Limitations in transmitting intelligence were systemic problems for all Mediterranean states in antiquity. Different states addressed these limitations in a variety of ways. While it was desirable for one state to know about the events
6 The ability to achieve this would require not only a standing professional army, but
also the justification for agents in foreign territories, and the ability to secure
information transferral in a predictable and timely manner. During the mid-republic, this was simply impossible.
7 See above, pp. 17-25, for a discussion of the link between modern intelligence studies
and neo-realist IR theory. While it may be possible for scholars to make a case for Realist interpretations of Roman history it is dangerous to assume that was the case based on modern interpretations of affairs. For arguments supporting a Realist interpretation see Eckstein 2006; Eckstein 2008. Contra Gruen 1984; Burton 2011.
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and affairs of others, they relied on a combination of oral and written communication in an environment where such communication was unpredictable and vulnerable to corruption.8
Some developed postal systems in order to introduce a degree of predictability into the system. Herodotus would have us believe the Persian system was so reliable no weather would affect it.9
According to Xenophon, this was established by Cyrus to ensure he could remain informed in a timely manner about the affairs of his far-flung empire no matter where he happened to be within it. He set up postal stations one day’s journey apart.10
The Ptolemaic system was based on the earlier Persian one. Every station housed an administrative system to record the couriers’ comings and goings, and to protect against lost or corrupted communications.11
Under the Persian and Ptolemaic systems, a timely delivery was ensured via the
establishment of a series of postal stations, where messages would be transferred to fresh couriers.
Unlike both the Persian and the later Ptolemaic empires, the Romans of the mid-republic never developed a sophisticated and organised postal service, for either domestic or military purposes. There is in fact no suggestion that any existed in surviving literary accounts.12
Telephonic modes of communication were not often attempted, although there are suggestions of the short-range use of trumpet signalling. Fire signals were also used, as described in theoretical terms by Aeneas Tacticus and Polybius; these systems are very poorly understood.13
The lack of an organised postal service limited the transmission of
8 The prevalence of written communication during the mid-republic is difficult to
determine. Later historical sources certainly suggest that they were commonplace, though this could easily be back-projection based on their authors’ own times.
9 Hdt. 8.98. 10 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.17.
11 Remijsen 2007: 130. For general information about ‘postal services’ in antiquity see
Kornemann 1953.
12 Ramsay made an argument for a later republican postal service, possibly set up as
part of the Gracchan reforms. The argument is controversial, and relies on a questionable interpretation of a single inscription. Ramsay 1920; contra Cary 1936.
13 Polyb. 10.43-47. Fire signalling was certainly known and used in the Mediterranean
world, especially by the Greeks. It is mentioned, for example, in the Iliad (18.207-213). See also Hdt. 7.183; Aesch. Aga. 281-311. There is little evidence for its use by the mid- republican Roman army. See Livy 28.5.16-17; Veg. 3.5. For Roman imperial signalling see Woolliscroft 2001; Sheldon 2005: 199-249.
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information.14
Information transferral was ad hoc, unorganised, and reliant upon private individuals. But any knowledge that individuals or the senate deemed to be important nevertheless had to be transmitted somehow, despite the absence of a formalised service. Whether information was transmitted depended on what was deemed worthy of transmission, a willingness to transmit, and the ability to procure a trustworthy courier. In peaceful circumstances, information flows to the senate and private individuals were largely reliable, as the panic that ensued when information pathways were blocked and delayed by warfare by inverse implication suggests.15
Roman despondence at a lack of reliable news suggests that, at least while conflict was limited to the Italian peninsula, there was an expectation the senate would remain well informed. During the Hannibalic war, the senate appointed Fabius Maximus dictator in part because of confused information coming in from the field, and an inability to securely send directives to the Roman armies.16
Desperation forced extraordinary measures. The lack of a formal postal system did not control the flow of information; geopolitical conditions—war and peace—did. The existence of a formal postal system would not have solved transmission problems. Nor would it have solved the perennial difficulties surrounding the security of communications: these would still have been vulnerable to tampering, and would have been difficult to track.
