The Beqaa valley, a predominantly Shi‘a inhabited area on the Lebanese-Syrian borders, has always been Hezbollah’s linchpin and its perpetual backyard and reservoir. It has been a base for its training campuses since its foundation in 1982, a permanent route for its weapon shipments from Iran via Syria, and since 2012, a frontline against the Syrian opposition and a starting point for its full engagement in Syria’s turmoil. Chapter 5 will unpack the clashes that occurred in the area and how Hezbollah began its gradual intervention through this region but it is important to mention in this chapter the confrontations that erupted on the Lebanese side of the border. Flanked by large numbers of Shi‘a, Arsal, a Sunni village of approximately 40,000 citizens, sits atop the Beqaa
84 “Michel Aoun Rises to Lebaense Presidency, ending power vacuum”, by Thanassis
Cambanis. On 31 October 2016. The New York Times. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/world/middleeast/michel-aoun-lebanon- president.html
mountains and converges with Syria’s border. The Sunni citizens of this village, along with other Lebanese Sunnis, had accumulated their antagonism towards Hezbollah for years, namely driven by the 7 May clashes that was paralleled with the rise of the Sunni- Shi‘a schism in the region. With the eruption of Syria’s civil war, Arsal became a sanctuary for jihadist factions, namely Hay’at Tahreer al-Sham (HTS), formerly Jabhat al-Nusra, and ISIS later, who were taking refuge in its mountain tops.
In 2014, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) executed a clandestine operation leading to the arrest of a military leader of HTS. In retaliation, the village was overrun by HTS and ISIS kidnapping 30 Lebanese soldiers and police officers before retreating to the barren hills of the village. Under political pressures spearheaded by Sunni clerics and figures, the LAF weren’t given permission to advance to the rescue of their comrades and the attack was halted. However, with Aoun in office since late 2016, the situation changed and the confrontation in the hills started looming. Additionally, Hariri, supported by the US, agreed to conduct the operation by the LAF to cleanse these mountains from terrorists. But before plunging into the war, the Lebanese political elites, hoping to ease sectarian tensions, expressed that this operation was directed against terrorism rather than Sunnis. Sectarian otherness was never the causal factor of most confrontations, and if occurred, it was an exception. But it was easy to malign the other by using a sectarian discourse and victimhood. During this period of time, HTS and ISIS had clashed multiple times in the hills for a battle of domination but with little advancements from either side.
While the preparation for the confrontation was ongoing, Hezbollah stepped in on 20 July, and launched an offensive against HTS-dominated peaks.86 Aram Nerguizian (2017) accused the organization of preventing the LAF from executing a dual plan to attack both together, HTS and ISIS.87 Regardless, with Hezbollah closing up on al-Nusra
from all sides, the latter bargained a deal for a safe retreat towards Idlib, northwestern Syria. One month later, on 19 August, Aoun initiated an offensive he dubbed “Fajr al-
Jouroud” (Dawn of the Barren Hills) conducted by the LAF against ISIS fighters “Dawn of
the Barren Hills”. Tacitly coordinating with the LAF, yet without public confirmation, Hezbollah and the SAA declared too, the beginning of a raid they called “En ‘Odtom
‘Odna” (If you’re back, we’re back), against ISIS’s strongholds from the Syrian side of the
borders. These confrontations were dictated by the overlap of politics and facts on the ground.
“The United states and the United Kingdom have stated clearly that as members of the US-led counter-ISIS coalition, they stood ready to assist the Lebanese armed forces, should Lebanon and the armed forces request it.”88 Donald Trump, the US president, indirectly stood against Hezbollah’s claims of defending Lebanon saying that “American assistance can ensure that the Lebanese army is the only defender Lebanon
86 “’Dawn of the barren hills’ and ‘If you’re back, we’re back’ the reason of the similiar
timing”, by Ali Awada. On 20 August 2017. An-nahar newspaper: Lebanon. Retrieved from: https://www.annahar.com/article/643917-دﺣاوﻟا-تﯾﻗوﺗﻟا-بﺑﺳ-ﺎﻧدﻋ-مﺗدﻋ-ناو-دورﺟﻟا-رﺟﻓ
87 The Lebanese armed forces, Hezbollah and military legitimacy. By Aram Nerguizian,
on 4 October 2017. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from: https://www.csis.org/analysis/lebanese-armed-forces-hezbollah-and-military-legitimacy
88 “The Lebanese armed forces, Hezbollah and military legitimacy”, by Aram Nerguizian.
needs.”89 This statement remains confined to the political dynamics rather than facts on
the ground. “Hezbollah’s cooperation with the LAF is not new but rather perpetual, so how come they would not cooperate with them while both are attacking the same target in one geographical zone.”90 However, Nerguizian (2017) insisted that “elements close to
Hezbollah” are promoting the rhetoric of collaboration between the LAF on one side and their Syrian counterpart and Hezbollah on the other. Nerguizian’s argument is misleading from a military point of view because facts on the ground dictated the rudder of the confrontation and it impossible not to coordinate the attacks.
