RESULTADOS PRELIMINARES

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if this is so, then, we are not allowed, after all, to say th at our intuition is 'd ep en d en t u p o n the existence of the object', as the above quotation states so clearly. To say that our intuition is d ep en d en t u pon the existence of the object is to m ake the form er som ehow d ependent u p o n being related to the latter.

It could be said th at this difficulty stem s from th e conflation be­ tw een form of intuition and form al intuition. The latter is a determ inate or particular intuition of an object, e.g., the intuition of a triangle. The form er is the m an n er by w hich we are given objects in sensibility or, as AUison says, the "m anner of intuiting" So, the objection goes, the "form al in tu ­ ition" alone stands in im m ediate relation to a particular object (of p u re in­ tuition, e.g., a m athem atical object). If this is granted, w e m ay be inclined to say th at space and time consist in the m anner w hereby we grasp m ind independent, external objects, i.e., th at space an d tim e consist in the form whereby objects distinct from us or our thoughts show u p w ithin our expe­ riential horizon.^® H ow ever, in the passage q u o ted above, K ant clearly states th at the mode o f intuition its e lf is possible only insofar as w e are af­

fected by the o b ject In Kemp Sm ith's terms, it is our w ay of sensing th at "is

dependent u p o n given m atter" So, it seems th at not only the formal in tu ­ ition b u t also the form of intuition stand in causal connection w ith aUeged m ind independent objects. In this way, the distinction betw een form al in tu ­ ition and form of intuition is not of m uch value for us. We still have to de­ term ine w hat it is th at causes us to intuit things spatiaUy (and temporaUy), i.e., w hat it is th at our m ode of intuition is d e p en d e n t u p o n and, at the same time, w hat it is that is m ind independent.

It should be noticed that w e are not here urging K ant to d eterm in e

w h y space and tim e are our forms of intuitions. If this w ere the question,

there w ould be no difficulty circum venting it. K ant says th at such a ques-

cf. Allison 1983, p. 97. Allison also detects another sense of the expression “form o f intuition” in Kant, namely, the form, “or essential structure, of that which is intuited". For my purposes, though, I shall omit this latter sense,

cf. Lipson 1992, p. 85. Smith 1984, p. 109.

tion "transcends all the pow ers of our reason". There is no p o in t in asking w hy we are given "intuition in space only an d n o t some other m ode of in­ t u i t i o n " . O u r question, though, is rather ivh a t is the cause of ou r m ode of intuition. If we cannot establish w h at this so m eth in g is like, w e shall not be able, as Kant expects, to claim that, by lim iting the ideahty of the exter­ nal w orld to its form, w e are entitled to estabhsh its em pirical reahty or its m ind independence.^^ That is to say, we shall not be able to get empirical realism by assum ing transcendental ideahsm . In th at case, the very id ea th at space and time are forms of intuition wiU become useless in our quar­ rel against the sceptic. The transcendental idealist account by w hich we can properly characterise the m ind independence of the external w orld wih be acknow ledged as untenable.

One m ight say th at w e are being a bit too h arsh w ith Kant. In fact, the reply goes, we do n o t need to know w h at the affecting object of intu­ ition is hke. It suffices to acknowledge the intuitive and passive characters of ou r sensibihty in order to ascertain the existence of som ething outside us, and hence distinct from our thoughts. H ow ever, we are worse-off w ith­ o u t a p ro p er account of such a thing. The sceptic can assert that, not know ­ ing w hat it is th at is m ind independent, we can never be sure that our view of externahty is the case. It m ay w ell be th at the m ind in d ep en d en t w orld is not as we represent it. That is to say, we can be m istaken w ith respect to w h at the external w orld is hke. A nd if this is the case, ou r know ledge claims will lack a p ro p er justification.

In view of this, let us consider some candidates for playing the role of this affecting object. First of all, it cannot be the em pirical object. We have seen that, according to Kant, our conception of such an object already presupposes space and time. We cannot m ake use of the notion of empiri­ cal object as the cause of our m ode of intuition for the sim ple reason th at

cf. B 585.

