Resultados en tablas y figuras

As argued in Section 3.3, the key characteristic of a majority of Serbian and some Croatian parties is that they were generally weakly ideologically rooted and predominantly strategically driven parties, which had consequences for their positions on the EU. Namely, a number of parties did not have ideologically motivated stances on the EU, given the lack of genuine fundamental values and identity, or an eclectic mix of different ideological principles. These were primarily the Serbian Progressive Party, the Socialist Party of Serbia and, to a great extent, the Croatian Democratic Union and New Serbia. These essentially pragmatic parties shifted their stance on the EU and their countries’ EU membership as a direct consequence of their strategically driven ideological transformations. They changed their stances as a means for fulfilling more practical and short-term objectives, such as coming to power and getting legitimisation in the eyes of the West, which will be discussed in Chapter 7. In other words, there was limited evidence that these parties, with a pronounced Eurosceptic political legacy, fully embraced European values and it is doubtful that their soft Europeanism was a reflection of deeper ideological beliefs.

On the other hand, this chapter did find that the majority of parties appeared to express more ideologically and value-driven positions on the EU, despite the general lack of parties’

ideological underpinning. This paradox was most visible in the cases of the Democratic Party and G17 Plus/United Regions of Serbia which, as pragmatic and strategically driven parties, adopted principled Euroenthusiasm as a core element of their overall identities and

‘world views’. However, their approach to the EU was not related to any firmly rooted

ideology. As such, they constituted the prime examples of generally strategically motivated parties that adopted principled positions on the EU. Additionally, a number of parties were ideologically driven (although only a few had a coherent ideological profile related to both the socio-economic left-right and identity issues). Consequently, these parties adopted mostly ideologically based positions on the EU, which was the case with the Democratic Party of Serbia, Liberal Democratic Party in Serbia, Social Democratic Party of Croatia, Croatian Peasants’ Party and the radical right family.¹⁴ These parties thus remained insulated from the logic and patterns of party competition and other strategic incentives to adjust their broad, underlying stances on the EU, as discussed in Chapter 4. However, the way they used EU issues in domestic party competition and, in some cases, their stances on EU membership of their countries appear to have been strategically and tactically driven.

For parties that were mostly ideologically driven, their position on the cosmopolitanism vs.

nationalism dimension (unlike on the socio-economic left-right dimension) accounted for their stances on the EU. Figure 3.1 presents the attitudes of Serbian and Croatian parties towards the EU and their position on the socio-economic left-right axis. A left-right division was not always clear-cut in these countries and almost all parties advocated leftist and egalitarian socio-economic principles, including parties that were the most radical right on identity issues. In other words, these parties tended to avoid competing on this dimension and were overwhelmingly positioned in the centre or left-of-centre (which may be seen as a result of the lack of politically articulated socio-economic interests of different social groups). As a consequence, parties’ position on this dimension was less relevant for their attitudes towards the substance of the European integration.

14 Parties that changed their stances on the EU (Serbian Progressive Party, Socialist Party of Serbia, Croatian Democratic Union) also appear to have had ideologically motivated stances prior to the strategically driven transformation of their ideologies and positions on the EU, as discussed in Chapter 4.

Figure 3.1: Attitudes towards the EU and ideological position of Serbian and Croatian parties on the socio-economic left-right dimension

Sources: Party programmes and interviews with party officials Support for the EU

Croatian People’s Party Liberal Democratic Party Social Democratic Party Democratic Party G17 Plus

Socialist Party of Serbia Croatian Democratic Union

Serbian Progressive Party

Croatian Peasants’ Party Socio-economic left Socio-economic right New Serbia

Democratic Party of Serbia Croatian Party of Rights Serbian Radical Party

Opposition to the EU

Note: Croatian parties are in Italics

Empirically, parties characterised as Euroenthusiastic were located across the whole left-right spectrum in socio-economic terms, from the neoliberal Liberal Democratic Party in Serbia to the social democratic Socialist Party of Serbia and the Social Democratic Party of Croatia. In addition, parties termed Eurosceptic (the Serbian Radical Party, the Croatian Party of Rights and the Democratic Party of Serbia) had a rather centrist position with strong leftist elements in their programmes or an eclectic mix of mutually opposing stances on socio-economic issues, as in the case of the Radicals. Enthusiasm and scepticism for the EU did not seem to be driven by party stances on socio-economic issues and had less to do with party stances on the issue stemming from the left-right socio-economic dimension of party competition in these two countries. As a consequence, the bottom left and right quadrants were not populated by any party with deeply grounded stances on these issues.

