LOS RESULTADOS DE LAS POLÍTICAS Y LA CRISIS DE LA

Matar (2005, 2008), who has extensively researched Nasrallah’s charisma, observes that Nasrallah’s public persona is constructed based on his religious attributes and oratorical skills. These two dimensions allow Nasrallah to adapt his public image and rhetoric to specific political contexts. In her view, Nasrallah’s discourse integrates contemporary events with historical and cultural signifiers that resonate with a broad spectrum of the Lebanese audience. Matar (2015) argues that Nasrallah mixes frames of suffering and redemption with resistance, struggle and promises for divine rewards. According to Matar, Nasrallah mixes two basic frames. The first is a religious frame that appeals to the wider Muslim community, invoked through the use of religious terms, such as jihad, martyrdom and the divine promise. The second is an Arab nationalist frame, invoked through terms like ‘muqawama’(resistance) and ‘oppressed’ (see Chapter 1, section 3) in order to appeal to a pan-Arab community.

The different approaches to the notion of charisma outlined above can enrich the analysis of Nasrallah’s charisma. For example, Nasrallah can be shown to fit Weber’s notion of charisma in at least the following ways. First, where Weber emphasises the divine origin of a charismatic personality, Nasrallah is a highly regarded religious scholar who is believed to be a descendant of the Prophet. Such a view might partially explain the ensuing obligations and duties imputed on followers (the 8th of March audience).

Consequently, Nasrallah’s words and commands are taken, by followers, as undisputable, unnegotiable and beyond any doubt, thus his followers tend to be less vigilant (see

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Chapter 3, section 6.3.3).17 Second, where Weber focuses on the influence of social factors on a charismatic personality, few studies have examined the effects of Nasrallah’s upbringing, social class and schooling etc. on shaping and refining his charismatic

personality (see Matar, 2008, 2014, 2015; Thiel, n.d.). Such an analysis might explain Nasrallah’s constant endeavour to portray himself as an ordinary man who has passed through hardships and is thus able to articulate people’s grievances. This suggests that Nasrallah’s charisma fits the different personality traits proposed by Eatwell (see section 3.1).

Nasrallah’s charisma can also be shown to fit the culturalist approach. Nasrallah’s salvation narratives are constructed around a moral argument (Houri, 2012), the

components of which revolve around the values of resistance, pride, justice and liberty, i.e. the components of Hizbollah’s national identity (see Chapter 1, sections 3, 4). Indeed, Nasrallah’s charisma is predicated on the “manufactured fear and hatred of a purportedly evil adversary, the state of Israel, and Nasrallah’s associated narrative frame of salvation” (Thiel, n.d., p. 1).18 The above discussion, related to the different characteristics and dimensions of a charismatic personality, points to an important implication, i.e. audiences seem to be persuaded by charismatic leaders.

17_{This might explain, at least partially, how violent actions taken against Nasrallah’s opponents and their}

supporters are accepted by Nasrallah’s followers and sympathisers. Due to the fact that they take his words on trust, they tend to be less vigilant. However, this research is interested in the relation between charisma and its effects on opponent audiences’ epistemic defences (see Chapter 3, section 6.3.3).

18_{Many researchers identify the evil ‘Other’ in Nasrallah’s discourse as the Israeli enemy. However, recent}

studies hint at a change in the identity of Nasrallah’s enemy (Høigilt, 2007; Khatib, 2014) (see Chapter 1, section 5).

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It is pertinent at this stage to elaborate on the data, as these form the basis for testing the thesis hypotheses and via which I further investigate the link between charisma and the promotion of nationalist or populist identities. Thus, the following section outlines the steps for data selection.

5.Data

Nasrallah’s speeches, from 2000 onwards, are all available on Hezbollah’s official website: www.mediarelations-lb.org. The speeches are classified based on the occasion on which they were delivered. For example, there are speeches to commemorate

‘Martyrs’ Day’, ‘Jerusalem International Day’, ‘2000 Liberation’, ‘August 2006 Victory’ and the commemoration of ‘Hezbollah leaders’. There are also speeches given primarily on religious occasions like Ashura. The speeches analysed in this thesis are retrieved from the sections that are labelled ‘General Speeches’ and ‘July 2006 War Speeches’. Within these two categories, the data are further downsized to those which are delivered at times of heightened political controversy between 2006 and 2014.

More specifically, the data are collected from speeches delivered by Nasrallah as an attempt to restore the legitimacy of controversial past actions and decisions. In total, there are six speeches in which Nasrallah attempts to justify already taken political actions or decisions.19 Four of these are selected for detailed, qualitative analysis. These four are selected because Nasrallah’s speeches are relatively long. The topics of the four speeches and the word count of the original Arabic versions are presented in Table 2.1, below:

19_{The speeches are conveyed via video-conferencing to ensure interaction with the audience who gather in}

advance in designated areas to watch Nasrallah. Moreover, the speeches are broadcasted on all Lebanese TV channels to ensure that a wider audience receives the message.

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Date Topic of Speech/Occasion Word Count

25/7/2006 Israeli war 1,982

7/12/2006 Protests against Siniora’s government 4,904

15/5/2009 Invasion of Beirut 5,444

16/1/2011 Resignation of pro-Hizbollah ministers 6,022 Total: 18,352

The transcripts of the Arabic versions are available on Hizbollah’s official website

(mentioned above) and can be easily retrieved. The English versions of the speeches, with the exception of the first speech which can be downloaded from

http://www.musicman.com/00pic/nasrallaha.html, are available on Hizbollah’s English official website: www.english.alahednews.com.lb. However, the translations are of poor quality. This is because English, in Hizbollah’s view, is the language of the imperialist enemy, i.e. the US. Therefore, I have made some changes to the original translations, such as making scrambled sentences comprehensible, adding missing verbs, nouns or phrases and so on.

I am quite aware that the critical stance I am taking in approaching Nasrallah’s speeches might influence my interpretation and translation. However, I have tried to minimize this risk by providing literal translation as much as possible and consulting online newspapers that affiliate with different sides of the struggle. Consulting an archive for online

newspapers provided the political context specific to each speech, and based on which the analysis is conducted. The online newspapers consulted are: Almustaqbal (affiliates with

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the 14th of March party), Alakhbar (affiliates with the 8th of March party) and Alanwar (an independent one).