Results of inter-domain evaluation

2.1.1 Basic essentials of the Maussian gift

Building on Marcel Mauss’ (1990) theory of the gift, the analysis first focuses on the humanitarian moment of transnational solidarity expressed in form of ‘pure’

gifts to humanitarian aid organizations. To better understand the consequences of such expressions of solidarity, it is helpful to embed the concept of solidarity into the theory of the gift carving out the paradox of good intentions and hidden ambivalences of the ‘humanitarian gift’ (cf. Stirrat and Henkel 1997). But what do the two concepts - solidarity and gift giving - have in common and how can solidarity be analysed through the theory of the gift? Seemingly both concepts have nothing in common as they differ in their etymological and scientific histories: “Whereas solidarity is an abstract concept … gift giving is often associated with concrete and material objects exchanged on certain occasions between people having a certain type of relationship” (Komter, 2005: 1). However looking at solidarity and gift giving in their entirety, it becomes clear, that both do relate in their most fundamental manifestations and functions: solidarity and gift giving are both motivated by the nature of human relationships creating and maintaining social ties. Or as Mary Douglas (1990: XV) puts it “the theory of the

gift is a theory of human solidarity” (Komter 2005; Korf 2007; Mauss 1990; Rippe 1998; Ratke 2007; Smith 2005; Stirrat/Henkel 1997).

In his work “Essai sur le don” Marcel Mauss (1924) (English version 1990 ‘The Gift’) came to the conclusion, that gift giving in archaic communities should be seen as a system of exchange, which involves “the three-fold sequence of obligations (to give, to accept, and render)” (Silber, 1998: 138) emphasising the direct relation between donor and giver. Mauss argued, that the exchange of gifts connects individuals to a larger society and can be seen as a “total social phenomena” (1990: 11) in which economic and social motives are inseparable.

He identified that gifts carry a wide range of meanings – religious, economic, political and social and that the process of giving follows its own logic related to an initiated cycle of reciprocity establishing social relations and consolidating hierarchy. Based on his observations he further contends that even if a gift is given without the thought of a return-gift, the act of giving implies an implicit expectation of reciprocity. Derrida (1992) underlines Mauss’ argument noting that there is no such thing as a ‘free gift’. In his view gift giving does negate its own principle due to the fact that “as soon as a gift is giving knowingly as a gift, the subject of generosity is always anticipating a return, already taking credit of some sort, if only for being generous” (in Barnett and Land 2007: 1072). Even self-congratulation or the hope that good action will bring good (not necessarily directly from the recipient of the gift), in which the biblical image ‘as you sow, so shall you reap’ fits so well, invalidates the gift as ‘pure’ (Derrida 1992; Laidlaw 2000).

Sahlins (1972) identified in Mauss’ essay three forms of gift giving differing in their reciprocity: balanced, generalized and negative. The classification is founded on the giver and receiver’s capacity to give back. Balanced reciprocity indicates giving among social equals, meaning, the given gift can be given back in same value. Negative reciprocity on the contrary reveals, that the universal obligation of reciprocity does no longer hold as the social divide is too large and the recipient is left with a huge moral and social debt and dependency based on the incapability to reciprocate. Sahlins sees in negative reciprocity a tool to affirm social hierarchy and power over time. Vandevelde (2000) yet suggests that recipients always have the capacity to give back, even if it is only by showing gratefulness. He notes: “very often situations in which one can only respond to a gift by being grateful, are considered as humiliating. They oblige us to admit our inferiority”

(Vandevelde, 2000: 19).

2.1.2 Maussian gift and humanitarian aid

Richard Tittmus (1971) inaugurated with his book ‘The gift relationship: from human blood to social policy’ a publicly influential line of thinking, reiterated more recently by Godbout and Caillè (2001) and Gouldner (2005), contending that Mauss’ approach is no longer applicable evaluating the system of modern giving. Agreeing with Marcel Mauss on the fact, that voluntary giving is “not only morally superior, and eventually even practically more efficient than the market in the provision of public goods and services … and constitutive of a higher level of social solidarity” (Silber 1998: 138), he refuses the most fundamental features of Mauss’ gift theory. For Tittmus the modern form of giving (or in his words modern

‘altruistic’ giving) in contemporary societies is based on anonymity and made to strangers, therefore not entailing expectations of a return gift from the recipient to the donor. In his understanding modern generosity is an act of “altruism as behaviour intended to benefit another, even when doing so may risk or entail some sacrifice to the welfare of the actor“ (cited in Adloff/Sigmund, 2005: 217;

cf. Gouldner 2005). Giving is thereby found on the norm of beneficence that requires supporting and giving others the help and aid they need regardless of former interpersonal relations or expected gratitude. Modern ‘altruistic’ giving represents the ‘pure’ gift that is “…spontaneous, uncoerced, and for those reasons often received with surprise…The gift is unexpected by the recipient, completely voluntary and unnecessary by the giver” (Smith 2005: 3) and it does deny reciprocity. In the opinion of Jacques Derrida (1992) Marcel Mauss in his essay does never address this form of the gift.

A growing number of literature in the context of internationally organized development aid bring back Mauss’ concept into the analysis disclosing that Tittmus’ view is not only a very partial rendering of the concept of today’s solidarity but also of the actual workings of international organized giving and further remains only as a partial applicability of the conception of the gift process (Eyben 2006; Hattori 20031/2003; Karagiannis 2005; Kapoor 2008; Korf 2007;

Mawdsley 2012a/b; Silber 1998; Stirrat and Henkel 2006). Most of these studies argue that the “biography of the development gift”⁴ (Stirrat and Henkel 1997) starts off as a ‘pure’ gift guided by an ethical and disinterested act of generosity and not based on personal relations of donors and givers. However its processing and mediation through different types of aid brokers (Bierschenk et al 2002;

Mosse and Lewis 2006; Sørenson 2008) entering “at various nodes in the aid chain

….both internal to the humanitarian agencies (as consultants, experts, project

4 The thesis will use the notion development gift and humanitarian gift interchangeably

managers and volunteers, for example) and external to it (as local bureaucrats

…, local politicians…, or as other agents of a local or national elite…)” (Korf et al 2010: 62) does pollute the gift’s purity.

Motives of self-interest and reciprocity have become prominent features in

‘development gifts’. From a Maussian point of view, such gifts are ultimately self-serving and accompanied by a huge range of “…internal and external rewards (such as self-esteem or pleasure; social prestige among both peers and inferiors or even upward social mobility; business connections; public relations improvement, etc)” (Silber 1998: 140). Even so one could doubt an existing reciprocity between givers and receivers of development gifts, the analysis of development practices uncover a purposeful mediation of reciprocity in the complex and highly regulated aid chain. Furthermore, various actors within the aid chain present and ritualize the gift at different localities using it as a commodity, a social investment;

altruism serves self-interest supporting the struggle over power, profit and recognition within the highly competitive international aid sector or actors’ socio-political environment. In other words, “a gift is worth nothing if it does not reflect an authentic appreciation of our personal qualities…it proves to establish a good reputation and to serve our long-term interests. It supplies us with honour and gratitude” (Vandevelde, 2000: 2-3). Humanitarian gifts therefore are intentional, personal and even political comprising self-interests while creating or re-enforcing social relationships hereby denying pure altruism (Adloff/Sigmund 2005; Bourdieu 1998; Chouliaraki 2012; Derrida 1992; Gouldner 2005; Hattori 2001/2003; Korf 2007; Korf et al. 2010; Silber 1998, 2001; Simmel 2005).

However the rhetoric within the aid chain continues to relate the development gift to ‘altruism’; to the humanitarian momentum that opened the charitable space of doing good legitimizing the practices of brokerage and mediation as disinterested.

This illustrates what Bourdieu defines as the open secret of giving: “no one is really unaware of the logic of the exchange, but no one fails to comply with the rule of the game which is to act as if one did not know the rule … Everyone knows – and does not want to know – that everyone knows – and does not want to know – the true nature of the exchange“ (1997: 231-232). Givers and receivers participate in the “collective self-deception” (ibid: 231) euphemizing the power and symbolic violence that is hidden in the process of gift giving. This line of interpretation of the gift suggests that Mauss’ findings on the gift in archaic communities are applicable to the problems of humanitarian gifts. He already stated that “gifts are presented in rituals looking to be spontaneous, voluntary and altruistic, but in general the gestures accompanying the act of giving are fiction, formalism and social lies covering the truth of the gift: compulsion and

interests” (Mauss in Moebius and Papilloud 2006: 63). That is what makes humanitarian gifts so vulnerable for the receiver: it serves the donator and is based on the arbitrariness and power of their generosity and interests. As Korf argues: “the core problem with geographies of generosity is…that they invigorate compassion and emotions as the core virtues that should ground ethical action.

However, compassion is not per se something that is positive for the one who is the addressee of this compassion” (2007: 370).

Based on Mauss’ theory of the gift it was possible to show in the analysis that similar to gifts in archaic communities, non-anonymous humanitarian gifts still present the three-fold sequence of obligations; remain a blend of political, aesthetic and moral dimensions, and further are accompanied by ritual activities, ceremonies and public presentations of generosity subtly defining, confirming, or modifying prestige and status distinctions (Article 1, Article 2, Article 3). Focusing on Mauss’ aspect of a deep connection between the gift and the donors’ identity, the empirical case contained evidence illustrating the impact of donators’ personal structures, their personal source of identity and socio-political preferences (including a particular opinion on ‘good’ life and politics). Yet the research interest here does not lie on the fact of this existence but more on the processes of and the how of transferring the imbedded donators’ identity to the recipients. As Mauss does not provide analytic tools for this research objective, the next chapter will introduce Foucaults’ (1977) concept of governmentality outlining its application on the non-anonymous humanitarian gift.