As shown earlier, due to the historical development and political nature of these societies, there were no radical left parties that would, for instance, oppose the EU for its neoliberal nature. Similarly, no radical right parties embedded in the socio-economic right, which would oppose the EU on its socialist characteristics, were identified. Eurosceptic parties across both countries were rather indifferent to the EU in socio-economic terms, although they increasingly started objecting to EU membership on the grounds that it would have

deleterious effects on national economies since the 2008 financial crisis. Parties in these countries, including those whose positions may be interpreted as ideologically driven, mainly viewed the EU through the prism of EU membership or policies towards the former Yugoslavia – policies that were not essentially related to the issues stemming from the left-right socio-economic dimension of party competition.

Conversely, there was a dominance of the social cleavages that stemmed from a division between the nationalism vs. cosmopolitanism in these societies: these strongly impacted party stances on the EU. As Figure 3.2 shows, the nationalism vs. cosmopolitanism aspect of the GAL-TAN axis neatly reflected party stances on the EU. Parties that strongly advocated individualism in opposition to the state, multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, an open society based on democracy and the respect of human rights, such as the Liberal Democratic Party, G17 plus and the Croatian People’s Party-Liberal Democrats, were the most pronounced Euroenthusiasts. Eurosceptic parties were all traditionalist and national parties, with hard Eurosceptics (the Serbian Radical Party, Croatian Party of Rights) being pronounced nationalist and authoritarian radical right parties. In other words, traditionalism and nationalism mostly bred isolationism and opposition to the EU, although the case of the Croatian Democratic Union also showed that traditionalism can be accommodated with Euroenthusiasm (the latter was strategically driven, though). Serbian and Croatian parties, therefore, projected their stances on issues of sovereignty, democracy, traditional values, human rights and, crucially, national identity onto the EU, which was primarily perceived as a political, rather than economic, reality. The notable absence of any party in the bottom-left quadrant – that is, the lack of any libertarian, green, post-material or radical left Eurosceptic parties – was a reflection of the nature of these countries, where social conditions did not give rise to the development of modern post-material societies and parties, particularly those that would oppose the EU.

Figure 3.2: Attitudes towards the EU and ideological position of Serbian and Croatian parties on the cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism dimension

Sources: Party programmes and interviews with party officials Support for the EU

Liberal Democratic Party Croatian People’s Party G17 Plus Social Democratic Party Democratic Party

Socialist Party of Serbia Croatian Democratic Union Serbian Progressive Party

Croatian Peasants’ Party Cosmopolitanism/Modernism Nationalism/Traditionalism

New Serbia

Democratic Party of Serbia Croatian Party of Rights

Serbian Radical Party

Opposition to the EU

Note: Croatian parties are in Italics

Figure 3.3 summarises party stances on the EU and their ideological party families. At first glance, the figure suggests that parties from the same party family expressed the same or similar stances on the EU in these two countries. While the liberal family stood out as principled hard Euroenthusiastic, the radical right family adopted principled hard Eurosceptic positions. Between the two opposing poles were the social democratic family, which expressed consistently higher levels of Euroenthusiasm than the conservative, Christian democrat and agrarian families, which were characterised by strong traditionalism and pronounced concern for national issues. However, the study also found that parties from the same ideological family expressed different positions on Europe. Conservative parties had a wide range of attitudes, spanning from strong rejection (the Democratic Party of Serbia) to support for Serbian EU membership (the Serbian Progressive Party, New Serbia). Similarly, social democrats were all Euroenthusiastic, but their position was rather strategically driven (the Socialist Party of Serbia) or not based on elaborated ideological principles (the Democratic Party), which showed that their orientation was not necessary grounded in social democratic ideology. Moreover, the ideological grouping of these parties into party families was largely conditional, given that they were mostly ideologically

ungrounded, especially in terms of socio-economic left-right division. Therefore, belonging to a particular family cannot be considered a factor that decisively or significantly shaped party positions in a certain way in Serbia and Croatia. However, two party families were the outliers, namely the liberal and radical right, since they uniformly and consistently supported and opposed the EU, respectively, throughout the analysed period. This may, to some extent, be the result of their ideological convictions and consequent belonging to these party families. Nevertheless, party family did not generally prove to be a reliable indicator of party stances on the EU.

