The main theoretical claims, however, are about the differences between the motivations of high-commitment recruits (in this case respondents from community organizations) and low-high-commitment recruits (those on the roadside and in criminal gathering spots). The material benefits (H1) and safety (H2) which result from truces should have a much larger effect on the low-commitment pool than on the high-commitment pool.
Figure 4.4 shows how wages and lifestyle (top two panels) and safety (bottom panel) affected
16Collier (2000), Mueller (2000)
Figure 4.4: Effects of Material Benefits and Safety on Joining (by Recruit Type)
Results from OLS model (same model as Figure 4.6) with type interaction and SEs clustered at respondent level. Group trait effects are relative to reference attribute for each category (Low wages, No ceasefire offer). Includes FE for enumerator-region pair.
the willingness to join for the high-commitment and low-commitment respondents. As the theory suggests, low-commitment respondents were much more likely to be moved by material benefits and safety than were high-commitment respondents. For the low-commitment respondents, wages and lifestyle were by far the most important motivating factor in joining an armed group. All else equal, moving from no wages (and a hard lifestyle) to low wages (and an okay lifestyle) moves low-commitment respondents nearly three quarters of a scale point toward joining (on a 1-5 scale).
This effect is about .75 standard deviations of the dependent variable — an effect that dwarfs the other five factors that respondents are considering. The slightly less realistic scenario of a group offering high wages and a good lifestyle moved low-commitment respondents even more: more than 1.25 scale points.
For the high-commitment respondents from community organizations, this effect is less than half as large. All else equal, high-commitment respondents were moved just 0.3 scale points by a
rebel organization offering low wages. Even one offering high wages and a good lifestyle moved high-commitment recruits just 0.75 scale points. The differences in these effects are massive: about half of a scale point, or half a standard deviation of the dependent variable. Importantly, though, the high-commitment respondents were no less eager to join a rebel group which offered material ben-efits than the low-commitment respondents. Instead, the difference comes from high-commitment recruits being more willing to endure joining a rebel group with few material resources. High-commitment recruits were more likely to join in the worst scenarios and more likely to be moved by other features of the group like military strength and social ties. High-commitment respon-dents were more likely to say they would join an organization that is militarily strong but offers no wages than one that is militarily weak but offers low wages. Similarly, these idealists would prefer a group have co-tribal leaders than offer wages.
This all means that rebel groups are likely to attract very different types of recruits depending on the types of benefits they offer (Figure 4.5). Overall, just under 10 percent of respondents ex-pressed interest in joining rebel groups which offered no wages and a hard lifestyle (i.e. they said
“Most” or “All” people like them would join).17 But these 10 percent who join were dispropor-tionately high-commitment respondents from community organizations. As laid out above, these high-commitment respondents were much more willing to join a rebel group that offered few ma-terial benefits, especially if it had other appealing qualities. Groups that offered low wages and an OK lifestyle attracted more people (16 percent of respondents), but nearly all of these additional people were low-commitment types. Whereas about three-quarters of the likely joiners of no-wage groups are high-commitment types, the low-wage groups’ joiners are split 50-50. This is a good proxy for the effect of truce offers on rebel recruitment. The safety and ease of truces typically enable rebel groups to go from offering no wages and a hard lifestyle to offering low wages and an OK lifestyle. The result, then, confirms the basic intuition of the theory. The material benefits of truces undermine the natural screening process which keeps out low-commitment recruits.
17This exercise upweights high-commitment respondents to assume a 50-50 starting pool.
Figure 4.5: Wage Screening Effects
0 5 10 15 20
None Low
Wages
Percent Saying at least 'Most' Would Join
Commitment
Low−Commitment High−Commitment
Stacked bar graphs showing the proportion and composition (whether they are high-commitment or low-commitment) who responded that at least “Most” individuals like them would join, for rebel groups that offer no wages vs. low wages.
Even holding constant the material benefits, however, truces still have a differential effect on low-commitment and high-commitment recruits. The lower panel of Figure 4.4 shows how a ceasefire offer affects the two groups of respondents. The offer had a clear positive effect (albeit a smaller one) on low-commitment respondents, increasing their willingness to join about a quarter of a scale point. Meanwhile, the ceasefire offer had almost no effect overall on high-commitment respondents. Because this feature is separate from wages, this treatment captures all of the residual effects of truce — the safety, mobility, and emotional security of truce. Truce offers, then, have an even greater effect on the commitment of rebel recruits than Figure 4.5 suggests. Truces both make life safer and open up new material benefits for soldiers. Both of these factors encourage selfish, opportunistic recruits to join while having little effect on the community-minded recruits who rebel leaders want to attract.