RESULTADOS OBTENIDOS EN LA ENCUESTA CERRADA, APLICADA A

This decision was quickly exposed as shortsighted. In April 1974, a group of Portuguese military officers, backed by a mass Left-wing movement, overthrew the dictatorial Caetano regime. Bloody and futile wars being fought against national

88

‘Document 222, Commonwealth Government to Addison, 28 August 1945,’ in Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49: Volume VIII: 1945, ed. W.J. Hudson and Wendy Way, Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1989.

89

Ibid.

90

‘Document 231, Commonwealth Government to Addison, 3 September 1945,’ in Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49: Volume VIII: 1945, ed. W.J. Hudson and Wendy Way, Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1989.

91

‘Document 225, Addison to Commonwealth Government, 30 August 1945,’ in Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49: Volume VIII: 1945, ed. W.J. Hudson and Wendy Way, Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1989; ‘Document 234, Addison to Commonwealth

Government, 30 August 1945,’ in Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49: Volume VIII: 1945, ed. W.J. Hudson and Wendy Way, Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1989; Hastings, ‘Timor - some Australian attitudes, 1941-1950,’ p. 47.

92

Hastings, ‘Timor - some Australian attitudes, 1941-1950,’ pp. 49-51.

93

Although there was a flurry of interest from Australian officials in the mid 1960s. See Wendy Way,

Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974-1976, Carlton South, Melbourne University Press, 2000, pp. 22-43.

94

liberation movements in Portugal’s African colonies were a major source of discontent with the dictatorship. As such, the new regime moved rapidly to divest itself of the empire, including East Timor.95

There had been sporadic outbursts of armed resistance to Portugal’s rule in Timor throughout the colony’s existence. But these were generally localised revolts led by one or another of East Timor’s traditional ‘kings’, the liurais, rather than anything resembling a modern nationalist movement.96 An exception to this was a revolt in 1959 in the Viqueque region, which was at least partly inspired by a group of Indonesians who had been involved in the ‘Permesta’ rebellion against the Sukarno government, and who had been granted asylum in the area. The long term impact of these episodic revolts was to provide an inspiring precedent, rather than any ongoing organisation or political tradition.97

By 1974, there was a recognisable nationalist sentiment among a handful of young, educated members of the Timorese elite. But their activities before Caetano’s downfall were restricted to informal discussions about the territory’s future, and the publication of articles in East Timor’s limited, and heavily censored, press.98

Nonetheless, the new Portuguese regime’s promise that East Timor would be granted self-determination was greeted enthusiastically. Within a few weeks, several new political organisations were formed. All were created by members of the educated elite, but they differed in political outlook, and their attitude towards East Timor’s future.99

The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT in its Portuguese initials) was initially the most prominent party. It drew support from the more prosperous Timorese

landholders and officials. The UDT came to favour a gradual approach to self- determination, advocating a lengthy federation with Portugal before eventual

95

For an account of the popular movement which goes beyond the normal view of a simple military coup, see Peter Robinson, ‘Portugal 1974-75: Popular Power,’ in Revolutionary rehearsals, ed. Colin Barker, Chicago, Haymarket Books, 2002.

96

Although they sometimes involved wider coalitions of liurais and threatened to end Portuguese rule, especially the revolt of 1887-1912, led by Dom Boaventura. See Helen Hill, Stirrings of nationalism in East Timor: Fretilin 1974-78, Sydney, Otford Press, 2002, pp. 42-43.

97

Dunn, East Timor: A rough passage to independence, 15-17, 27-28; Hill, Stirrings of nationalism, pp. 42-43; Jill Jolliffe, East Timor: Nationalism and colonialism, St Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 1978, 21-39, 48-50.

98

Hill, Stirrings of nationalism, pp. 52-53; Jolliffe, East Timor, pp. 55-57.

99

Accounts of the parties can be found in Dunn, East Timor: A rough passage to independence, pp. 47-62; Jolliffe, East Timor, pp. 61-91.

independence. The UDT’s main rival was the more Left-wing Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT), which gave rise to Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) in September. The third major party, although lagging far behind Fretilin and the UDT in popular support, was Apodeti (Timorese Popular Democratic Association). They openly called for integration with

Indonesia.100

The ideology and social basis of Fretilin is worth considering in more detail.101 They adopted a broadly Left-populist political ideology, emphasising the role of the peasantry and calling for complete independence, although only after a transitional period lasting years. This helped them establish a far greater popular following among the peasantry than the UDT, and they built up a mass organisation at the village level. Crucially, Fretilin also began to attract support from Timorese personnel in the Portuguese army, especially those who had served in Africa. However, various claims that Fretilin were Communists, especially from Indonesia and the UDT, were overstated. The party encompassed a range of political views, but even those on the Left wing were more moderate than their opponents suggested.102 Over time the party’s Left wing did gain the ascendancy though, as a lack of support from Portugal and conflict with both Indonesia and the UDT lent credence to more radical strategies.103

Their ideological differences not withstanding, the UDT and Fretilin initially shared much common ground. Both were opposed to integration with Indonesia, and both were prepared to be flexible over the timing and details of separation from Portugal. In January 1975 the two parties formed a coalition, demanding a transitional

government of three to eight years before independence.104 Formal talks with Portugal on the arrangements for decolonisation began in May. By then, however, there were increasing tensions between the UDT and Fretilin, and even physical clashes between their supporters. In late May, the coalition disintegrated. On August

100

Two other parties, Kota and Trabhalista, attracted only nominal support. Another short lived group proposed integration with Australia, but this possibility was quickly quashed by Canberra. See Dunn,

East Timor: A rough passage to independence, pp.61-62.