Figure 3.3: Support for/opposition to the EU by party families in Serbia and Croatia Sources: Party programmes and interviews with party officials

SERBIA CROATIA Support for the EU

(5) Liberal Democratic Party (5) Croatian People’s Party-Liberal Democrats (5) G17 Plus (1) Social Democratic Party

(1) Democratic Party

(1) Socialist Party of Serbia (3) Croatian Democratic Union (2) Serbian Progressive Party (4) Croatian Peasants’ Party

(2) New Serbia

(2) Democratic Party of Serbia

Opposition to the EU (6) Croatian Party of Rights (6) Serbian Radical Party

Note: Party families: (1) social democrat, (2) conservative, (3) Christian democrat, (4) agrarian, (5) liberal and (6) radical right

Finally, the two most important dimensions of party competition, party families and party positions on the EU in both countries are presented in Figure 3.4. All the striking features of individual parties and both party systems, as discussed in this chapter, are visible in this figure. Specifically, very few parties adopted a socio-economic rightist political platform and the majority of parties were located around the political centre. The pragmatic nature and the absence of any deeper ideological profiling are visible in the central position across both dimensions taken by the Serbian Progressive Party. The dominance of the GAL vs.

TAN axis, specifically the cosmopolitanism vs. nationalism dimension, is also evident given the parties’ position along the full spectrum of this axis. This dimension was crucial for party positioning on the EU, since both soft and hard Eurosceptic parties were close to the

TAN pole that shaped party-based Euroscepticism across both countries. Conversely, both pro- and anti-EU parties were located towards the centre of socio-economic left-right axis.

Moreover, the conservative family (presented together with similar Christian democratic and agrarian families) and radical right families were significantly more Eurosceptic than social democratic and liberal families.

Figure 3.4: Dimension of party competition, party families and positions on European integration in Serbia and Croatia

Sources: Marks et al. (2006), party programmes, interviews with party officials

Cosmopolitanism/Modernism

Acronyms: DS-Democratic Party, DSS-Democratic Party of Serbia, NS-New Serbia, SRS-Serbian Radical Party, SPS-Socialist Party of Serbia, LDP-Liberal Democratic Party, SNS-Serbian Progressive Party, HDZ-Croatian Democratic Union, SDP-Social Democratic Party, HNS-HDZ-Croatian People’s Party-Liberal Democrats, HSS-Croatian Peasants’ Party, HSP-Croatian Party of Rights

3.5 Conclusion

On the basis of the analysis of Serbian and Croatian parties’ ideologies and their responses to Europe presented above, it is possible to draw a number of conclusions. This chapter first and foremost argues that ideology was a key factor that determined broad, underlying positions on the EU for the majority of Serbian and Croatian parties. This may seem a paradox, given that the majority of parties were generally loosely ideologically grounded.

However, the specific nature of European issues in the context of these post-communist and post-conflict societies triggered predominantly ideologically driven responses to Europe, as explained below. As a result, parties formed stances on the EU primarily based on their attitudes towards identity issues – that is, their position on the cosmopolitanism vs.

nationalism dimension – while location on the socio-economic left-right axis and belonging to party families were less relevant for their positioning on the EU. This pattern of support for and opposition to the EU was the result of the structure of party competition, since party stances on European integration essentially reflected the dominant patterns of domestic politics across both countries, as presented in Figure 3.4. These propositions are further discussed in this concluding section.