The triumph of the LAF was considered quick in rock-solid terrains, full of hidden caves and elevated hills. Cornered between the LAF from one side and Hezbollah from the other, ISIS bargained a deal with the latter allowing them to journey to the then ISIS controlled area of Deir ez-Zor in northwest Syria. In exchange, ISIS pledged to release Hezbollah captured fighters and to reveal the place of the bodies of the LAF and police soldiers which had been abducted in 2014. Hezbollah tried to promote itself as the redeemer by bringing back the bodies of the dead soldiers of the LAF. As a matter of fact, Hezbollah was keen to appear as the defender of Lebanon’s soil and overstated the battle’s results when Nasrallah claimed that this is “the second war of emancipation.”91 By the expulsion of these jihadist fighters who found sanctuaries in the Beqaa’s barren
89 “ISIS negotiates safe exit from Lebanese border in air-conditioned buses”, by Richard
Hall. On 30 August 2017. USA today. Retrieved from:
https://eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/08/30/isis-negotiates-safe-exit- lebanese-border/615533001/
90 Interview with author. 4 September 2018.
91 “Nasrallah: 28 August is the second day of emancipation and to investigate with
whoever prevented the army since 2014”, on 28 August 2017. An-nahar newspaper: Lebanon. Retrieved from: https://newspaper.annahar.com/article/650049--بآ-28-ﷲرﺻﻧ
hills, Lebanon secured the last enclave on its territory. If compared to its full-scale intervention in Syria’s civil war, the decision to conduct this offensive by Hezbollah was minor. In parallel to the ground assault, it also led the negotiations with these groups. Taking part in the assault did not need the approval of Iran as Hezbollah had already been enmeshed in Syria’s civil war for years now.
4.9 2018 Parliamentary elections: Massive win
Parliamentary elections in Lebanon take place every four years. However, gridlocked in the turmoil caused by the civil war in Syria and its political and security spillovers into Lebanon, elections were adjourned 3 times. The elections that were supposed to be held in 2013, were postponed twice on conditions of security threats and the possible terrorist attacks that might occur. On 16 June 2017, after a long governmental stalemate, political factions agreed, some reluctantly, on a new proportional representation (PR) law for the first time since independence. Therefore, a technical extension for 11 months was to postpone the elections until 6 May 2018. The new electoral law gave voters the choice of one preferable vote within the list they choose to elect, called single transferable vote (STV). Pundits have criticized this suggestion by pointing out that it “redraws electoral districts in an overly sectarian fashion, insuring that parliamentarians are elected mainly by their co-religionists.”92 Although PR is better than the majoritarian system as it gives the opportunity for minorities and small parties to be represented, the religious and sectarian mindset of most voters would drive them to give
92 “Is Lebanon’s new electoral system a path out of sectarianism”, by Elias Muhanna.
On 29 June 2017. The New Yorker. Retrieved from”
the preferable vote for a candidate of their sect. This is not the norm in other countries, however.
The amendment of the electoral system was the hardest milestone. Their mutual antagonism notwithstanding, Aoun and Geagea had always appealed to change the majoritarian electoral law to a more democratic PR system. In his inauguration speech, Aoun insisted that a new electoral law must be implemented and hence allowing a fair and better representation for all Lebanese groups.93 As mentioned in the “Memorandum of Understanding” signed between Aoun and Nasrallah in 2006, a new electoral law based on PR must be implemented. Hariri and Jumblatt, however, both afraid to lose seats for their political opponents and hoping to confiscate the decision-making in their sects, were opposed to any kind of PR. But to gain their approval, many constituencies were gerrymandered in their favor. Hezbollah knew that a PR system will give them a majority in the parliament because the majoritarian system will not allow their Sunni and Druze allies to be elected as they don’t represent a majority in their sects. Palpably, Hezbollah’s foremost target is bringing to the fore its Muslim identity rather than confining itself to the Shi‘a sect, especially after the sectarian splits in the region and its accusation of targeting Sunnis. So once their Sunni allies get elected, the organization will counter- argue the “Shi‘a identity” label.94 Nevertheless, such attempts were nearly impossible as will be shown in chapter 5 and 6, because Hezbollah helped aggravate the Sunni-Shi‘a schism by instrumentalizing further its sectarian identity.