To be efficient and useful, communications had to arrive in a timely manner. Transportation was generally slow in the ancient world, as noted above. And, as also noted before, the Romans were not the only people to have to live with such limitations. Various uncontrollable factors influenced the ability for
14 The later Roman imperial system appears to have preferred reliability over speed.
In contrast to other Mediterranean systems, the posts provided fresh horses and lodgings rather than new couriers. Both systems had their advantages and
disadvantages. The timely transferral of knowledge is vital to military intelligence, but using one rider increases security and offers the chance to supplement written communications with eyewitness information.
15 After the period investigated here, the near constant stream of letters to and from
Cicero indicates that neither the cost nor the lack of a centralised courier system prevented the flow of letters. The content of many letters was frivolous rather than necessary, highlighting an ease of communication. See for instance Cic. Att. 6.22.1, 8.114.11, 12.42.1. For more on the circulation of information in Cicero see Pittia 2002.
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couriers to transmit information.17
There are only a few indications of land transportation speeds in antiquity. Attempts to determine a general average speed of movement are doomed to fail since recorded speeds tend to be exceptional. For instance, Suetonius records that Julius Caesar could travel 100 miles a day in hired carriages and typically arrived before messengers sent to announce his coming.18
Livy records a messenger taking four days to travel on horseback from Luni to Rome in 181, a distance of 93 kilometres per day.19
Plutarch claims that an average speed of 115 kilometres per day could be achieved on a journey from Brundisium to Rome,20
a speed supported by Appian’s account of a journey from Ravenna to Rome during the civil wars.21
Speeds were affected by numerous uncontrollable factors including weather, terrain, the season, infrastructure, and state of security. These variables limited the usefulness of intelligence. Any information received via land routes was potentially out of date and of limited use, especially if it contained time-sensitive tactical information.22
Intelligence of events and actions gained by chance that needed an immediate response could only be put into action if it pertained to events in the immediate vicinity of Roman military forces or of Rome itself. Pre- emptive strikes based on intelligence gathered in the field were, of course, out of the question.
17 For examples of the unreliability of transport speed see Bérenger-Badel 2002; Pittia
2002.
18 Suet. Div. Iul. 57. 19 Livy 39.21.5. 20 Plut. Cat. Mai. 14. 21 App. B Civ. 2.32.
22 Our understanding of seaborne travel speeds is little better. Ancient sources
disagree on almost all matters relating to seaborne travel, as do modern
interpretations of them. See for instance Semple 1932; Casson 1951; Reddé 1979; Reddé 1986; Romm 1992; Horden and Purcell 2000; De Souza 2002; Beresford 2013. Even the length and time of the ideal sailing seasons is disputed. Modern sources base the sailing season on excerpts from Hesiod, who admits to knowing nothing about the sea, but advises a highly restricted period: Works and Days, 663-669; the late fourth- century AD military handbook of Vegetius, who advocated a limited sailing season between March and November for merchant vessels, and between late May and September for military ships: 4.39; and the fourth-century AD edict of Gratian, which restricted the sailing of state-owned navicularii cargo shipping from Roman Africa: Codex Theodosianus, 13.9.3. Hesiod’s restricted season of 50 days is, however, often taken out of context and ignores the other references in his poem to sailing during both the spring and the autumn: Works and Days, 618-683.
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Even if communiqués were sent under urgency in perfect conditions, the intelligence they contained was vulnerable to interception. Little is known about the use of written ciphers and codes in the mid-republic, especially by Roman forces.23
It is possible that secure communication existed but failed to become known to surviving commentators. Among the extant sources, Aeneas Tacticus devotes the fullest attention to cryptography and communication security. He presents eighteen different methods regarding both cryptography and
steganography, which takes up approximately twelve percent of his treatise.24
These techniques were devoted to keeping the contents of a message hidden from any potential interceptor.25
Aeneas’ discussion indicates that interception was a matter of great concern in antiquity. His cryptographical methods relied on prearranged keys. The receiver needed to know how to solve the cipher for them to be of any use. For anticipated communications, this could be arranged beforehand. Ciphers are less helpful in unplanned and urgent intelligence scenarios. Steganographic systems may have reduced the seizure of intelligence, especially against an unsuspecting or naïve enemy, who did not thoroughly search the messenger, his baggage, and his equipment.26
Attempts to hide information acknowledge and assume interception attempts would take place. Although there are few examples of this in extant Roman sources, or
descriptions of security measures, fear of interception certainly existed.
