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RATIFICATION BY PEOPLE; ONLY ONE ELECTION TO BE HELD THEREFOR. — The language of Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution is sufficiently clear. It says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that

"such amendments shall be valid as part of the this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast as an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocally says "an election" which means only one.

REYES, J.B.L., ZALDIVAR, RUIZ CASTRO and MAKASIAR, JJ., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION; REQUIREMENTS FOR PROPER SUBMISSION THEREOF TO PEOPLE. — Amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions, compare them with the proposed amendments, and to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly insidious influences. We believe the word "submitted" can only mean that the government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every efforts to inform every citizen of the provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof. By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100 citizens cannot be reached, then there is no submission within the meaning of the word as intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection. For as we have earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There must be fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection.

FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, NOT SOVEREIGN IN CHARACTER. — It does not thereby follow that while free from legislative control, a constitutional convention may lay claim to an attribute sovereign in character. The Constitution is quite explicit that it is to the people, and to the people alone, in whom sovereignty resides. Such a prerogative is therefore withheld from a convention. It is an agency entrusted with the responsibility of high import and significance, it is true; it is denied unlimited legal competence though. That is what sovereignty connotes. It has to

yield to the superior force of the Constitution. There can then be no basis for the exaggerated pretension that it is an alter ego of the people.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTONOMY IN PROPOSING CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS. — The view that commends itself for acceptance is that legislature and constitutional convention, aliked recognized by the Constitution, are coordinate, there being no superiority of one over the other. Insofar as the constituent power of proposing amendments to the Constitution is concerned, a constitutional convention enjoys a wide sphere of autonomy consistently with the Constitution which can be the only source of valid restriction on its competence. It is true it is to the legislative body that the call to a convention must proceed, but once convened, it cannot in any wise be interfered with, much less controlled by Congress. A contrary conclusion would impair its usefulness for the delicate and paramount task assigned to it. A convention then is to be looked upon as if it were one of the three coordinate departments which under the principle of separation of powers is supreme within its field and has exclusive cognizance of matters properly subject to its jurisdiction.

3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, RULES OF GRAMMAR NOT DULY RELIABLE IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION. — No undue reliance should be accorded rules of grammar; they do not exert a compelling force in constitutional interpretation. Meaning is to be sought not from specific language in the singular but from the mosaic of significance derived from the total context. It could be, if it were not thus, self-defeating. Such a mode of construction does not commend itself. The words used in the Constitution are not inert; they derive vitality from the obvious purposes at which they are aimed.

D E C I S I O N BARREDO, J p:

Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years "shall be submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as they direct the holding of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.

As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent only the COMELEC, the Court required that copies thereof be served on the Solicitor General and the Constitutional Convention, through its President, for such action as they may deem proper to take. In due time, respondent COMELEC filed its answer joining issues with petitioner. To further put things in proper order, and considering that the fiscal officers of the Convention are indispensable parties in a proceeding of this nature, since the acts sought to be enjoined involve the expenditure of funds appropriated by law for the Convention, the Court also ordered that the Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Convention be made respondents. After the petition was so amended, the first appeared thru Senator Emmanuel Pelaez and the last two thru Delegate Ramon Gonzales. All said respondents, thru counsel, resist petitioner's action.

For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication of arguments and even possible confusion, and considering that with the principal parties being duly

represented by able counsel, their interests would be adequately protected already, the Court had to limit the number of intervenors from the ranks of the delegates to the Convention who, more or less, have legal interest in the success of the respondents, and so, only Delegates Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera, Pablo S.

Trillana III, Victor de la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all distinguished lawyers in their own right, have been allowed to intervene jointly. The Court feels that with such an array of brilliant and dedicated counsel, all interests involved should be duly and amply represented and protected. At any rate, notwithstanding that their corresponding motions for leave to intervene or to appear as amicus curiae 1 have been denied, the pleadings filed by the other delegates and some private parties, the latter in representation of their minor children allegedly to be affected by the result of this case are with the records and the Court acknowledges that they have not been without value as materials in the extensive study that has been undertaken in this case.

The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969, respectively. The delegates to the said Constitution were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The pertinent portions of Resolution No. 2 read as follows:

"SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines, to be composed of two elective Delegates from each representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those required of Members of the House of Representatives.

xxx xxx xxx

"SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and considered part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in an election at which they are submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution."

Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the different cities and provinces fixed originally in Resolution No. 2.

