and Solutions in Urban Areas”(UNHCR, Geneva, September 2009), para. 156.
144Ibid., para. 1, 3.
145Verdirame and Pobjoy, “End of Refugee Camps?,” 479.
146UNHCR, “UNHCR Policy on Refugee Protections,” para. 80-81. 147Ibid., para. 85.
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Service (CRS),149 but these services are highly overburdened and not able to provide assistance for all refugees in need of them.
At the late nineties, UNHCR in Cairo followed the urban policy approach of 1997. Sperl, however, concluded that the minimization and early termination of assistance in an environment in which socio-economic integration and self-reliance is elusive is not only putting more hardship on refugees, but is also counter-productive to the idea of fostering self- sufficiency.150 As a response to the bloody crackdown of Sudanese protests in front of the UNHCR office in December 2005, the UNHCR Cairo office started to focus on building community assistance structures and to encourage the establishment of refugee associations in 2006 and 2007. UNHCR provided among others training and material assistance. It also put more emphasis on building the capacity of NGOs serving to refugees.151 In its operation plan for 2008 and 2009, it reported its increased communication with CBOs through information dissemination, regular meeting and briefing sessions and highlighted its cooperation with six CBOs representing mainly persons of concern from Sudan and Somalia.152
Overall, the decentralized nature of Cairo makes it extremely difficult to establish and maintain contacts with the various refugee communities. The rising number of CBOs in recent years seems, hence, to be a welcoming possibility for UNHCR to facilitate its outreach.153 However, as was explained to me by former and current staff of the UNHCR Community Service Team in Cairo, the team started to shift its community outreach approach since 2007. Firstly, it started to work more through two new implementing partners:
149Rizvi, “Shifting Sands.”
150Sperl, “Evaluation of UNHCR's Policy.”
151UNHCR, “Country Operation Plan: Executive Committee Summary. Country: Arab Republic of Egypt. Planning Year: 2005” (Cairo: UNHCR Regional Office Cairo, 2004); UNHCR, “Country Operations Plan: Executive Committee Summary. Arab Republic of Egypt. Planning Year: 2007” (Cairo: UNHCR Regional Office Cairo, 2006).
152UNHCR, “Country Operations Plan 2008,” 7.
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Tadamon and the “Psychosocial Training Institute in Cairo” (PSTIC). PSTIC trains refugees to work as psycho-social workers within the refugee communities and has taken over most of the community outreach with regards to psycho-social issues. The UNHCR Cairo office nurtures a close collaboration with PSTIC, receiving daily updates from the organization or using its network to disseminate information to refugees.154 Tadamon is a local NGO which currently runs – with the financial help of UNHCR – five refugee centers, distributed throughout the city, including Hadayek el Maadi, Ar di Liwa and the SAFWAC center in Nasr City.155 These centers are open to all refugees and provide activities, such as vocational and language training. They constitute main venues for UNHCR to meet refugees and to implement community programs. In addition, UNHCR finances a micro-grant project through Tadamon. CBOs and refugee groups can apply for these grants to finance activities that promote livelihoods or foster integration with Egyptians or between different refugee groups. Those groups whose application is accepted also receive some project management and budgeting training prior to the start of their projects
Secondly, while in the past, UNHCR used to consider single CBOs created by refugees for financial support, such as rent payment, it retracted from this policy in 2010 due to incidences of fraud, misuse of provided funds, and the rising number of request of CBOs for financial support and instead limits financial assistance to the Tadamon centers.156The decision to cut funding for CBOs can also be explained by a decreasing budget for community outreach activities. The UNHCR budget for Cairo was revised from nearly USD 14 million in 2013 to USD 65.1 million. However, the majority of this budget increase is devoted to the emergency response for Syrians.157 By contrast, the budget for community
154UNHCR Senior Community Service Assistant, interview by author, UNHCR Cairo office, November 14, 2013.
155Tadamon Council, “Welcome to Tadamon,” 2014, http://tadamoncouncil.org/.
156UNHCR Senior Community Service Assistant; Former Assistant Community Service Officer, interview by author, UNHCR Cairo Office, November 25, 2013.
157
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mobilization and self-reliance programs was reduced from approximately USD 1.9 million to USD 1.7 million in the same time period.158
The team still meets refugee groups. If needed, it takes the initiative to convene meetings with refugee communities. For example, UNHCR convened a meeting with NGOs and CBOs after the Revolution in January 2011 to discuss options for more coordinated responses in future crisis situations,159 and met with Somali community leaders in 2013 when more than sixty Somali unaccompanied minors came to the attention of UNHCR.160 Usually, however, refugee groups (e.g. CBOs or less formalized groups with some form of representation, but not individuals) are required to request meetings in written form at UNHCR. If UNHCR approves the request, a meeting is convened during which an action plan is established. Usually, one or more follow-up meetings in three-month intervals take place. The UNHCR used to meet these groups in the communities but after some tensions during meetings, which once even turned slightly violent, the office decided to meet at the premises of UNHCR. Overall, however, UNHCR has fewer meetings with and within the refugee communities than it used to.
Overall, the institutional network within which UNHCR operates has changed over the last decade. On the one hand, new NGOs have been established that serve for refugees. While UNHCR directly cooperates with PSTIC and Tadamon, the establishment of the NGO AMERA, providing legal and psychosocial support, can be seen as a source of pressure on UNHCR to meet its commitments, especially concerning sound refugee status determination procedures. On the other hand, UNHCR has to respond to the increasing demands of refugee groups to be heard. Somali and Sudanese groups, including CBOs, have been active in initiating negotiations with the UNHCR Cairo office to mitigate Somalis’ and Sudanese’
158
UNCHR, “UNHCR Global Report 2012: Egypt,” UNHCR (2012), http://www.unhcr.org/51b1d63816.html; UNHCR, “UNHCR Global Appeal 2014-2015. Egypt,” UNHCR (2013), http://unhcr.org/528a0a2b0.html.
159Samakab, interview by author, Somali community center in Hadayek el Maadi, November 13, 2013.
160
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protests in front of UNHCR or to advocate for refugees’ rights and needs.161
However, the Community Service Team is in less regular contact with various refugee communities as is, for instance, AMERA which operates a specialized Community Outreach Team comprised of Syrian, Sudanese, Somali, Ethiopian, and Eritrean community outreach officers.162Still, when thinking about population management as an umbrella orientation for the work of institutions, UNHCR cannot deny the impact that an increased number of actors in the urban refugee policy and service-provision sector have. An increase in advocacy and service provision by an increasing number of organizations may help reduce the tendency of merely treating refugees in terms of numbers and give a more human face to the provision of protection and assistance to refugees.