APLICACIÓN DE LAS PRUEBAS DE TENSIÓN AL CASO ECUATORIANO
CHI2 D_VARIWTI 1,732 2 0,4
4.4 RESULTADOS FUNCIÓN IMPULSO-RESPUESTA
‘Aqaba itself is perhaps too well known to need much description. Its situation is picturesque, and some day it may revive the memories of a glorious past when it was Elath at the head of Ælanitic gulf and the neighbour of Ezion-Gerber, the port of Solomon. For the moment it is a miserable little village of roughly constructed huts of granite masonry in the midst of an attractive palm-grove whose owners from time immemorial have been the Huwaitat Badawi (Philby 1925: 154)
mixed cargo consisting of camels, horses, sheep, slaves and Arabs, and, last but not least, a king”.
44 The British Mandate for Palestine was a legal commission that took administrative
control of the former Ottoman territory of Nablus, Acre, the Southern portion of the Beirut Vilayet, and the Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem. The formal objective of the League of Nations Mandate system was to administer parts of the defunct Ottoman Empire until the region was able to be self-‐sufficient. The mandate document formalized the creation of two distinct
British protectorates -‐ Palestine, as a national home for the Jewish people under direct British rule, and Transjordan.
World War II was beneficial to Transjordan in terms of both economic and infrastructure development. During the war, the village of Aqaba was used once again for military purposes. The British, still laying claim to Transjordan as part of the Palestine Mandate employed Bedouin on British military construction projects during the winter of 1941; between 5000-‐8000 Bedouin worked on rail and road-‐ projects in the Aqaba area (Robins 2004, Bocco and Tell 1994). Transjordan’s loyalty to England during the war helped secure a loan of £50,000 in 1942 from the British Treasury for the development of the port of Aqaba (Robins 2004, Bocco and Tell 1994) at which time the British built two wharfs in Aqaba for aiding in the import of military goods (Hindle 1966). The local population also benefited from increased demand and cost of imported goods created by wartime shortages, which resulted in a resurgence in the demand for camel transportation for smuggling (Robins 2004).
Even with these new facilities, however, Jordan did not rely on Aqaba as its port. Until 1948, with the establishment of the state of Israel, Jordan had unimpeded access to the Mediterranean Sea via the ports of Haifa and Jaffa, only about 150 km from Amman. With the creation of Israel, Jordan shifted their trade to pass through Syrian and Lebanese ports, with Amman being situated almost 310 km from Beirut. However, the distance from the centre of trade in Jordan with these new ports was not the only disadvantage. Goods that were destined for Jordan needed to pass through two or three customs controls, involving a great deal of paperwork. The transportation of the cargoes were highly regulated and were required to be moved by local companies and paid for in local currencies. The roads were often unpaved
and in poor condition. Perhaps the biggest downfall to using these ports was that Jordan’s economy and trade was at the mercy of its neighbours. Jordan often found itself having to contend with political events and upheavals, such as Syrian coups d’états and disputes between Lebanon and Syria, leaving Jordan in a vulnerable economic position. The dependence on these northern ports resulted in Jordan being faced with shortages of essential goods (Drysdale 1987).
It is important to note that initially Aqaba was not an ideal solution to losing the use of the ports at Haifa and Jaffa. Nearly 90% of the country’s population at the time lived within 80 km of Amman, which is about 330 km from Aqaba while Beirut is slightly closer at 310 km. Other factors that lent Beirut to being a more suitable port than Aqaba, despite all the above factors, were that land communications between Amman and Aqaba at this time was much worse than between Amman and Beirut, the roads from Aqaba to Amman were not only in worse condition that those between Amman and Beirut, but they were also much more dangerous to traverse because of mountains and gorges, as well as being prone to flooding and rock slides. Aqaba is also located in a politically sensitive region, sandwiched between Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia making it highly vulnerable and nearly impossible to defend if attacked. Further, Beirut was an established port of call for many shipping
companies while Aqaba required not only a 300 km detour up and down the Gulf of Aqaba but vessels also had to pay additional tolls at the Suez Canal. Freight rates
between Europe and Beirut were lower than Europe to Aqaba45. Finally, Jordan only
45 To help counter the discrepancy in shipping costs, the Jordanian government put a 20%
tax in place on goods that were imported into the country via any port aside from Aqaba (Drysdale 1987).
laid claim to eight km of coastline, making it difficult to expand the port, as it was not until the treaty with Saudi Arabia in 1965, which clearly defined each country’s boundaries, did Jordan obtain their current 27 km (Drysdale 1987).
Developing the port of Aqaba became a national priority in the early 1950s, both politically and economically and in 1952, the first plans for developing the port of Aqaba were drawn up. Initially the existing port was sufficient for some Jordanian trade to enter through Aqaba rather than through their northern neighbours;
however the wharfs dating from World War II were incapable of handling civilian imports for a country that needed to import most of its manufactured goods, many raw materials, along with food supplies. By 1958, Aqaba had become Jordan’s
lifeline with the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon. By 1960, several key projects were completed, including the first deepwater general-‐cargo berth.
In the early 1960s, the Jordan Development Board drafted a five year economic strategy that centered around 3 key objectives: expand the country’s gross domestic output, reduce unemployment, and to improve Jordan’s balance of trade and reduce their reliance on imports. One way to achieve this plan was to improve upon Aqaba’s port by expanding it along with increasing road and rail access to and from it (Robins 2004). With these improvements, along with political upheavals in neighbouring countries, port traffic through Aqaba experienced an impressive increase by the mid-‐1960s.
