Resumen

FACTS : Merito Miguel (respondent) run for the position of municipal mayor in Bolinao, Pangasinan to which he was elected. However his election was opposed by the petitioners on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the US not of Bolinao because on the back of the card, it printed that

“Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the US. In his answer admitted that he hold a green card but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the US. He alleged that he obtained the green card only for convenience in order that he may freely enter the US for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, that he voted in all elections including the plebiscite for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

After hearing, the COMELEC ruled that the possession of a green card by Miguel does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Phil.

because in spite of his green card, respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in all previous elections.

It is also averred that the act of filing of certificate of candidacy constitutes a waiver of status as a permanent resident/immigrant in the US.

ISSUE : 1. Whether or not possession of Miguel of a green card constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Phil.

2. Whether or not mere filing of certificate of candidacy constitutes a waiver of status as a permanent resident in the US.

HELD : 1. Yes, Miguel’s immigration to the US constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Phil. for he did not go to US merely to visit his children but with the intention to live there permanently as evidence by his application for an immigrant’s visa. Base on that application he was issued by the US govt. the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.

2. No. His act of filing a COC did not constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant in the US. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to the filing of his candidacy and without such prior waiver, he is disqualified to run for any elective office.

GARCIA FULE V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. L-40502, November 29, 1976

FACTS : Petitioner, Virginia Fule filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of administration alleging, inter alia that Amado Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna died intestate in Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna. Private respondent, Preciosa Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. She contended that the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado Garcia. On the contrary, Preciosa Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado Garcia was at 11 Carmel, Carmel Subd. Quezon City. Parentically, in her amended petition, Virginia Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.

ISSUE : 1. Whether or not the deceased’s last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna.

2. What does the term “resides” mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death?

HELD : 1. No. The SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G.

Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence

of the decedent at the time of his death. ¹² As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.

2. This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.

Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"

but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,

"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

SALUDO, JR. V. AMERICAN EXPRESS G.R. No. 159507, April 19, 2006

FACTS : Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers alleging inter alia, that plaintiff "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines."

The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. Respondents raised the affirmative defenses that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was

issued at Pasay City. To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.

Saludo asserted that such allegations was baseless and unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. The court a quo denied the affirmative defenses interposed by respondents stating in its order that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the incumbent Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to dispell any and all doubts about his actual residence. As such his personal, actual and physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte. Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same. They then filed with the appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition which the appellate court granted the said petition.

Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate court denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE : Whether petitioner Saludo was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.

HELD : Yes. Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had

because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.

In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his profession or doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election or political purposes where he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then he can have residences in these two places. Because it would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually, personally and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law.

The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place.

UYTENGSU vs. REPUBLIC 95 Phil 890 (1954)

FACTS : Petitioner Wilfred Uytengsu was born in the Phil. of Chinese parents. He began his studies here from primary school to college. He filed an application for naturalization but after the filing he immediately left the Phil. for the US not returning until several months after the first date set for the hearing of his application. Subsequently, the CFI of Cebu granted his application for naturalization.

The republic appealed on the ground that petitioner failed to meet the residency requirements laid down by law for naturalization that he will reside continuously in the Phil from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Phil. citizenship.

Petitioner contends that the word residence laid down by law is synonymous with domicile which one acquired is not lost by physical absence until another domicile is obtained and that he continued to be domiciled in, and hence a resident of the Phil. his purpose in staying in the US at the time was merely to study therein.

ISSUE : Whether or not for purposes of that law residence is synonymous with domicile.

HELD : No. for purposes of naturalization law residence requires physical presence in that place for a longer or shorter period of time. Residence is used to indicate the place of abode whether permanent or temporary while domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, on has the intention of returning.

Residence is not domicile by domicile is residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time.

Hence, absence during period intervening between the filing of application and hearing is an obstacle to petitioner’s naturalization.

B. MERITS AND DEMERITS OF DOMICILE MERITS –

1. In cases where the individual who belongs to a country following the domiciliary theory is involved in a case before the Philippine courts, his personal status, capacity, condition, and family rights will be governed by the law of his domicile;

2. In cases of stateless persons who may claim dual or multiple nationality, in which case the court will have to refer to their domicile;

3. When an alien domiciled in the Philippines executes a will abroad DEMERITS –

1. One’s domicile is not ascertainable without first resorting to the courts to establish whether or not there is animo manendi

2. The notion of domicile differs widely with some states distinguishing between residence and domicile or attributing different meanings of domicile for different purposes;

3. If the law of the domicile of origin is given utmost significance, then it will give rise to the same problem as in nationality

4. In cases where the individual who belongs to a country following the

C. GENERAL RULES ON DOMICILE

1. No person shall be without a domicile;

2. A person cannot have two simultaneous domicile since the very purpose for identifying one’s domicile is to establish a connection between the person and a definite legal system;

3. Domicile establishes a connection between a person and a particular territorial unit.

4. Once acquired, it remains the domicile unless a new one is obtained:

a. by capacitated persons b. with freedom of choice c. with actual physical presence

d. and provable intent that it should be one’s fixed and permanent place of abode, there should be animus manendi (intent to remain) or animus nonrevertendi (intent not to remain)

5. The presumption is in favor of the continuance of domicile. The burden of proving a change of domicile is upon whoever alleges that a change has been secured.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC 248 SCRA 300

FACTS : Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. She stated in the COC that she is a resident of the place for seven months. Private respondent Montejo subsequently filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification on the ground that Imelda failed to meet the constitutional requirement of one-year residency.

COMELEC granted the Petition for Disqualification, holding that Imelda is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City as her place of domicile when she lived and even voted in Ilocos and Manila.

ISSUE : Whether or not Imelda is deemed to have abandoned her domicile of origin HELD : An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained

residence in different places. Residence implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion that

“she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places” flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election purposes.

UJANO V. REPUBLIC