Responses of non-Western societies to modernisation and Westernisation have varied considerably; from total rejection of both to total acceptance of both and to combinations of what is in between (Farhang , 1 988, p. 65; Huntington, 2003, pp. 72- 78). The response of Muslim societies to modernisation and Westernisation at both the state and the individ ual levels was neither cohesive nor consistent. Muslim societies and various g roups within each society had d iffering attitudes towards the "modernisation" issue, and each responded according to its own relig ious convictions and construal and in line with its own political agendas.
At one end are those who unreservedly reject both modernisation and Westernisation based on the assumption that for any 'non-Western' country to embrace Western modernity will eventually result in that country's being a Western colony. Muslims who
adopted such view have developed two argu ments and conseq uently two d iffering approaches as how to respond to Western modern ity: the first argument explicates that Muslims are not willing to sacrifice their cultu ral values, or compromise their own identity to embrace modernisation for economic gain. To them, being labelled "backward" is more gracious than participating in their "self-destruction" under the banner of modernisation and development (Jameelah , 1 998). They feel that their culture and their values a re being disgraced and threatened , so they tend to react negatively and look inward . They avoid getting in contact with Western modernity because they believe that such avoidance is the best assurance of not falling under its influence. This negative attitude towards Western modernity can also be viewed, in part, as an expression of dissatisfaction with the Western eco-politics and their exclusive policies and discriminatory attitudes towards Muslims. Some Muslims believe that they are being deliberately marg inalised , excluded and have no control over their own resources (Falk, 1 997). In brief, they feel that they are being re-colonised , a feeling that was shared and expressed by many Saudi entrepreneurs throughout the fieldwork.
Pipes (1 983, p. 349) believed that complete rejection of modern isation as well as Westernisation in this modern age is a difficult pursuit. He fu rther suggested that total rejection is to be found only on a smaller scale within remote commun ities or among "the very most extreme fundamentalists". Hu ntington (2003), duly concluded that total rejection is by no means "a viable option" in the global era, and reiterated Pipe's (1 983) prediction that the inevitable end of rejectionist policies will be sooner rather than later.
The second argument is also based on the same perception of Western modernity and its "destructive impact" on Muslims' values and beliefs and on other cu ltu res as well. However, it offers an alternative to "the modernist paradigm" (Davutoglu, cited in Falk, 1 997, p. 1 4). Un like the passive response and the feeling of isolation and vulnerability impeded within the first approach , the advocates of this view believe that Muslims have an ethical respon sibility as well the means to salvage humanity (including the West) from the ills of the Western modernity (Falk, 1 997).
At the other end of the spectru m were a few Muslim countries that embraced both modernisation and Western isation. They d id so under the assu mption that Westernisation is a precondition for modernisation and d evelopment, thus, they have implicitly accepted the inferiority of their own cultures and q uestioned the sound ness of their value systems and conseq uently, they g ave in to an agonizing and demeaning
cultural tran sformation process. Turkey and, to some extent, Iran (prior to the Islamic revolution in 1 979) are the only two Muslim cou ntries that e mbarked on this developmental path . The de-Islamisation process of Turkey wh ich started soon after World War I might have succeeded in adopting state policies of secu larisation, but such policies, as Yavuz (2003, p. 57) argued are, "not able to touch the g rassroots levels of informal networks", enforcing the argu ment that policies are most likely to have greater impact on formal rather than informal institutions.
The 'u ncompromising modernisation' wh ich advocates accepting modernisation while rejecting Westernisation is a response based on the hypothesis that practical separation between modernisation (the form / technique) and Western isation (the content / spirit) is possible and modernisation without Westernisation is attainable. This form of response to modernisation and Westernisation is by far the most preferred approach among non-Western nations. China and Japan, for example, who for a long time strongly rejected both modernisation and Westernisation , have eventually, abandoned their stand of total rejection in favour of accepting modernisation but on their own terms (Huntington , 2003). Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Gulf States have also embraced this view in their response to the question of modernity.
Why the economies of the Muslim Midd le-Eastern cou ntries are so weak despite their wealth of natural resources, while other economies are prosperous despite their lack of such resources is a puzzling question. The Asian model presents a simple, but convincing answer. East Asian countries, including the Muslim country of Malaysia, did not ditch their value systems in the midst of their economic transformation . On the contrary, they successfully capitalised on such cu ltural, ethical and religious values to advance their developmental strategies. Policymakers have built their development models with special focus on the particularities of their own cu ltures. The Japanese experience with modernisation is another sensible and a practical example from wh ich Muslim societies can benefit. Japan has exploited its "cultural traits" and mobilised its value system, which is centred on the 'emperor' and the 'family', to h asten its modernisation process (Hooker, 2003, p. 40).
The cultu rally based approach to development, complemented with enabling institutions and a constructive reward system, made it possible for East Asia to qu ickly embrace modernisation th rough entrepreneurship (Cantori, 1 997). The arg u ment that these examples were specific points in history does not undermine their validity or dimin ish their viability. Muslim countries can learn greatly from such rich experiences,
most notably from their own history, in terms of the viability of integrating their national cultural values with in their broad development strateg ies.