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There are, however, a number of problems concerning phenomenalism that have led to its rejection. First, the language of sense data which describes the appearances one senses, or the way in which one is appeared to, leads to controversy. For example, Ayer suggested

-59-that some sense-data statements are incorrigible, ¹⁵ and we have considered the problems surrounding such a claim. Second, some philosophers doubt that the

required meaning analysis of statements about external objects in terms of sense-data statements can be effected. Chisholm, for example, has argued convincingly that no statement about an external object logically implies any statement about sense data or appearances and, therefore, that the meaning equivalence fails. ¹⁶ It is possible,

nevertheless, that the meaning of statements about external objects is exhausted by

the meaning of statements about sense data in the sense that the latter logically imply the former, though not vice versa. The exhibition of such logical implications would yield an important kind of reduction for foundationalism. If statements about sense data, even if not incorrigible, logically imply statements about external objects, even if not vice versa, then basic beliefs about sense data, if true, can logically guarantee the truth of nonbasic beliefs about external objects.

The appeal to analytically reductive theories to support foundationalism faces a decisive problem that can be illustrated by further consideration of phenomenalism.

Suppose we have a statement about an external object, E (for example, that there is a tomato in front of me) and we have a phenomenalistic analysis of E in sense-data language, consisting of a conjunction of sense-data statements S1, S2, and so forth, through Sn. For the sake of simplicity, let us refer to the statements expressing the contents of basic beliefs as basic statements and those statements expressing the content of nonbasic beliefs as nonbasic statements. Consider the statements S1, S2, and so forth, to Sn. Are these statements basic or nonbasic ones?

Some of the sense-data statements S1, S2, and so forth, to Sn which analyze or even logically imply the external object statement E must be nonbasic. We can illustrate this by appeal to the statement that there is a ripe tomato before me. Consider the sort of sense-data statements one might think are part of the analysis of this

statement. Some of these statements would be about what I am sensing at the

moment, for example, a reddish, roundish sense datum, and these might be basic, but they are not logically sufficient to analyze or imply logically that there is a ripe tomato before me. We would also require hypothetical, indeed, contrary-to-fact hypothetical, statements about what I would be sensing if I were to alter the circumstances, for example, by striking in the direction of the sense data with the intention of squishing the tomato. If such efforts produce no alteration, the sense data may be deceptive, the stuff of dreams and hallucinations, rather than those of a genuine ripe tomato.

In short, the hypothetical statements in question must articulate what sense data I would sense under various conditions if there were a ripe

-60-tomato before me, in order to yield the conclusion that there is a ripe -60-tomato before me. Some of these hypothetical statements must be nonbasic, because they would have to be justified by evidence, if they are justified at all. Many of them would be contrary to fact, asserting what one would sense if certain facts were other than they are. Belief in the truth of a contrary to fact conditional, if it is justified at all, is

justified on the basis of evidence. Therefore, the set of statements S1, S2, and so forth, to Sn of any plausible phenomenalistic analysis or reduction cannot all be self-justified basic beliefs about sense data. The upshot of this argument is that the sense-data statements S1, S2, and so forth, to Sn of any plausible phenomenalistic analysis or reduction of a statement E about an external object cannot all be basic. If not all the sense-data statements are basic, then the analysis or reduction does not provide us with a set of basic statements that guarantee the truth of a nonbasic statement.

The preceding argument can be extended to a variety of analytically reductive theories. Philosophers who have eschewed phenomenalism as unrealistic have often

embraced some other analytically reductive theory to sustain their own version of a foundation theory. For example, some philosophers of science have regarded

observation statements as basic and have proposed some reductive analysis of

generalizations and theories in terms of observation statements. It was once argued, for instance, that generalizations of the form 'Anything that is O1 is O2', where 'O1' and 'O2' are observation terms, may be analyzed as a conjunctive statement: If x1 is O1, then x1 is O2, and if x2 is O1, then x2 is O2, and so forth. Here the difficulty mentioned above becomes obvious. Since it is clear that not all the hypothetical statements are self-justified, at least some of them must be justified, if they are justified at all, as nonbasic beliefs, that is, their justification must be based on

evidence. The reason is that we shall not have observed every one of the objects x1, x2, and so forth, and, thus, even if we allow that beliefs in categorical observation statements are self-justified, not all the hypothetical statements in the analysis of the generalization are self-justified. Consequently, some of those beliefs will be nonbasic.

