RESULTADOS DE LA RELACION DE LA VARIABLE GESTION INSTITUCIONAL Y SATIFACCION LABORAL.

interpretation of Nietzsche's "eternal recurrence", as the latter is developed in e.g. aphorisms 55 and 1053-1067 in Nietzsche, 1968: 35-36 and 544 ff.), it is still quite doubtful whether the concept of life is employed in the same fashion by the two thinkers. At times it seems that with the employment of the term “life” Heidegger moves more into the direction of Dilthey and has in mind more a "generic differentiation between the ontical and the historical" that is furthermore conceived as the iundamental task of “the

philosophy of life"(B&T: 455). This is not to suggest that Nietzsche's employment lacks this “historical”,

or even "aesthetic"- not in the Kantian sense- dimension; I am just sceptical about the extent to which Heidegger would like to follow the biological connotations of Nietzsche's employment of the term, such as the references to “inner constructive” drives (see e.g. Nietzsche, 1980: 39).

h u m an s140. In a surprisingly “fast" discussion of these three kinds of history the claim is m ade that the allegedly om itted -by Nietzs.-he- proof of their necessity or the grounding of their unity is to be recovere .1 with reference to authentic historicity and tem porality.

D espite the im pression the reader m ight get that Heidegger’s schem atic presentation of the aforem entioned unity lacks the powerful narration, the suffering, and hence the paradoxical qualities of Nietzsche’s ’m editation”, it still presents us with a fruitful im agery concerning historicity and historiology, w here Nietzsche’s distinction betw een “use" and “abuse" is silently replaced by the contrast between the "authentic” and the "inauthentic”.

T hus, in Heideggers interpretation, so far as Dasein "resolutely discloses” the “p a st” possibility it has chosen141 and enacts it in authentic repetition, it is considered to be "open for the monumental possibilities142 of hum an existence", while the kind of historiology stem m ing from this attitude is also said to be monumental (B&T: 448).

Similarly, since even authentic repetition requires t.:\ adm iration for possibilities past, authentic antiquarian historiology is adum brated in the authentically m onum ental, while w hen historiology com bines those two qualities it is seen as "necessarily a critique of the Pret-rnC, and hence as critical (B&T: 449). T hus in an attem pt to ascertain a grasp of the historical that reaches well beyond the ontic realm of entities, Heidegger concludes the chapter on historicity by "putting in practice" his argum ent concerning the authentic historicity of the historian who only "edits” sources143.

Consequently the announced discussion on Dilthej and Count Yorck acquires prim arily the character of an “editing" of passages ¡rom C ount Yorck's letters to Dilthey, w ith the plain intention to establish:

First, th at the question of historicity is of an ontological nalure, secondly, th at the question concerning the ontical is again an ontological one and th at thirdly, the ontical being one domain "of entities other than Dasein" the "idea of Being" m ust em brace both the ontical and the historical.

This last consequence is of crucial im portance since by stating the necessity of a "generic differentiation" of the “idea of Being” it reaffirms the prim acy of the question concerning the m eaning of being right in this section of the book w here it seem ed to be mostly losing in relevance (B&T: 455).

Thus, the announced "destruction” of traditional ontology receives a new form ulation in th is furthering of the ontological question through the * 141 attempts to recover an over-conceptual attunment with being in the thought of the pre-Socratics can be seen as vivid examples of the way the philosopher understood -and enacted- authentic historicity.

141 Heidegger uses the following example in order to illustrate the manner in which authentic historiology might be enacted: "If the historian throws himself straightway into the world-view of an era, he has not thus proved as yet that he understands his object in an authentically historical way md not just aesthetically. And on the other hand, the existence of a historian who only edits sources, may be characterised by a historicality which is authentic" (B&T: 448).

juxtaposition between the "ontic" and the "historical” of which the ages rem ained purportedly ignorant.

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter it was attem pted to juxtapose C astoriadis and Heidegger’s conceptions of history with em phasis on their critiques oo the traditional or inherited conceptions of tim e and history. An analogy was traced betw een the role of the couplet of authenticity and inauthenticity \u the shaping of Heidegger’s theorisation of historical praxis and the function of the antithesis between autonom y and heteronom y in Castoriadis’ conception of historical creation. The positions of the two thinkers were presented som ew hat separately and the two accounts were not brought explicitly together for two im portant reasons. The first stem s from the epistemological position favouring ’m apping’ as a mode of presentation that allows for conceptual ‘spaces’ to emerge more adequately than ‘traditional’ and rationalistic’ m odes of presentation. The second -and equally im portant- reason concerns my determ ination to m aintain the difference between the two accounts. This latter reason becom es ever m ore im portant in light of th e fact that the analogy between authenticity/inauthenticity and autonom y/heteron imy can be easily m isconstrued as the postulation of an identity betw een the two. It is thu s im portant to m aintain the difference between Heidegger’s conception of the ‘collective’ and C astoriadis’ conception of the social-historical Although in both thinkers all known social-historical form ations can be characterised as primarily inauthent ic (in the case of Heidegger) or heteronon ous (in the case of

Castoriadis), there is still a huge difference in em phasis I “tween them than needs to be acknowledged. Thus, in th e case of C astoriadis ind in line with the M arxist tradition historical praxis is prim arily addressed from the perspective of the social historical, while even autonom y is conceived in term s of a self­ recognition of the social historical q u a instituting agency. It is in my mind im possible to conceive the 'collective' in Heidegger in sim ilar term s, and this despite the fact that an authentic m ode of collective historical enactm ent is im plied in Heidegger’s form ulations. I have th u s tried to show th a t Heidegger's account on historicity is prem ised on the singular hum an being’s capacity for inauthentic and authentic com portm ent. Furtherm ore, by juxtaposing the two accounts I attem pted to tem porarily create a tension between a conception of history based on radical novelty and a conception based on authentic repetition. It is this tension, as well as the one betw een ‘concrete’ history and ‘historicity’ that is brought under closer scrutiny in the next chapter with the discussion of G adam er's oeuvre. Finally, it w as show n that for both Castoriadis and Heidegger the mode of being of the hum an and therefore historical’ is radically different than th a t of the ‘n atural’ realm . This cnicial insight shared by th e two thinkers duly provides the ground for the first part of the next chapter, where G adam er's understanding of the historical consciousness and tru th is discussed over against the claim s of scientific instrum ental reason.

Chapter Three

The problem of Historical Consciousness & the U niversality o f Herm eneutics

Introductory remarks

In this chapter the interrelationship between m eaning and historicity is explored from the perspective opened up by G adam er's elaborations on the phenom enon of the effective historical consciousness and hi- general attem pt at the form ulation of a universal herm eneutics. In the beginning of the chapter G adam er's project of a herm eneutic philosophy is discussed in close relation to Heidegger's understanding of tru th as disclosure already presented in chapter one and in juxtaposition to prevalent epistemological conceptions of truth. It is argued that in opposition to the claims of m odem epistemology and scientific reason the phenom enon of history is made accessible in a more prim ordial m anner in the very act of the herm eneutic appropriation of the understanding. Since Gadam er's views have often been interpreted form tiv; vantage point of m odem epistemology, a non-reductive interpretation of his positions would have to start with an attem pt to w rest his thought from the claims of the aforem entioned interpretative frameworks. This is achieved by situating Gadam er in the wider context of hum anistic thought -sp an r ing from Plato and Aristotle to Germ an Idealism, Phenomenology and Critical Theory- and showing how his conceptions of truth, m eaning and historicity ire irreducible to scientific and epistemological concerns.