Mitigating the security risks, in a context where human transportation was the only option, was extremely difficult.27
There was no alternative but to use
23 There is evidence in surviving Egyptian papyri of Greek cryptography in the
Hellenistic and Roman periods. See Gardthausen 1911: II, 305.
24 For a current translation and commentary on Aeneas see Whitehead 2001. Leighton
1969 provides an overview of suggested secret communication techniques among Greek and Roman forces.
25 Aen. Tact. 31.
26 Even with ciphers, the capture of a messenger posed a threat. Pertinent tactical
information could be extracted about enemy movements, numbers, and morale.
27 Austin and Rankov allege that the paucity of evidence for written communication in
the earlier periods of Roman history makes it clear that almost all intelligence
gathered from across Roman frontiers was oral communication –autopsy and hearsay were only committed to writing if it were necessary. Austin and Rankov 1995: 35-6. It is possible that written communication is an anachronism from later Roman history. But the same security problems exist in oral communication. Removing a letter from a messenger could easily become removing the messenger. Further, the lack of physical evidence from the mid-republic does mean written communication was not used.
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reliable couriers to convey intelligence and to develop contingency plans that did not rely on information being received. Interception and forgery are common counterintelligence and covert activities. They allow an enemy state or army to gain information about what the other side knows and is planning, and to actively interfere and deceive.28
The fear of interception is more prevalent in the Roman historical record than successful attempts at seizing intelligence. Of the latter, only two detailed mid-Republican examples exist,29
both dating to the Second Punic War. In 207, the consul Claudius Nero intercepted a
communiqué from Hasdrubal to Hannibal announcing his presence in Italy, and reportedly advising that they meet in Umbria. Roman forces were already aware of Hasdrubal’s crossing the Alps from their own monitoring efforts. The
interception of these letters gave insight into Hasdrubal’s plans and allowed Nero and his colleague Livius Salinator to join forces. This interception was not planned, of course, but was due to luck. The Numidian riders sent by
Hasdrubal became lost in Italy. Nero captured and interrogated them. He deceived Hannibal by sneaking out of camp, while maintaining the illusion the camp was strongly garrisoned. Taking advantage of Hasdrubal’s ignorance of his lost communiqué, the two consuls deceived Hasdrubal about the size of their forces. Ultimately, the interception led to the defeat of Hasdrubal at the battle of Metaurus.30
Without the information, the two Roman armies may never have joined forces before Hasdrubal succeeded in meeting with Hannibal.
The other noteworthy case involved two distinct interceptions. In 215, the Roman fleet intercepted Xenophanes, an agent of Philip V of Macedon, as he was returning from meetings with the Carthaginians. He was arrested and detained. The Romans learned that Xenophanes had been negotiating a treaty with the Carthaginian senate.31
He had already been intercepted once before but had talked his way out of Roman detention. Livy claims that Xenophanes and
Everyday records were not destined to survive antiquity. If the chance finds at Vindolanda are indicative of common practice, military reports and communications were destroyed. For more on the Vindolanda tablets see Bowman 2003.
28 Cases of deception and interference will be discussed in the following chapters. 29 Also worthy of note is the removal of the hands of some Capuan messengers
intercepted by the Romans attempting to send a letter to Hannibal. See Zonar. 9.6.
30 Livy 27.43-51; Polyb. 11.1-3; Cic. Brut. 73; App. Hann. 52-54. For further references to
the battle see MRR I.294.
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his colleagues, on their way to their first stop to visit Hannibal in Capua, had bypassed Roman patrols by avoiding Tarentum and Brundisium as their disembarkation point.32
By chance, Roman patrols intercepted them in Apulia and escorted the embassy to the praetor Valerius Laevinus. Xenophanes convinced the praetor he was there on behalf of Philip to seek an alliance with Rome. Laevinus provided Xenophanes with hospitality and openly furnished him with intelligence. Philip’s agent learnt of routes across Italy, and of areas held by Carthaginians and by Romans. He manipulated Laevinus and succeeded in reaching Hannibal.