101

The definitive study of Fretilin’s formative period is Hill, Stirrings of nationalism.

102

For a detailed account of Fretilin’s ideology and program in this period, see Ibid., pp. 70-94.

103

Dunn, East Timor: A rough passage to independence, pp. 55-56, 228-238; Jolliffe, East Timor, pp. 152-154, 199-200.

104

On this phase of decolonisation, see Dunn, East Timor: A rough passage to independence, pp. 64- 65, 77-83, 139-142; Jolliffe, East Timor, pp. 92-119.

11th the UDT launched a coup, starting a brief civil war between UDT and Fretilin forces.105

Most of Fretilin’s leadership, including a number of military veterans, escaped the coup in Dili. Their party was better organised and enjoyed more popular support than the UDT, and crucially they won over the bulk of the Timorese in the Portuguese army. Fretilin counter-attacked immediately, taking control of the capital by the end of August. Having captured the substantial Portuguese arsenal, Fretilin’s forces quickly drove the UDT towards the West Timor border, along with supporters of Apodeti and other groups. These groups retreated into Indonesia in late September, after being compelled to pledge their future allegiance to the integration cause. The Portuguese authorities withdrew to Atauro island off Dili. Fretilin therefore set about establishing a provisional administration, while requesting that the Portuguese authorities return and fulfill the obligations of decolonisation.106 As signs of

Fretilin’s goodwill, the Portuguese flag continued to fly throughout the territory, the governor’s residence and office stood empty, and the cash reserves in the Portuguese bank were untouched. But discussions on the resumption of Portuguese authority made little progress. Even before the coup, the Portuguese government seems to have decided to leave Timor sooner rather than later, no matter the ramifications for self- determination. Although opposed to Indonesia’s use of force, they offered no practical solutions to the territory’s problems.107 Moreover, they had already privately informed Jakarta that they ‘accepted that the easiest outcome was incorporation into Indonesia through an internationally acceptable act of self-

determination.’108 Divided amongst themselves due to domestic political turmoil, the Portuguese became little more than spectators as others decided East Timor’s future.

The Indonesian invasion of East Timor

Long before any of this, however, Indonesia had already decisively intervened in East Timor’s decolonisation. In October 1974 the Indonesian military launched a campaign aimed at destabilising the territory, and ultimately at incorporating it into

105

For accounts of the conflict, see Dunn, East Timor: A rough passage to independence, pp. 139- 172; Jolliffe, East Timor, pp. 120-152.

106

For detailed accounts, see Dunn, East Timor: A rough passage to independence, pp. 175-192; Jolliffe, East Timor, pp. 144-165.

107

See Paulo Gorjao, ‘The end of a cycle: Australian and Portuguese foreign policies and the fate of East Timor,’ Contemporary Southeast Asia 23, no. Apr (2001), pp. 103-106.

108

Indonesia. Decolonisation may not have proceeded peacefully even without this interference, but the East Timorese were never given the opportunity to resolve their own differences. Yet the assertion that Indonesia’s interventions were aimed only at solving existing problems is sill common. For example, Woolcott, the Australian ambassador to Indonesia at the time, has argued that

While the use of force by Indonesia cannot be condoned, the abandonment of the colony by Portugal in August 1975, the outbreak of civil war and

Fretilin’s unilateral declaration of independence in November established the conditions in which the invasion took place.109

Former Australian Prime Minister Keating claims that

Civil war had broken out between local groups who wanted independence and others who favoured integration with Indonesia and were supported by Jakarta. The main pro-independence group, Fretelin [sic], was tied up with the Portuguese Communist Party.110

By shifting the blame away from Indonesia, such accounts seek to exonerate Australia from its own support for the invasion.111

Indonesia’s campaign to incorporate East Timor, codenamed ‘Operation Komodo’, began in October 1974, although it did not gather momentum until early 1975.112 Initially the campaign was one of propaganda, rather than military intervention. Indonesia was aided by Apodeti, which in return for financial backing became Jakarta’s mouthpiece. Indonesia also broadcast radio propaganda from West Timor, and spread undercover agents throughout the territory. Realising that Apodeti had little popular support, Indonesia focused on destabilising East Timor by creating conflict between the parties opposed to integration. They denounced Fretilin as being

109

Richard Woolcott, The hot seat: Reflections on diplomacy from Stalin’s death to the Bali bombings, Sydney, Harper Collins, 2003, p. 156.