Recall that, as shown in chapter 2, Kant’s critique of Berkeley brings up the assumption that only the form, not the matter, of empirical objects is (transcendentally) ideal.

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the form er requires the latter. Hence, to avoid a vicious circle, we m ust im­ pugn this candidate.

It m ight be objected th at this circle is only apparent. W hen we say th at the em pirical object is dependent u p o n ou r m ode of intuition, we use "dependence" here on the transcendental level, i.e., w e state that such an object is an item to be found w ithin the experiential realm. So, the objec­ tion goes, the circle w ould only hold if w e stated th at our m ode of in tu ­ ition is "transcendentally" dependent on the (empirical) object. This cannot be the case because, transcendentally speaking, the latter depends upon the former, i.e., the em pirical object is thought of, on the transcendental level, as d ependent upon us, or in connection w ith our capacities of know ledge. To h o ld th e o p p o site , i.e., to h o ld t h a t sp a c e a n d tim e are "transcendentally" dependent upon the empirical object, is to think of Kant as departing from the Copernican Revolution and as reinstating the object as the m aker of nature. Hence, there is no circle once we avoid characteris­ ing the notion of dependence in the quotation above on the transcendental level.

The problem w ith this objection, though, is th at it forces us to search for another sense w hereby our m ode of intuition is said to be dependent upon the em pirical object. If we are prohibited from interpreting the no­ tion of dependence in this context on the transcendental level, w h at is left is just the em pirical level. But to hold th a t o u r m ode of in tu itio n is "em pirically" d ep en d en t on the object is to hold th at space and time are (empirically) caused by the object. Now, this solution is unpalatable to a transcendental ideahst, for it turns him into a phenom enahst. Recall, the phenom enalist beHeves that space and time are picked u p from experience. For this reason, we have to take the statem ent "our m ode of intuition is de­ pendent upon the object' as a transcendental claim, which m eans that we go back to the place w here w e started, i.e., we bum p into the vicious circle again.

Let us now take account of another candidate for playing the role of the affecting object of intuition, namely, the thing in itself. But such a can­

didate will not do. The assum ption that the thing in itself is the ground of our representations has been already discarded in chapter 1. O n the one hand, Thing in itself' has to be view ed as just a negative notion, i.e., a no­ tion of w h at objects are not. The thing in itself cannot be thought of as an existent and ipso fa cto cannot stand in a causal connection w ith anything. O n the other hand, the assum ption th at the thing in itself is the cause of our representations w ould bring back the unpalatable notion of transcendental affection. Thus put, it is quite objectionable to claim, as Gram does, that the "no tio n of intuition adm its a perception of things in them selves b u t that such an adm ission is harm less" A s show n in chapter 1, the positive no­ tion of the thing in itself w ould leave open the possibility for the sceptic to challenge how we can establish a causal connection betw een the w orld as it appears and the reality in itself.

In this way, the weakness of the notion of a priori intuition seems to consist of the fact th at it carries w ith it the requirem ent of an affecting ob­ ject w hich is not hable to a p ro p er interpretation in transcendental idealist terms. Such a requirem ent generates philosophical com plications th at can­ not be disentangled w ithin K ant's epistemology. The notion of a priori in­ tuition does not allow us to say th at our know ledge of the w orld is indeed know ledge of objects distinct from our thoughts, or in space outside us. We thereby rem ain unable to characterise externality w ithin the experiential field. This is tantam ount to saying that transcendental idealism does not li­ cense us to be empirical realists after all.

Some in terp reters tend to dism iss the problem s just alluded to by contending th at we have not yet considered a third candidate to play the role of the affecting object of intuition, namely, the transcendental object.^^ The m ajor difficulty here, though, is to m ake sense of such a notion. K ant insists th at the transcendental object "cannot itself be intuited by us",^® so th at it m u st be considered as "unknow n".^^ From this it follows that the

^ cf. Gram 1984, p. 33, my italics, cf. Stem-Zweig 1981.

5 6 A 109; cf. B 522.