Hence, such a reductive analysis will not show how basic observation statements guarantee the truth of nonbasic generalizations. Similar remarks apply to reductive analyses of theoretical statements in terms of observation statements. Thus, reductive analysis, though motivated by foundationalism, fails to support it because the

reduction will leave us with a base of hypothetical statements in the preferred vocabulary of sense data or observation. These hypothetical statements will not,

however, supply us with a foundation. We will be justified in accepting them, if we are justified at all, only on the basis of evidence, and, therefore, they are nonbasic. The objective of reduction

-61-is to reduce nonbasic statements to a collection or conjunction of basic statements.

Reduction fails in this objective exactly because it leaves us with a set of different but equally nonbasic statements.

Summary

We have seen that the quest for infallible foundations is a failure. The attempt to find infallible basic beliefs that guarantee their own truth to serve as a foundation yielded the most meager results. Fallibility infects almost all our beliefs. The attempt to extend the guarantee of truth from basic to nonbasic beliefs by undertaking to reduce the content of the latter to the contents of collections or conjunctions of the former is equally unsuccessful. The reduction leaves us with different but equally nonbasic beliefs. The idea that we might construct or reconstruct the edifice of knowledge from a set of basic beliefs whose truth is guaranteed and which guarantee the truth of all the rest was of extraordinary importance in the theory of knowledge. Had it been successful, it would have provided us with a means of insuring the truth of what we accept. Like other philosophical traditions, it taught us something different from what was originally intended. The lesson is that we are fallible in what we believe and must proceed without any guarantee of our success. The quest for truth, if based on a foundation of self-justified beliefs, must be based on a fallible foundation.

Introduction to the Literature

There is an excellent discussion of foundationalism in John Pollock's Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, including, in Chapter 5, part 7, a defense of a kind of direct realism which resembles foundationalism though the foundational states are not beliefs. This view is an alternative to the kind of foundationalism discussed in this chapter. The traditional forms of foundationalism are exposited and defended by Panayot Butchvarov in The Concept of Knowledge, by Arthur Danto in Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge, Bertrand Russell in The Problems of Philosophy, and A. J.

Ayer in Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. Roderick Chisholm defended something akin to an infallible foundation theory in his early work, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. See also Carl Ginet Knowledge, Perception, and Memory, and Paul Moser Empirical Justification.

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Fallible Foundations

THE PRECEDING CHAPTER has shown why a foundation theory of justification must subscribe to the doctrine that at least some basic beliefs are fallible, or else embrace skepticism. The number of infallible beliefs is far too restricted to support our

commonsense claims to knowledge. Foundationalism is the doctrine that self-justified beliefs constitute the foundation of knowledge. Can the edifice of knowledge be based on a foundation without a guarantee of truth? Is it tenable for the foundation theorist to allow that beliefs which are fallible, which may be false, are, nevertheless, basic and self-justified beliefs?

Let us consider the merits and shortcomings of a fallible foundationalism advocating that knowledge rests on fallible but self-justified beliefs. Thomas Reid claimed that some beliefs, for example, perceptual beliefs concerning what we see immediately before us, are justified in themselves without need of supporting arguments, even though we have no guarantee that they are true. In short, such beliefs are self-justified because their justification is inherent. As Reid put it, they are beliefs of

commonsense which have a right of ancient possession and, until this inherent right is successfully challenged, they remain justified without support from any other beliefs. ¹ Reid hit upon a critically important line of defense for the fallible foundation theory.

According to him, some beliefs are worthy of our trust even if we have no guarantee that they are true much in the way in which an experienced guide is worthy of our trust, even though we have no guarantee she will bring us to our destination. Though we remain vigilant to detect errors, we may, in the customary affairs of life, rely upon the intrinsic justification that attaches as a birthright to various of our beliefs. They are completely justified in themselves without

-63-appeal to independent information. If this doctrine proves tenable, it could provide us with a set of basic but fallible beliefs. The rights of birth and ancient possession have,

however, been challenged in the political sphere, and we must bring them under close scrutiny here as well.