Aqaba’s rapid growth came to a quick stop in 1967 because of the war with Israel, resulting in Jordan’s economy coming to a standstill. The West Bank, which had previously been under Jordanian rule and had contributed greatly to the wealth
of the country, was now being occupied by Israel. Additionally, Jordan found itself having to readjust their trading patterns because of the second closing of the Suez Canal, which lasted for eight years. This meant that travelling between London and Aqaba by ship now took upward of two months whereas when passing through the Suez Canal, it took only two weeks. At its height in 1966, Aqaba received 666 vessels but in 1968, after a year of the Suez Canal being closed, they received only 275 vessels (Drysdale 1987: 93). This resulted in Jordan once again relying heavily on trade through Syria and Lebanon until 1971, at which time Syria closed its borders and airspace with Jordan in protest during the Jordanian civil war. Syria had briefly intervened in support of Palestinian guerrilla fighters but the Jordanian army eventually defeated them. This resulted in Aqaba once again regaining its
importance during 1971-‐72 even though the Suez Canal remained closed. When the Suez Canal reopened in 1975, Aqaba was a key beneficiary as arrivals increased drastically; in 1974 only 299 vessels arrived in Aqaba whereas in 1976, 1064 vessels called at the port and by 1978 nearly 60% of all Jordanian trade passed through Aqaba (Drysdale 1987: 97-‐98). This increase in traffic caused congestion and over the next five years, port infrastructure was greatly expanded. Between 1991-‐1996, Aqaba became the sole outlet for good to pass in and out of Iraq from the outside world as humanitarian goods not under sanctions were imported via Aqaba. (Robins 2004).
While the port of Aqaba, along with a burgeoning phosphate industry46, was gaining in national importance the town itself did not seem to be building up
alongside it. In 1966 Hindle, a British geographer, suggested that this lack of growth was attributed to the lack of labour and power, limited fresh water supplies, and its distance from the main population of Jordan, which situated close to Amman. Because of these factors, he predicted that Aqaba’s future, while playing a vital role in Jordan’s economic development, would be that of a simply a transit port. Even though the town was the country’s only sea access and an important trade and transportation center, it has until recently remained an area marginalized from socio-‐economic development, as the town was considered by many Jordanians more of a remote tribal outpost.
In 197347, the port was set up as a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) although it
consisted of only one facility, which served the transit trade. It remained a relatively modest undertaking until 1983, when the Aqaba Regional Authority (ARA) was established. The ARA was a financially independent institution, receiving most of its revenues from land-‐sales and directly linked to the Prime Minister’s office. It was responsible for socio-‐economic development in the region –primarily through tourism development, as well as formulating strategic structure along with
coordinating with other public and private agencies. Its key objective was to act as
46 Aqaba is home to extensive phosphate deposits, making it the world’s 4th largest exporter
(Robins 2004).
47 Also in 1973, the Mexican state of Quintana Roo in which Cancun is located was also
establishes as a Free Trade Zone (FTZ). As Castillanos (2007: 5) points out, “what was being traded was not goods but rather Mexico's sun, beaches, and gendered, exotic Others”. While Aqaba did not develop as this tourism-‐based FTZ at this time, likely because of social and political reasons it eventually did in 2001.
the planning, research and regulatory body to organize the other government agencies in Aqaba. The ARA’s power kept growing and it eventually became responsible for all infrastructure work in the city of Aqaba. The ARA was a pilot project for regional planning in Jordan and the Jordan Valley Authority (JVA) and the Petra Development and Tourism Regional Authority (PDTRA) are both modeled on the ARA format (Interview with Aqaba Regional Authority Director in 2010).
Aqaba was designated as a governate in 1990, which resulted in several governmental departments offices opening branches in the small city. The three key government agencies shaping Aqaba now included the ARA, the city municipality, and the Aqaba municipality, with the ARA having legislative and administrative authority over the other two. This inevitably resulted in confusion and antagonism between the agencies. For example, the governor of Aqaba technically controlled all government institutions and agencies in Aqaba, but according to the ARA law, the governor was just a member of the Authority board, chaired by the president of the ARA. However, the ARA did not have authority over the other central government agencies located in the city. This resulted in chaos as well, as they reported all their activities and projects to their respective headquarters in Amman.
Soon, studies began to be undertaken looking at how to better transform
Aqaba and make better use of its strategic location. One such study, completed in 1994 by Jordan’s Royal Scientific Society (RSS), suggested that Aqaba region not be made into one large free zone but rather that multiple zones be established
throughout the area and only encompass 60 sq kms. However, this plan was forgotten with the signing of the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel later that
same year. This peace treaty brought Aqaba to the forefront as it was seen as an ideal location to develop a hub for regional economic cooperation, specifically through the Jordan Valley Rift (JVR), a tri-‐lateral initiative between the United States of America, Jordan, and Israel designed to integrate infrastructure and services as a means of promoting private sector investment, and the Taba-‐Eilat-‐Aqaba Macro (TEAM) zone.
The TEAM zone, supported by the European Union, had a goal of preparing the Taba-‐Eilat-‐Aqaba area for local and foreign public and private investments, with a focus on tourism development. Initial projections suggested that close to $5 billion USD over a fifteen-‐year period was anticipated. Proposed projects included a free zone for tourists, an underwater coral reef park, harbours for yachts and cruise ships, along with creating a ‘Red Sea Riviera’. Unfortunately, the second half of the 1990s turned out to not be one of economic prosperity. Coupled with Benjamin Netanyahu’s government in Israel coming to power in 1996, which resulted in the collapse of the young peace treaty and brought regional cooperation to a near halt (al-‐Khouri 2002). Once again ideas about developing Aqaba, without input from Egypt or Israel, became the goal of Jordan. Studies got underway exploring possibilities for both light and heavy industry by 1997. These studies soon
illustrated that the impact from these activities were limited, especially in terms of employment opportunities and so the government began to look for a more
aggressive model for the city and its surroundings.