110

Keating, Engagement, p. 128.

111

It was a tactic Whitlam also used at the time, for example see ‘Document 191, Cablegram to Jakarta, Lisbon and New York, 27 August 1975,’ in Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974-1976, ed. Wendy Way, Carlton South, Melbourne University Press, 2000.

For further post-facto examples see East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian policy challenge, Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001, pp. 10-11; J. Mackie, ‘Australia and Indonesia,’ Australian Journal of International Affairs 55, no. 1 (2001), pp. 34-35; Whitlam,

Abiding interests, p. 74.

112

On Indonesia’s propaganda activities, see Desmond Ball and Hamish McDonald, Death in Balibo lies in Canberra, St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 2000, pp. 12-19; Dunn, East Timor: A rough passage to independence, pp. 94-101.

Communist, and claimed that they had massacred Apodeti members and that Chinese Communist forces were in the territory. At the same time, Indonesia impressed on the other political groups, in particular the UDT, that they would not tolerate a Communist aligned East Timor. Early in August, they told the UDT that Fretilin was planning a coup, and that Indonesia would respond by invading. This could not but encourage the UDT to take what it saw as pre-emptive action against their Left-wing rivals.113 As Dunn writes,

There is no evidence that the Indonesians were directly involved in the planning of the UDT move, but it was clearly the desired outcome of Indonesian meddling and subversion… Operasi Komodo sought to exploit and magnify out of all proportion political differences common to most decolonisations, including the experience of Indonesia.114

Indonesia took Fretilin’s victory as an opportunity to shift from propaganda to military intervention. Initially this action remained covert. Apodeti and UDT troops were used as cover for Indonesian troops to penetrate East Timor from the western part of the island.115 On October 7th they captured Batugade, close to the border. Despite increasingly stiff resistance from Falintil (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor), Fretilin’s military wing, Indonesia gradually gained territory near the border. On October 16th Indonesian forces attacked and captured the town of Balibo, resulting in the deaths of five journalists working for Australian television news services (known as the Balibo Five). While the precise details of their deaths remain uncertain, it seems most likely that the journalists were deliberately killed by Indonesian soldiers.116 The regional capital of Maliana was captured at the same time. From mid November Atabae, well into East Timor, was bombarded by air and sea. On the morning of November 28th, the town fell to the Indonesians.117

It was now clear that Indonesia intended to incorporate East Timor by force, but Fretilin’s calls for international assistance went unheeded. In response, they decided

113

Dunn, East Timor: A rough passage to independence, pp. 140-142.

114

Ibid., pp. 100-101.

115

See Ibid., pp. 195-217; Jolliffe, East Timor, pp. 164-177.

116

The most detailed discussion of the events is Ball and McDonald, Death in Balibo, especially pp. 100-113.

117

to abandon their policy of recognising Portugal’s continued sovereignty.118 In a hasty ceremony in Dili on November 28th, Fretilin President Xavier do Amaral unilaterally declared the independence of the Democratic Republic of East Timor. In part,

Fretilin hoped that declaring independence might give them some status in the international arena. Perhaps more importantly, the declaration was intended as a rallying point for resistance by the East Timorese people. One Fretilin leader stated ‘It is not that we want to be independent yet, or that we are ready for it. But if we are going to fight to the end, we can at least die independent.’119

Indonesia, however, used the declaration as an excuse to launch an outright invasion of East Timor. On December 7th Indonesian forces landed in Dili. Up to 2000 civilians were murdered over the next several days, including hundreds of the city’s Chinese population, as well as Australian journalist Roger East. Even some Apodeti supporters were killed.120 This was just the beginning of East Timor’s suffering. It has been estimated that by 1980 as many as 200,000 East Timorese, or over one quarter of the population, had died as a result of Indonesia’s invasion, mainly due to starvation and disease.121

But resistance to the invasion was far stronger than Indonesia expected. Fretilin retreated into the formidable mountains which cover most of East Timor, where they had already stockpiled supplies.122 Falintil inflicted heavy casualties on Indonesia’s troops, and after a few month the latter’s offensive had stalled. Even at the end of 1976 Fretilin was in control of most of the interior, although Indonesia held the towns and villages. Large numbers of civilians retreated along with Falintil and Fretilin’s leadership, and a functioning national administration was established. However, in early 1977 Indonesia launched a massive new offensive. Suffering from continual aerial bombardment and a severe lack of food, by 1978 most of the civilian population had been forced to return to Indonesian held territory. In December 1978

118

See Dunn, East Timor: A rough passage to independence, pp. 229-235; Jolliffe, East Timor, pp. 210-217.

119

Cited in Dunn, East Timor: A rough passage to independence, p. 234.

120 Ibid., pp. 243-249. 121 Ibid., pp. 277-278. 122 Ibid., pp. 232, 251-253, 263-276.

the East Timorese president, Nicolau Lobato, was killed.123 Mere survival became the priority for Falintil and Fretilin for the next several years.