After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. Its preliminary labors of election of officers, organization of committees and other preparatory works over, as its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which began on September 27, 1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of September 28, 1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus:

"CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1

"A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18.

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"BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention:

"Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines is amended to as follows:

"Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are (twenty-one) EIGHTEEN years or over and are able to read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election.'

"Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the Philippines when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide with the local elections in November 1971.

"Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution.

"Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the sum of P75,000.00 from its savings or from its unexpended funds for the expense of the advanced plebiscite; provided, however that should there be no savings or unexpended sums, the Delegates waive P250.00 each or the equivalent of 2-1/2 days per diem.'"

By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon respondent Comelec "to help the Convention implement (the above) resolution."

The said letter reads:

"September 28, 1971

"The Commission on Elections Manila

Thru the Chairman Gentlemen:

Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution No. 1 quoted as follows:

xxx xxx xxx (see above)

Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No.

6132 otherwise known as the Constitutional Convention Act of 1971, may we call upon you to help the Convention implement this resolution:

Sincerely,

(Sgd.) DIOSDADO P.

MACAPAGAL

DIOSDADO P. MACAPAGAL President"

On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite on condition that:

"(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the printing of separate official ballots, election returns and tally sheets for the use of said plebiscite at its expense;

"(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own security measures for the printing and shipment of said ballots and election forms; and

"(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered to the Commission in time so that they could be distributed at the same time that the Commission will distribute its official and sample ballots to be used in the elections on November 8, 1971."

What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from intervenors' statement of the genesis of the above proposal:

"The President of the Convention also issued an order forming an Ad Hoc Committee to implement the Resolution.

"This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were approved by the President who then transmitted them to the Commission on Elections.

"The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report on the progress of the implementation of the plebiscite in the afternoon of October 7, 1971, enclosing copies of the order, resolution and letters of transmittal above referred to (Copy of the report is hereto attached as Annex 8-Memorandum)

"RECESS RESOLUTION

"In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the Convention approved a resolution authored by Delegate Antonio Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a recess of the Convention from November 1, 1971 to November 9, 1971 to permit the delegates to campaign for the ratification of Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies of the resolution and the transcript of debate thereon are hereto attached as Annexes 9 and 9-A Memorandum, respectively).

"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION

"On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution No. 24 submitted by Delegate Jose Ozamiz confirming the authority of the President of the Convention to implement Organic Resolution

No. 1, including the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee ratifying all acts performed in connection with said implementation."

Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co incident with the elections of eight senators and all city, provincial and municipal Officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention. On the other hand, respondents and intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay down the details of the plebiscite for the ratification of any amendment the Convention may deem proper to propose is within the authority of the Convention as a necessary consequence and part of its power to propose amendments and that this power includes that of submitting such amendments either individually or jointly at such time and manner as the Convention may direct in its discretion. The Court's delicate task now is to decide which of these two poses is really in accord with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question of jurisdiction. They contend that the issue before Us is a political question and that the Convention being a legislative body of the highest order is sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of the Congress and the courts. In this connection, it is to be noted that none of the respondent has joined intervenors in this posture. In fact, respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Convention, expressly concede the jurisdiction of this Court in their answer acknowledging that the issue herein is a justiciable one.

Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the decision of this Court in the case of Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774, wherein the members of the Court, despite their being divided in their opinions as to the other matters therein involved, were precisely unanimous in upholding its jurisdiction. Obviously, distinguished counsel have either failed to grasp the full impact of the portions of Our decision they have quoted or would misapply them by taking them out of context.

There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts of the Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, and, for that matter, those of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the Constitution, which concededly is at par with the former. A simple reading of Our ruling in that very case of Gonzales relied upon by intervenors should dispel any lingering misgivings as regards that point. Succinctly but comprehensively, Chief Justice Concepcion held for the Court thus:

"As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this Court

— speaking through one of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P.

Laurel — declared that 'the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of

powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.'

"It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one, declined to pass upon the question whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the Constitution — which was being submitted to the people for ratification — satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the Senate (81 Phil:

818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851, March 4 & 14, 1943), Tañada v. Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957) and Macias v. Commission on Elections, (L-18684, Sept. 14, 1961). In the first we held that the officers and employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine the number of Senators necessary for quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act, on behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes therein of two (2) Senators belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the representatives districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases that the issues therein raised were political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.

"Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments

"Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments