Resultados Esperados

Cuba reached mid-1991, and the fifth pragmatic cycle, without the signs of mass discontent that doomed communism in Eastern-Europe. Still, several respected people from the army and air force defected to Florida. A key to the long survival of the Revolution was the ability to institutionalize the revolutionary process through the army, the militia, and the “Committees for the Defense of the Revolution”. The Communist Party was given a greater or lesser role at the initiative of Fidel and the top revolutionary leadership.¹²⁹ The obvious means of extending the prerogatives of the Communist Party was to enhance control of society, reaching more people than existing institutions already were in touch with. Under the banner of “popular participation”, grass-root elections for regional assemblies were held, and this was according to Cuban government a much more democratic system that the one of the U.S, where only the richest would have the possibility to reach office.

By the mid 1990´s, Cubans were complaining about a highly centralized, bureaucratized and inefficient state apparatus.¹³⁰ The Soviet bloc collapsed and with it COMECON (the foreign trade authority for the U.S.S.R and Eastern-Europe), which brutally exposed Cuba´s economic vulnerability as the foreign underpinning of its economy vanished almost overnight. By 1992, all Russian economic and military aid was gone. The reason for the economic crisis that occurred was not hard to identify as Cuba had 85 % - 90 % of its foreign trade within the inefficient COMECON system. Cuba had failed to diversify its foreign commerce in the course of the past 35 years, despite that this had been a central goal

129 Ibid. P. 322

130 Ibid. P. 322

59 of the revolution. Cuba could not prevent the collapse or contain the damage from it.¹³¹ Oil shipments fell 86 percent from 1989 to 1992, and food imports dropped 42 % in the same period. Vital replacement parts for buses and other mechanical devices were nowhere to be found, and general economic activity fell by at least 29 % between 1989 and 1993. Cuba had suffered one of the greatest economic blows experienced in Latin America in the twentieth century.¹³² Few could foresee the downfall of the U.S.S.R, and Cuba had excessively

concentrated its trade and finance with one market, about 84 % alone with COMECON. The security in the Soviet connection gave little need to diversify its exports or its markets. Again, Cuba became the ultimate example of dependency.¹³³

Cuba entered “the special period in peace time” as Fidel declared it, and this cycle was to be definitively pragmatic, where Cubans experienced a drastic fall in living standards.

Monthly rationing quotas now covered only one or two weeks, electricity could only be enjoyed 4-8 hours per day, and bus services virtually disappeared because of fuel shortages.

Fidel now had to protect the island´s sovereignty as well as the socialism. In 1993, he declared that:

“Today we cannot speak of the pure, ideal, perfect socialism which we dream because life forces us into concession”.¹³⁴

Cuba was in need of hard currency, which led to the court of Western investment. The use of dollar was decriminalized, and in 1994 farmers was allowed to sell on the open market, while private taxis and family run restaurants (paladares) reappeared in the major cities. These enterprises were burdened through tough regulations and high taxes, as Fidel was determined to throttle the spread of capitalism as long as he could. Still, severe shortages and virtually zero investment (aside from tourism) plagued every sector of the economy, worsened by the U.S embargo and the lack of foreign exchange. Even though the laws could be ignored by most countries, the incentives to invest or do business with Cuba would in most cases not be worth the risk of facing dominant capital giant U.S. I will return to the history and effects of the embargo.

131 Heraldo Juan M. Del Aguila in Muñoz, Joseph Tulchin, and Jae-Sung Kwak, "Latin American Nations in World Politics," (1997). P. 91

132 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America. P. 323

133 Ibid. P. 323

134 Ibid. P. 323

60

In 1995, decree law 77 was enacted to pursue the goals of the economic austerity program. It set out specific guarantees for foreign firms by establishing full protection and security against expropriation and it opened all sectors of the Cuban economy (except public health, education and the military). Tourism became an essential source of hard currency, matched only by remittances from Cubans living abroad, and several joint ventures appeared in cooperation with European investors. The sharp contrast between tourists and locals set another tone to society. Were Cubans supposed to work for moral incentives while they observed the material goods, and heard stories of better lives from the tourists, and family members living abroad?

In 1997, the cycle of stagnation had begun as Fidel and his followers feared the de-collectivization, decentralization and the delegation of financial power with an increased independence to farmers, self-employed workers and other sectors that displayed the state as weak. An increase in employment rates and inequality was too far a stretch from the

ideological guidelines.¹³⁵ Still, on the fortieth anniversary of the revolution, in the cycle of stagnation, on January 1. 1999, Fidel reaffirmed his commitment to saving the country,

revolution, and the conquest of socialism from the “new religion” of neoliberalism, which had turned the planet into a giant casino.¹³⁶ Again he introduced restriction on private sector, but during the hard 90´s the flirting with capitalism had already made some balls rolling.

Venezuela became a substitution of the U.S.S.R as the big subsidizer of Cuban socialism and economy under the Chavez government. Between the years 2001-2007, Cuba received $4000 million U.S. worth of credit, investment and financial support from

Venezuela. The accumulation of debt reached $2500 million U.S. for the importation of petroleum, which Cuba paid with 20 000 doctors, teachers and health personnel. Investors like Sherritt International from Canada and Meliá from Spain increased investment in mining and tourism. These positive economic trends gave Fidel the confidence to make some cuts in the strict reforms of the 90´s, which challenged his ideology. The trend of “thinking capitalism, but continue being socialists” became more adequate as the deep economic crisis of the 90´s left its mark in Cuban society and the leaders of the republic. The U.S embargo remained, but in 2001, it opened for selling foodstuff and medicines to Cuba.¹³⁷

A new idealist cycle was initiated between the years 2003 – 2006, but as the former cycle of the same character, it came out negative. The anti-market cycle of the mid 2000s may

135 Mesa-Lago, Cuba En La Era De Raúl Castro: Reformas Económico-Sociales Y Sus Efectos. P. 42

136 Skidmore and Smith, Modern Latin America. P. 324-325

137 Mesa-Lago, Cuba En La Era De Raúl Castro: Reformas Económico-Sociales Y Sus Efectos. P. 47

61 have increased state control over the economy, but it lacked the idealistic character of

previous idealist cycles. Raúl´s initiatives now represent a much-needed departure from previous ways of managing Cuban economy.¹³⁸

With Fidel´s ambiguous class commitment and the nature of populist politics, he became different things to different people, but in August 2006, at the end of the 7^th idealist cycle, Fidel transferred the power to his brother Raúl Castro. Due to the serious situation of Cuban economy, Raúl called for structural reformation and reached consensus in the government. He entered the 8^th cycle of structural reforms. In 2008, Raúl was declared

“Presidente del Consejo de Estado y de Ministros” and confirmed the direction he was taking.

From 2010, the reformation process accelerated further as he implemented, in a moderate form, approval of private initiatives and market mechanisms.¹³⁹ For Raúl, it was clear that the failure of the idealist cycles would strengthen the support of the structural reforms. The frequent changes to economic ideology created opposite indications that led to instability and insecurity, and affected development as there never was time enough to consolidate with one policy and harvest any potential fruits it would carry.¹⁴⁰