Resultados

Annual flow, U.S. as percentage of total

1920 53 nd

1938 89 nd

1953 324 27.6

1962 1,097 41.6

1971 nd 38.8

aThis is an estimate, based on the figure for “country of last departure of permanent and long-term arrivals,” of 1,409.

bFigures for 1971 are in U.S. dollars. Numbers in parentheses indicate the percentage of total Australian exports or imports accounted for by exports to or imports from the United States.

cFor investment, 1919 and 1936 are used rather than 1920 and 1938; the figures for 1953 and 1962 are averages for 1952–54 and 1961–63 respectively, due to large annual

fluctuations.

Note: Some discrepancies exist between sources with regard to these figures, but the order of magnitude is in every case the same.

Source: Immigration to Australia: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Yearbook Australia, various years.

Immigration from Australia to the U.S.: Historical Statistics of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960) and Supplements (Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Government Printing Office: 1965); and (for 1971) Yearbook Australia (Canberra: Australian government, 1972).

Visits: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Overseas Arrivals and Departures, 1971 (Canberra).

Trade: Yearbook Australia, various years; for 1971, International Monetary Fund/International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade, 1970–74 (Washington, D.C.:

IMF/BFD).

Investments: Before 1971, Donald Brash, American Investment in Australian Industry

(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966); for 1971 (flows), Yearbook Australia, 1972 and Commonwealth Treasury, Overseas Investment in Australia (Canberra, 1972).

Thus, even though Australia’s economy and population are smaller than Canada’s, it is less dependent economically on the United States. Only about 12 percent of total Australian exports in 1971 went to the United States, compared to 66 percent of Canada’s. Imports from the United States constituted only about 22 percent of total Australian imports (as opposed to 67.5 percent of Canadian imports).¹⁸Although trade, direct investment, and migration all increased sharply

Australian-American Relations and Complex Interdependence 153

between 1920 and 1971, they remained much smaller for the Australian-American relationship than for that between the United States and Canada.

Between the governments, there is what one official called “a tremendous network” of contacts. Since 1950, Australian prime ministers have frequently visited Washington; the ANZUS Council meets annually at the cabinet level, and cabinet officials have often met with each other on a variety of questions. Yet most business is still transacted in Washington, where Australia maintains a large and well-staffed embassy. Although data on visits and telephone calls are not available as they were for the United States and Canada, there seems no doubt that such data would show many fewer points of direct contact between American and Australian officials with similar tasks.

The agenda of Australian-American relations, like the Canadian-American agenda, is quite diverse. Yet, unlike the Canadian-American agenda, it has a clear and consistent hierarchy. By far the most attention has been paid, on both sides of the Pacific, to political and military issues relating to the alliance. Memoirs and secondary works on Australian relations with the United States during the 1950s and 1960s overwhelmingly emphasized security questions, and the official record of Australian foreign policy, reflecting Australian parliamentary debates as well as governmental concerns, was preoccupied with them. So was reporting in the press and journals of foreign affairs.¹⁹Issues such as those of Malaya, Indonesia, and then Vietnam dominated the scene. The contrast with Canada is illustrated by Table 7.5, which indicates the amount of space devoted in the Public Papers of the President to politico-military, as opposed to socioeconomic, activities involving Australia since 1945. It therefore reflects what American presidents said publicly about Australia, and can be compared with Table 7.3, which carries out a similar task, with slightly different techniques, for the Canadian-American relationship. Except for the period in which Vietnam was a major issue, the salience of Australia to American presidents was obviously very low.

TABLE 7.5 References to Australia, 1945–71

Politico-military Socio-economic or other

Administration

Number of

pages Percentage

Number of

pages Percentage

Truman(1945–53) 0.4 50 0.4 50

Eisenhower(1953–61) 2.8 97 0.1 3

Kennedy-Johnson (1961–69)

41.1 94 2.5 6

Nixon(1969–71) 2.3 92 0.2 8

Source: Public Papers of the President (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945–71).

Australia’s often expressed concerns about military security during the 1950s and 1960s, and its sense of being a rather isolated outpost of Anglo-Saxon economic, political, and cultural institutions, living next door to actually or poten-tially hostile Asian neighbors, made it quite feasible to establish and maintain this hierarchy of issues with security affairs as the most important. After 1969, when our systematic analysis ends, Australian policy changed markedly, under the Labour government that came to power in late 1972 (but lost power in December 1975).²⁰ Nevertheless, throughout the two decades after 1950, the traditional hierarchy of issues remained intact.

As we shall see, conflicts took place on economic issues, but they were not allowed to disturb the alliance relationship on which the Australians believed their security depended. Furthermore, on economic and social issues Australia was simply not as closely tied to, or dependent on, the United States as Canada was. Not only was there less direct investment, trade, and travel, but mass communications were quite different. American news magazines are sold in Australia, and a number of American television programs appear there; but the effect of American culture is much less pervasive than in the English-speaking areas of Canada. It may be an overstatement to argue that “Australia is still remote and separated from the day-to-day emotions, the drive and braking forces, the flow of life in America—

almost as remote as she was when the only medium of communication was a clipper.”²¹Yet the fact that this exaggerated comment could seriously be made indi-cates the tremendous difference between Australia’s relationship to the United States and Canada’s. Distance is not entirely an illusion.

It is evident that the basic conditions within which Australian-American relations take place are very different from those for Canadian-American relations.

Nonetheless, certain aspects of the regimes governing the postwar relationships are quite similar, particularly alliance consultation and avoidance of overt linkages in bargaining. Between 1950 and 1969, explicit linkages were virtually taboo.

Although the Australian decision to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty was clearly connected to the United States decision to agree to the formation of ANZUS, diplomats tried to convince their audiences that the two events were not part of a single bargain.²²As in the Canadian cases, linkages had not been uncommon before World War I. But in the Australian-American postwar relationship, politicization did not increase and the taboo against linkage was not threatened, because Australia did not, in general, take an assertive stand toward the United States.

Because Australian-American relations approximate realist conditions better than Canadian-American relations, we expect the overall structure model to explain the former better than the latter. We shall show that this is the case: Australian-American relations can be well explained in terms of overall structure, but the outcomes of post-war Canadian-American policy conflicts diverge considerably from expectations based on such a theory. To determine why Canadian-American relations are different we shall examine the political bargaining process. We shall argue that, to a considerable extent, patterns of complex interdependence linking Canada and the United States account for the differences in patterns of outcomes between the Canadian-American and the Australian-American cases.