4.2. TRATAMIENTO ESTADISTICO
4.2.4. Resultados estadísticos obtenidos con “IBM SPSS STATISTICS”
A =.001 .515 2.793 .667 77=.001 TOT 1 2.792 .667
3c
^
A(&)
A =.001 77 =.999 TOT .495 2.791 .667 .505 1 2.792 2.791 .667 .667 0,25 0.2 0,15 0,05 3 4 2 1 0,25 0,2 0,15 0,1 0,05 m 3 4 K .483 2 7 9 3 .667 A =.999 .517_ 2.787 .667 77 =.001 TOT 1 2.79 .667 A =.999 77 =.999 *^64 TOT 7T B(k) .489 2.78 .667 .511 1 2.80 2.79 .667 .66711
F i g u r e 6 . 2
0 . 0 5 À=.001 7/=.001 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 30 40 60 10 20 50 0 0 . 0 5 À,=.001
77 =.999
0. 04 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 1 4 9 3 7 5 3 4 1 5 7 4 5 6 1 6 2 5 1 3 9 5 5 4 3 5 6 4 7 6 3 6 4 0 . 0 5A =.999
7?=.001
0. 04 0. 03 0. 02 0. 01 1 5 49 1 8 4 1 7 2 2 4 2 5 7 2 0 4 0 5 5 1 5 4 4 6 2 4 8 6 4 0 . 0 5A =.999
7] =.999
0 . 0 4 0 . 0 3 0. 02 0. 01 1 5 4 91841 7 2 2 4 2 5 7 2 0 4 0 5 5 1 5 4 4 624 8 64F
igure7.1
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