It is perhaps unfair to condemn Laevinus as foolish in hindsight. That the Macedonians knew of the Roman presence at certain ports suggests their own intelligence and contingency planning, which presumably included a convincing lie to report to the Romans if they were caught. That this interception occurred at all indicates a Roman appreciation of intelligence and information control. The choice to believe the information presented by Xenophanes or not was subjective and Laevinus cannot be condemned for it. He misinterpreted affairs, and risked damaging Roman chances in the war. If the interception and
subsequent questioning were more successful, valuable information would have been kept from Hannibal. In any event, on the return journey Xenophanes was caught, with a Carthaginian entourage, and placed under arrest.33
The
interception here has two significant implications for Roman intelligence. One was that Roman forces were actively attempting to investigate their surroundings; the other, more important point, is that interceptions existed and introduced a level of uncertainty into any widespread intelligence communication.34
Without
32The envoys, incidentally, clearly knew that Roman forces controlled these ports,
suggesting a level of reconnaissance on Philip’s part. Whether the patrols were attempting to prevent enemy manoeuvers or simply monitoring and attempting to avoid surprise is unknown. But that there were Roman patrols actively monitoring the area, presumably for Carthaginian forces, indicates that at least some commanders sought and valued current intelligence in military situations. The Romans were not simply waiting for Carthaginian forces to surprise them.
33 Livy 23.33-34; App. Mac. 1.
34 An investigation into the military use of intelligence and counterintelligence, that is
the use of intelligence by armies in the field such as security measures taken against deserters and the planting of false information by fake deserters, is not discussed in this thesis. In general, it is a poorly explored area that would benefit from further
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the ability to communicate with Xenophanes, Philip had no choice but to wait in ignorance, having no idea of whether his communiqué had been delivered or not. This uncertainty effectively meant that while commanders and foreign officials could provide information about tactical and strategic affairs, assuming they were not intercepted, they could not rely on information, or an active response to information, being returned to them.
The fear of interception is more pronounced in the sources than interception because the lack of instantaneous communication meant that dispatchers of intelligence could not be reassured that their communications had been received. Commanders in the field especially had to maintain a healthy scepticism about the fate of their dispatches. Help they requested might arrive, but there was no guarantee that their messengers had not been delayed, disappeared, or captured. In 181, the Ligurian Inguani besieged the proconsul Aemilius Paullus. After he was attacked, he sent two riders to the proconsul Baebius Tamphilus at Pisa with dispatches requesting immediate aid.35
Baebius had passed control of his forces to the praetor Pinarius Rusca to take to
Sardinia, and was not in a position to help. He did inform the senate, via another dispatch, that Paullus was under siege. He also wrote to the proconsul Claudius Marcellus informing him of the matter, and asked if it were possible for him to take his army into Liguria.36
But Marcellus had also handed over control of his army to the praetor Fabius Buteo who was campaigning against the Istrians.37
Again, this was of no help to Paullus. These missives were received without interception or corruption. There was nothing stopping Marcellus, Baebius, or the senate from informing Paullus about their receipt of his request, or indeed, communicating their movements to each other. Instead, there was a debate and relative panic in the senate about what to do. Emergency troops were raised, but had little hope of reaching Paullus in time to aid him. Paullus had originally chosen to defend and delay without relying too much on the hope that
investigation. For deserters in during the mid-republic and the Roman reaction to them, see Wolff 2009.
35 Livy 40.25.7. Frontinus suggests that Paullus feigned his fear to drive the Ligurians
into a false sense of security: Strat. 3.17.2. There is no support for this in Livy’s account.
36 Livy 40.25.8-9. 37 Livy 40.26.2-4.
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relief would arrive.38
Eventually, believing his messengers had been intercepted, he had little choice but to adopt a different plan.39
He marched against and routed the Ligurians.40
According to Livy’s account, there were at least four