3. However, because their theoretic constructs are generally more permeable than those of the natural sciences, disciplines in the social sciences and humanities ought to be more amenable to interaction with one another. The implications of a weaker disciplinary self-confidence on interdisciplinary research are,
however, unpredictable. Individuals in disciplines with a weaker status might, for instance, be prepared to yoke themselves together conceptually and methodologically in order to present a false united front to outsiders (Schoenberger, 2001); in effect making their discipline less permeable. Others, though, might be encouraged to seek collaborative relationships (Rowland, 2002). The latter is more likely in those disciplines that regard themselves as ‘synoptic’: those that because of their internal diversity are peculiarly open to other disciplines. While all disciplines import aspects of other fields to clarify their own perspectives some are particularly open to other disciplines.
Education, for example, is a net importer of theory: ‘…the domain has a rather startling trade deficit. One rarely encounters the insights of educators or educational researchers in academic literatures outside the field’ (Davis
& Sumara, 2006, p.165). Anthropologists, sociologists and historians, too, frequently become ‘licensed rustlers’ who poach stock and purloin crops from neighbours (Becher & Trowler, 2001, p.45). They also poach and purloin from each other. In the 1980s there was recurring concern by some historians that the influence of social anthropology and sociology, by emphasising the importance of the ‘hidden’ and ‘underlying’ above the observable, was leading the discipline astray (Peck MacDonald, 1994, p.83). This was countered, however, by the argument that these influences were a natural function of history’s significant internal interdisciplinarity:
…there is no exclusive preferred form for the writing of history and…no single group in history and no one aspect of the past—the social, the political, the cul-tural, the economic—is inherently more important, or more essential, or more relevant than others.
(Levine, 1993, p.12)
4. Disciplines like history, anthropology, sociology and geography can be regarded as ‘synoptic’ because of the comprehensive nature of their areas of investigation.
Other disciplines, such as computer studies, physics and mathematics, might also be regarded as such because they incorporate ‘languages of concordance’ that enable them to ‘harmonise their endeavours’ between each other (Thompson Klein, 1994). Even theoretic contiguity between individuals within separate disciplines might serve to make disciplines ‘synoptic’. It could, for example, be argued that a Marxist economist and a Marxist literary theorist have more in common than a Marxist economist and a neo-classical economist (Rowland, 2002). The point is most disciplines encompass a diversity of research styles and epistemological characteristics and the discourse communities in which academics function are frequently more stable than the disciplines to which academics belong (Peck MacDonald, 1994). A mechanical engineer, for example, remarked: ‘I have more
in common with the mathematicians who study fluid mechanics than I have with other engineers who study combustion—though combustion is my main research topic’ (Becher & Trowler, 2001, p.65). From this perspective, therefore, distinctions between disciplines often reflect administrative convenience rather than issues of intellectual substance (Fiumara, 1995).
2.6 COMMuNICATING BETwEEN ASYMMETRIC DISCIpLINES
1. A discipline is a ‘community of practice’ in the sense that it consists of individuals who derive their academic identity from the practices they share with other individuals in that discipline. It is important to recognise, though, that communities of practice constitute a community not because every person in it believes the same thing. Working together creates differences as well as similarities. In fact rebellion as a form of participation ‘often reveals a greater commitment than does passive conformity’ (Wenger, 1998, p.77). What makes a community of practice a community are the resources it creates for negotiating communal meaning (Wenger, 1998). Thus, because a sense of self is not expressed by language but, instead, is created by language (Linn, 1996), the vocabulary and literature of a community of practice are central to its cultural identity.
A ‘community of interest’, on the other hand, involves members of separate
‘communities of practice’ coming together because of a shared interest. An interdisciplinary team or network is an example. The differences between the two types of communities explain why it is logical to expect that a ‘community of interest’ will confront greater communication problems than a ‘community of practice’ (Bowker & Star, 1999). Because shared synoptic elements imply some disciplines are more related than others (Gilbert, nd) it is also logical to expect that in such disciplines these common elements will come to the fore in interdisciplinary undertakings in which each is involved and thus facilitate communication between them. But, interdisciplinary challenges that involve disciplines with minimal overlap have greater disciplinary breadth. In cases where, for example, approaches premised on Critical Realism in the natural sciences need to be integrated with those premised on Constructivism in the social sciences, a common vocabulary will need to be developed if any meaningful communication is to take place (Gilbert, nd). But the possible rewards for such development are significant for the most valuable innovations in interdisciplinary work are often a consequence of the integration of distinct, strongly articulated perspectives (Rowland, 2006).
2. If disciplines reflect different cultures each with its own system of meaning, they must also reflect different kinds of thinking. This is why the language of another culture can be studied but, if one is not part of that culture, meaning
can be illusive (Schoenberger, 2001). For this reason the question becomes: ‘Is it possible to combine different kinds of thinking into one form of understanding?’
(Ceroni, 2006, p.129). Is it possible, in other words, that some disciplines are commensurable while others are not? Because some disciplines represent different systems of belief and because it is not possible to set aside ones beliefs in order to see the world through the eyes of an individual with another system of belief, the answer at first glance must be ‘yes’. But, belief systems are necessarily complex conceptual constructions some of which are more accessible than others and none of which can claim to be pure. For these reasons it can be argued that:
…alternative cultures are not to be thought of on the model of alternative geom-etries. Alternative geometries are irreconcilable because they have axiomatic structures, and contradictory axioms. They are designed to be irreconcilable. Cul-tures are not so designed, and do not have axiomatic strucCul-tures.
(Rorty cited in Rumana, 2000, p.79)
Because difference is not total, mutual understanding cannot be engulfed.
Religion and science, for example, might appear to be incommensurable but both, in fact, pursue the same quest, the quest for truth. They do, though, ask different questions. Science asks, ‘how’? Religion asks what is arguably the more interesting question, ‘why’? Thus, because truth claims cannot be vindicated by the nature of their relationship with a mind-independent reality (Rorty, 1999), the communicative task is to find resources in language to enable communication between individuals with fundamentally different schema.