The thesis did not find evidence in the examined cases to support the H1a hypothesis that the more parties express socio-economic radical right or radical left ideology, the more likely that they will adopt Eurosceptic attitudes. Euroenthusiastic parties were both left- and right-wing in socio-economic terms while Eurosceptic parties, including those with hard Eurosceptic positions, did not have embedded stances on socio-economic issues and were rather positioned in the centre, with leftist elements in their socio-economic programmes (Figure 3.1). In other words, the ideological preferences of Serbian and Croatian parties on the traditional socio-economic left-right axis were not translated into specific stances on the EU. This was primarily the result of the fact that any left-right ideological distinction was very blurred in these societies, given the tendency of the majority of parties to express leftist socio-economic rhetoric and policies.¹⁵ Crucially, the class cleavages that give rise to party competition on this dimension were not dominant in these societies. In other words, there was a lack of politically articulated social and economic interests of distinct social groups (which, however, does not mean that they did not objectively have them). Consequently, parties perceived the EU almost exclusively as a political, not an economic, reality. The

15 This was not a unique characteristic of Serbian and Croatian parties (the same may be seen in other Central and Eastern European countries), although it was quite pronounced in these countries, given their historical experiences since the early 1990s as well as parties’ emphasis on national and statehood issues.

empirical data considered in this study, therefore, did not support the arguments of a number of authors (Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002) that argued for a strong relationship between the conventional left-right dimension and party positioning on European integration.

However, the evidence from the study strongly supported the H1b hypothesis that the more parties express a TAN (traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) based ideology, the more likely that they will adopt Eurosceptic attitudes (compared to parties closer to a GAN (green/alternative/libertarian) pole). This dimension appeared to be crucial in understanding party positioning on the EU in these countries, given that party attitudes towards the EU essentially matched party locations on this axis (Figure 3.2). This was a consequence of the fact that in both countries, ‘the ideological cultural cleavage’ (Čular and Gregurić 2007), based on the divide between traditionalist and conservative values on one side, and liberal, secular modernist concepts on the other, has been by far the most dominant. Consequently, parties perceived the EU through the prism of EU membership or EU policies towards the former Yugoslavia, which were closely related to the identity and value issues stemming from this dimension. This thesis therefore supports the arguments put forward by Marks et al. (2006) that the TAN-GAL position is the key for predicting party positioning on Europe in Central and Eastern European countries. More specifically, there is evidence that the TAN side of the dimension was a key driving force behind party-based Euroscepticism, while parties closer to the GAL pole tended to support European integration, as argued by Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002). However, it is important to note that it was a specific aspect of the GAL-TAN division that crucially shaped parties’ stances on the EU in Serbia and Croatia. In these countries, the issues related to green, alternative and post-material politics were fully absent from domestic party competition. Instead, the GAL-TAN dimension captured in these countries the social conflict around the defence of national communities and primarily identity and statehood issues. As a result, the division between nationalism (nativism) versus cosmopolitanism was the key driver of party responses to Europe. For example, although traditional, conservative and authoritarian, Serbian and Croatian party-based hard Euroscepticism drew primarily on the nationalist and nativist ideology, in opposition to cosmopolitanism.

Empirical data provided limited support for the H1c hypothesis that parties that belong to the radical right, radical left or green ideological family tend to be more Eurosceptic, whereas liberal, Christian democratic and social democratic families tend to be more Euroenthusiastic. The study found that

radical right parties were by far the most Eurosceptic, while the liberal family was most pro-European. However, social democrats were more Euroenthusiastic than the conservatives that, along with the Christian democrat and agrarian families, expressed rather Eurosceptic positions. Therefore, adherence to an ideological family may create a certain predisposition for parties to have particular attitudes towards the EU. Specifically, liberals and social democrats were more consistently pro-European, since they found it easier to accept the supranational principles of the EU, whereas this was a rather difficult issue for other party families given their traditionalism and pronounced concerns for national issues, such as the preservation of sovereignty, national culture and traditional values. Nevertheless, belonging to a particular ideological family was not a reliable indicator of party stances on the EU: parties from the same family also expressed opposing positions on this issue, most evident in the case of the conservatives. In addition, classification into ideological families was largely conditional, and the concept of party families had limited applicability in these cases, despite a tendency of some core parties to converge with Western concepts of party families, which served as models for their ideological reinventions. This chapter therefore did not find support for the arguments that the party family was a strong causal factor (Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002) for party stances on the EU in the context of Serbian and Croatian party politics.

The specific nature of European issues and their translation into party politics in the context of these post-Yugoslav, post-communist and post-conflict societies triggered party

The specific nature of European issues and their translation into party politics in the context of these post-Yugoslav, post-communist and post-conflict societies triggered party