RESULTADOS DEL MODELO

Furthermore, Type 2 processing is ruled-based because it operates on symbolic structures. Its computations have the properties that are normally assigned to rules, which Sloman (1996) describes as abstractions that apply to any problem that has a certain well-specified symbolic structure. Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011) explain that the rule concept indicates an if-then relationship of if (cue) and then (judgement). Rule-based reasoning tries to describe the world by utilizing logical, hierarchical, and causal-mechanical structures (Sloman, 1996) and therefore can compare objects on several attributes, and make deliberate choices between options (J. Evans, 2008). Sloman (1996) further claims that apart from their logical structures, rules possess a set of variables, which can be instantiated in more than one way. As these variables assume a class of possible values, they are necessarily abstract. In other words, rules are often content independent (Sloman, 1996) and therefore rule-based reasoning possesses

18 abstract characteristics and operates in an impersonal and decontextualized way, obeying logic (Verschueren, Schaeken, & d'Ydewalle, 2005).

Unlike Type 2, Type 1 processing is believed to be contextualized and domain-specific. Klaczynski and Lavallee (2005) and Stanovich (1999) observe that people tend to rapidly contextualize problems with their prior knowledge and beliefs. Verschueren et al. (2005) draw similar conclusions, stating that heuristic processing operates on contextualised representations. Therefore, Type 1 is rather personal as it takes individual goals into account. Belief-based heuristic reasoning is used as a default and, in order to overcome it, abstract (decontextualized) and domain general Type 2 processing needs to be activated. Stanovich (1999) shares this view and claims that the ability to decontextualize information is a good predictor of using Type 2 processing. People with higher ability to decontextualize are able to go beyond the context and think abstractly. They are less likely to be lured by heuristics or syllogistic thinking. People with lower ability to decontextualize information tend primarily to use cues derived from the content itself, such as believability of conclusions.

However, more contemporary works have revised this initial view on the abstractedness of Type 2 processing. In a more recent debate on the dual-process cognition, J. Evans and Stanovich (2013) argue that Type 2 thinking is not context-free and abstract, as the literature on the topic provides examples where both Type 1 and Type 2 processing are content dependent (e.g. see J. Evans, Handley, & Harper, 2001; Verschueren et al., 2005; Weidenfeld, Oberauer, & Hörnig, 2005), but the latter in a different way (prior knowledge affects both types of processing in qualitatively different ways; J. Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Therefore, J. Evans and Stanovich (2013) argue that decontextualisation is not a defining feature of the Type 2 processing but only a correlate.

Sloman (1996, 2002) speculates that one of the most salient features of Type 1 processing is its associative character, which distinguishes it from the rule-based Type 2 processing. Smith and DeCoster (2000) explain the term associative as “a learned connection between two items or concepts” (p. 113). In associative processing, objects are treated in a similar manner, so they are perceived as similar (J. A. Anderson, Gately, Penz, & Collins, 1990). Such processing operates reflexively and draws inferences from its environment by using similarities between problem elements (Sloman, 1996). It interprets cognition problems using aspects of general

19 knowledge, such as images and stereotypes and is able to divide perceptions into reasonable clusters on the basis of (quasi)statistical consistencies.

Theorists and practitioners investigating consumer behaviour are familiar with the existence of rules and associations in people’s shopping behaviour. Inconsistency between rules and associations is believed to be one of the primary sources of conflicts within and between individuals and these conflicts dominate much of consumers’ choice behaviour (Sloman, 1996). Consumers often have to choose between products that are brought to mind as an effect of strong associations (due to, e.g. vivid advertising or a brand’s market longevity) and products whose value can be rationally justified. Likewise, consumers often choose between brand names they are familiar with and more generic products, which sometimes have identical or better-quality ingredients and lower price (Sloman, 1996). The importance of associations in consumer decision making will be discussed in Chapter 3. Concerning the present research, it is likely to be the case that consumers purchase products endorsed by ethical logos due to their positive associations with the concepts represented by the logos, without much consideration of these logos. However, it would be interesting to see whether consumer preferences for the endorsed products can be enhanced if they are encouraged to consider the logos in a more thoughtful way that goes beyond simple associationistic connections.

Not all dual-process theorists agree on the clear distinction between associative characteristics of Type 1 processing as opposed to rule-based Type 2 processing. Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011) argue that both intuitive and deliberative judgments are rule-based and that the very same rules can underlie both types of judgments (see further discussion). Also, the ambiguity of Type 1 reasoning and the concept of multiple systems of implicit processes (discussed earlier) cause much doubt. This may be the reason why Chen and Chaiken (1999) and J. Evans (2006) prefer to talk about heuristic (rather than associative) vs analytic or systematic (rather than rule-based) processing. Similarly, Tversky and Kahneman seem to prefer this terminology as they devoted most of their academic lives to examining how heuristics affect people’s judgements and decision making (e.g. see Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 1974, 1984).

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