RESULTADOS DO PROGRAMA FORMATIVO: Os resultados de aprendizaxe correspóndense co nivel 4 do MECES. Os resultados dos indicadores do programa do

Marriage; Property Relations; Conjugal Property – All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged. [T]his presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.

SUSAN LIM-LUA, petitioner v. DANILO Y. LUA, respondent 697 SCRA 237, June 5, 2013

FACTS:

 On September 3, 2003, petitioner filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with herein respondent to the RTC. In her prayer for support pendent lite for herself and two children, petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as monthly support, citing huge respondent’s earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad. After due hearing, RTC cited article 203 of the family code, stating that support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand, and thus also granted support pendent lite of P250,000.00

25 | P a g e x7 corresponding to the 7 months that lapsed. Respondent file a motion for reconsideration asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well being in accordance with family’s social and financial standing.

 As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendent lite, as well as the P1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of the respondent. The respondent motion for reconsideration was denied. Respondent applied for second motion for reconsideration and having been denied for the second time respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the court of appeals. Court of Appeals nullified the RTC ruling and changed the amount to P115,000.00. the appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the expenses incurred by the respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses and the credit card purchases including groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother as well, and thus the amount of P3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two children. It is also noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support their children. Petitioner appealed.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the court of appeals erred in deducting the said amount from the current total support in arrears.

HELD:

 The supreme court declared that the petition is partly granted. As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other and shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. Such support in accordance with article 194 of the family code of the Philippines, comprises everything indispensable for the sustenance of the dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay the mother money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued instalments became judgment in favour, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by the respondent to be credited against the accrued support pendent lite. The amounts already extended to the 2 children, being commendable act of the petitioner, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources of his disposal.

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, petitioner, VS. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, REPRESENTED BY GREGORIO Z. LUNA AND EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, respondents.



G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014 FACTS:

 Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer up until his death, married Eugenia in 1947. Their marriage begot seven children, including Gregorio. After two decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and his wife agreed to live separately as husband and wife, and executed an Agreement For Separation and Property Settlement”

whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve their conjugal property. On January 2, 1076, Atty.

Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the Dominican Republic. On the same day, he married Soledad.

 In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with several other lawyers. The new law office thru Atty.

Luna obtained a condominium unit which they bought on an installment basis. After full payment, the

26 | P a g e condominium title was registered in the names of the lawyers with pro-indivisio shares. When the law office was dissolved, the condominium title was still registered in the names of the owners, with Atty.

Luna’s share fixed at 25/100. Atty. Luna established a new law firm with Atty. Dela Cruz. After Atty.

Luna’s death in 1997, his share in the condominium unit, his law books and furniture were taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first marriage. His 25/100 share in the condominium was also rented out to Atty.

DelaCruz.

 Soledad, the second wife, then filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty. Luna. According to him, the properties were acquired by Atty. Luna and her during their marriage, and because they had no children, 3/4 of the property became hers, 1/2 being her share in the net estate, and the other half bequeathed to her in a last will and testament of Atty. Luna.

 The RTC ruled against her, and awarded the properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage, except for the foreign law books, which were ordered turned over to her. Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals modified the RTC judgment by awarding all the properties, including the law books to the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage. In her petition before the Supreme Court, Zenaida alleged that the CA erred in holding that the Agreement For Separation and Property Settlement between Atty. Luna and Eugenia (the first wife) is ineffectual, hence the conjugal property was not dissolved.

 In deciding the case, the Supreme Court answered it by way of determining whether the divorce decree between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was valid, which will decide who among the contending parties were entitled to the properties left behind by Atty. Luna.

 The Supreme Court said that the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void: “From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.”

 No judicial approval of the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement: “Considering that Atty.

Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property relations.

This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage.

Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit:

Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.”

 Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad was bigamous, and void from the very beginning, hence, their property relations is governed by the rules on co-ownership:

“In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void.

Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly states:

27 | P a g e Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.

 Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.[23] A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio. Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n)

 In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.”

 Considering that Zenaida failed to adduce evidence of ownership of the properties subject of the case, the subject properties were awarded in favour of the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage.

 Therefore Petition denied.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. RODOLFO O. DE GRACIA, respondent.

716 SCRA 8, February 12, 2014

FACTS:



In 1969, Rodolfo De Gracia and Natividad Rosalem married each other. Their first child was born in the same year. In 1972, they begot a second child. However, after giving birth, Natividad left their conjugal home, even selling said house, and then had an affair with an engineer. She bore a child with the said engineer. In 1991, she left the engineer and cohabited with another man.

 In 1998, Rodolfo filed a petition to have their marriage be declared void on the ground that Natividad is psychologically incapacitated. Rodolfo engaged the services of Dr. Cheryl Zalsos to evaluate both parties.

In court, Zalsos testified that both parties are psychologically incapacitated; that Rodolfo failed to perform his obligations as a husband, adding too that he sired a son with another woman; that Natividad lacked the willful cooperation of being a wife and a mother to her two daughters; that both suffered from “utter

28 | P a g e emotional immaturity which is unusual and unacceptable behavior considered as deviant from persons who abide by established norms of conduct”; that the mental condition of both parties already existed at the time of the celebration of marriage, although it only manifested after.

 The RTC gave weight to Zalsos testimony hence the marriage was declared void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not psychological incapacity was proven in this case.

HELD:

 No. The evidence presented failed to support a finding of psychological incapacity. The psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Zalsos does not explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable within the parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence.

 The Supreme Court also ruled: Although expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties are usually given considerable weight by the courts, the existence of psychological incapacity must still be proven by independent evidence.

Ining v Vega

GR No. 174727, August 12, 2013 FACTS:

 Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria), who are now both deceased.

Sibling #1: Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.

Sibling # 2: Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children. In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs). Tresvalles and Tajonera are transferees of the said property.

 In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 5275 for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs.

In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregoria’s heirs (through son Antipolo) claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact.

 ISSUES BEFORE LOWER COURTS:

1. Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate;

2. Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and

3. Whether Leonardo’s claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by estoppel or laches.

29 | P a g e

 DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC

1. No. Declared lot to be the common property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining

2. Concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of Leon’s estate at the time of his death in 1962.

3. Dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription (30 years adverse possession).

(2) CA:

1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan; Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining;

2. Trial court’s declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was settled by petitioners’ failure to appeal the same.

3. There was no prescription. Prescription began to run not from Leon’s death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co- owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership,”

ISSUES:

I

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.

II

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.

HELD:

 No, the Court of Appeals is correct based on the following reasons:

1. The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leon’s estate.

2. Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.

3. Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property. no prescription shall run in favor of one of the heirs against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

4. For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. The CA held that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even in 1980 – when it has been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The CA thus concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period prescribed under Article 1141.

Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely

30 | P a g e Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora.

One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs.

 OTHER NOTES:

1. Possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the other co- owners but will be held to benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-heir is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co- heirs if he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation to deliver the same to his co- owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a depositary, lessee or trustee.

2. Principle of laches cannot apply as against Leonardo and the respondents. It held that laches is controlled

2. Principle of laches cannot apply as against Leonardo and the respondents. It held that laches is controlled