RESULTADOS Y DISCUSION

Pontic roads.

operations in the area and allow ed Rom an troops, w hich w ould facilitate easy diplom atic m ilitary pressure to be applied to Ciscaucasian kingdom s, to be deployed in - positions along the Euphrates. C ontem porary w ith construction aside the E uphrates, are a num ber of fortified harbours betw een Trapezus and D ioscurias, set at intervals of one day's cruise.51 W ith C appadocia and the Black Sea routes un d er direct supervision, law lessness was curbed and local econom ies improved.52 Furtherm ore, public construction w as u n d ertak en in the heart of the C iscaucasian kingdoms.53 A fort at Gorneae near the A rm enian capital of A rtaxata was built in A.D. 51, w ith a re-installation in A.D. 76, and another garrison was in stalled a t H arm ozica. G orneae com m anded th e A raxes valley, H arm ozica guarded the D arial pass and the upper Cyrus. O ther building projects are also indicated by both archaeological and textual evidence.54 Some scholars have view ed north-eastern construction as a response to the A rm enian w ars under N ero, or a desire for a secure frontier.55 Roman efforts w ere expansionist, but it is still debatable w hether they w ere sim ply opportunistic or part of a "grand strategy".55 The scale of Flavian and later developm ent, both civic and m ilitary, is too w idespread to support a thesis w hich offers personal greed as th e p rim ary m over b eh in d im perial policies.57 In the East, city foundation appears to be lim ited, and is taken by som e as indicative of the m eanness of im perial ad m in istrato rs, adm inistrators w ho stuck to m ilitary investm ent and shirked the burden of u rb an development.55 H ow ever, this interpretation view s the East in isolation from the rest of the em pire. W hereas city developm ent in w estern provinces w as m assive, the East required redistribution of w ealth a n d p e rip h e ra l d ev elo p m en t.5 9 The g reat cities of the eastern

51 T.B. Mitford (1980) 1192-4; B. Isaac 46-50.

52 F. Cumont (1923) 109-227; Bosworth (1976) 73; D.C. Braund (1989) 38-9. 53 T.B. Mitford (1980) 1192-4; B. Isaac (1990)46-50.

54 T.B. Mitford (1980) ibid.

55 See B. Isaac (1990) 50, nn. 205 and 206.

56 B. Isaac (1990) 51; 372-3. I shall return to this question in chapter five. 57 G.W. Bowersock (1973) 133-40.

65 B. Isaac (1990) 333-71. However, it is understandable, given the urban development of the East, that the military would establish a presence in the cities, see N. Hodgson (1989) 178-81.

M editerranean w ere already highly developed; public expenditure w as m et by the Liturgical system /o This institution perm itted city m agistrates to com pete via the developm ent of their ow n com m unity. For the im perial governm ent to interfere w ould have ruined pre-existing pow er structures, raised taxes, and w eakened local economies.^i Far from being m iserly, the im perial governm ent w as sim ply n u rtu rin g civic structures in such a w ay as to m axim ize overall econom ic benefits w ith o u t disrupting the essentially localised and highly differentiated econom ies of the empire.72

In addition to caring for m onum ental structures along the frontier, it w as equally, if not m ore im portant, for Rom an leaders to cultivate pow er structures beyond the Euphrates.73 A ssuring the success of pro- R om an rulers in A rm enia w as essential to Rom e's im perial policy in Ciscaucasia. Such support results in an inevitable bonding betw een elites at the center and their peripheral counter parts. Relations of this sort w ere bond to take on a personal tone, and the success or failure of the one p artn er effected the status of the other. O bviously, the relationship w as m eant to benefit both parties, yet create a dependency on the Rom an patron. This can be seen throughout Rom e's involvem ent in Ciscaucasia. For instance, after Pom pey obtained the captivity of the young Tigran and the dissolution of his kingdom in Sophene, the elder Tigran w as placed back on the throne of G reater Arm enia. So long as he rem ained steadfast in his loyalty to Rome, his disruptive son w ould be absent from the

r e g io n . 7 4 H ow ever, the client/patron relationship w as not one sided. For

exam ple, in rem aining beholden to C rassus or A nthony, the kings of A rm enia p in n ed their hopes to R om an successes w hich w o u ld allow them to exert their ow n political influence over neighbouring rivals in A lbania or M e d i a . 7 5 U nfortunately, both cases ended in failure. W ithout

rew ards, the client w ould seek a new patron, and in these tw o cases A rm enia shifted allegiance to Parthia. H ow ever, such set-backs could not 70 A.H.M. Jones (1940).

71 P. Garnsey and R. Sailer (1987) 32-4; G.Woolf (1992) 283-93. 72 p. Garnsey (1974).

73 D.C. Braund (1984) 75-85.

74 Appian, Mith., 105.

d isru p t the continued cultivation of peripheral elites. So long as pro- R om an elem ents existed in C iscaucasia, there w ould be a sharing of interests betw een some eastern and w estern nobles. The practice of taking hostages w as aim ed at perpetuating a supply of pro-Rom an supporters to export into foreign kingdom s, or sim ply to be used as a threat.76

The policies of legionary recruitm ent and veteran settlem ent w ere further contributions to regional stability. Legionary recruitm ent was an essential feature in Rom an territorial consolidation, having as its prim ary aim the rem oval of potentially dangerous elem ents from society and their tra n sfo rm a tio n in to a loyal arm of im p erial in s titu tio n s .77 The contribution of such m anpow er n o t only lessened local brigandage, b u t strengthened the ties betw een the various peripheral areas of the empire.75 By the m iddle of the first century soldiers w ere already being recruited along the E uphrates frontier, and th ro u g h o u t the second an d th ird centuries the presence of such eastern recruits is docum ented as far w est as V indobono (Vienna) and as far south as Nicopolis.79 Twenty-five years of service actively su p p o rtin g the u rb an netw ork of Rom e m u st have im b u ed the ran k and file w ith a sense of affiliation, if n o t to civic in stitu tio n s, th an at least to the em p ero r an d his army.50 Those legionaries w ho retu rn ed to th eir hom es could look fo rw ard to an increased social and econom ic position in their c o m m u n itie s .E v e n w hen veterans w ere not colonised en bloc, w hich does not seem to be the case along the Euphrates, the integration of individuals from the frontier in to im p erial stru ctu res created a client-patron relatio n sh ip w hich con tin u ed to be cu ltiv ated w hen the retired soldier retu rn e d to a prom inent place in his com m unity. The eastern cam paigns of Verus and Severus resu lted in nu m ero u s colonies beyond the E uphrates. The veteran settlem ents of M esopotam ia developed in the cities along the central route from A ntioch to Nisibis.52 Even if the theory that colonies

75 A.D. Lee (1991b) 366-8; D.C. Braund (1984) 12-16.

77 B. Isaac (1990) 59. 75 M.P. Speidel (1980) 730-744. 79 ibid. 50 B.D. Shaw (1983) 14-8. 51 R. MacMullen (1963) chp. 5; J.B. Cambell (1984) 181ff. 52 A.H.M. Jones (1971) 221-22.

such as these w ere not p art of a conscious defensive po l i c y , ® ^ veterans and

their families supported local governm ent, cultivated the land, paid taxes, and often provided sons for m ilitary s e r v i c e . 5 4

R om an activities in the East d id not alw ays resu lt in regional stability, even if they d id prom ote certain centripetal factors as in the resulting unification of A rm enia u n d er the A rsacids. The R om an state h ad clearly established strong diplom atic contacts in the East, as well as gained legitim acy in the m inds of H ellenistic monarchs.55 Initially, Rom e's friendship did m uch to stabilise the pow er struggles in the east, as w hen Ptolem aios IV en tru sted his son to L epidus for protection and education, so countering Seleucid advances against Egypt. Through such clients and friends Rome w as draw n into the East, learned eastern w ays, an d in tu rn do m in ated the H ellenistic world.55 But the long-term am bition of Rome was not to provide stability or create a balance of pow er for the H ellenistic or eastern m onarchies, b u t to sap their strength one by one and conquer them.57 W ith rare exception this aim can be illustrated in Rom an actions throughout Ciscaucasia from the period of their arrival until the rise of the Sasanians. It m ust be kept in m ind that instability in Ciscaucasia m ay have resulted in security for the Rom an provinces, and it certainly increased the o p portunity for further conquest. Yet in m any respects the pursuit of such a policy ensured that continued and increased com m itm ent w ould be necessary along the A rm enian frontier.

Rom e exercised a policy of deploym ent aggressive in intent, even during periods of apparent peace. The third w ar against M ithridates is a case in point.55 D enied w estw ard expansion, Pontus tu rn ed tow ard the C rim ea, w hile Rome built up a strong m ilitary presence in Cilicia and C ap p ad o cia, gain in g control of th e passes w hich led in P ontus. M ithridates’ suspicions w ere further fueled w hen the senate refused to ratify Sulla's agreem ent not to intervene in Pontic affairs. The result of this escalation w as five years of w arfare w hich, in the end, spilled into 53 As is held by numerous scholars, but questioned in B. Isaac (1990) 310-32.

54 p. Garnsey and R. Sailer (1987) 77 and 124; B. Isaac 332. 55 A.N. Sherwin-White (1984) 58-79.

56 D.C. Braund (1984) 9ff; F.W. Walbank (1984), esp. 66-71. 57 Polyb., 3.32.7; P.S. Derow (1979); contra F.W. Walbank (1963).

Arm enia. Furtherm ore, an offensive stance w as clearly used to dissuade the Parthians and their allies from supporting their ow n clients. In spite of P arthia's entreaties for a peaceful solution. R epublican com m anders carefully used treatises backed by hostile deploym ent to intim idate their