93 “New president in Inaugural speech: Lebanon to Cope with corruption, preemptively
fight terrorism”. On 31 October 2016. Al-Manar English. Retrieved from: http://english.almanar.com.lb/83290
A Pro-Saudi Shi‘a reporter accused the organization of pressing everyone to accept the new law in order to politically breach other sects representation, namely Sunnis. He contended that Hezbollah’s identity politics within the Shi‘a sect is impenetrable, which is not the case for other sects or parties. Therefore, this new PR system leveraged Hezbollah’s allies which now form a cross-sectarian alliance, but didn’t harm Hezbollah since its milieus are closed either by ideology or power of arms.95 The
“Lebanese Forces” spokesman argued that Hezbollah has supporters among all sects even though the percentages fluctuate from one sect to another, but they were always outnumbered in the majoritarian law. This is not the case anymore because the new PR system cleared the path for the triumph of its Sunni allies.96 The Future Movement deputy secretary general seconded that Hezbollah succeeded by insisting on a new electoral law which gave it, along with allies, a parliamentary majority, but “what is winning or losing in Lebanon?”, he ended.97 The outcome, however, was a clear win for Hezbollah and its allies, an endgame that the organization has always wished for.
Furthermore, in previous elections, not all Shi‘a seats were allocated by the Hezbollah-Amal coalition, i.e. Beirut Shi‘a seats were dominated by Hariri’s Future Movement who benefited from the majoritarian law in a Sunni majority district. Such prevail was only possible by the majoritarian system and all largely-represented parties have always took advantage of this system to marginalize their foes. Consequently, Hezbollah’s first priority in the May 2018 election was securing all Shi‘a seats. The second priority was to secure as much seats as it can for their Sunni allies; therefore, the
95 Interview with author. 13 November 2018. 96 Interview with author. 20 October 2018.
organization urged its supporters to vote for their allies in districts where Hezbollah has no Shi‘a candidates. As an outcome, 6 pro-Hezbollah Sunni figures won of which 4 formed a block in the post-election period that was called by the media and Hariri’s supporters the “Sunnis of the 8 March coalition”. By doing that, Hezbollah’s opponents tried to strip these MPs from their Sunni identity as being pro-Hezbollah, and therefore, pro-Shi‘a. Stripping people of their identity because of their political stances had always been the norm in Lebanon.
The tricky calculations of the new electoral law placed allies on rival lists. Some coalitions were a short-term marriage with electoral benefits rather than long-term political programs. The result was catastrophic for Hezbollah’s opponents as the latter secured, along with its allies, 71 out of 128 seats in the parliament: 29 seats were allocated for the FPM, 29 for Hezbollah and Amal, and 13 other seats for minor allies, including 6 Sunnis. However, the 14 March coalition only secured 38 seats: Future movement suffered the biggest lost as it only withheld 20 seats, the “Lebanese Forces” secured 15 seats, and “al-Kata’ib” (The Phalangists) won 3 seats. Jumblatt, however, won 9 seats but at this period of time he wasn’t completely sidelining with the 14 March coalition. But even with Jumblatt, they would count 47. 10 remaining seats were allocated for independents. Compared with the 57 MPs in the former parliament, Hezbollah and its allies were able to secure a majority in the parliamentary elections of 2018 surpassing the MPs of the 14 march block. Therefore, Hezbollah’s persistence to implement a new PR electoral system, together with its key ally, President Michel Aoun, proved fruitful. The 2018 elections marked the end of an era in Hezbollah’s history during which it reached the apogee.
4.10 Conclusion
Since its emergence, Hezbollah has continued to rise unabated. Despite its loathe by the West and many Arab regimes in later stages, the operational status of Hezbollah gradually gained credibility. In the 1990s, it witnessed its first transition by adopting the “infitah policy” leading to the heralding of its first participation in domestic politics. Faced by a multisectarian society, Hezbollah recognized that implementing an Islamic State in Lebanon was nearly impossible. Subsequently, it participated in the 1992 parliamentary elections amid internal debates creating the dichotomy of soft- vs hard-liners. While the latter rejected the participation in a confessional system that it had long pledged to thwart, the former adopted a more lenient stance by pressing towards an adaptation with the status quo. This chapter unpacked the maneuvers of Hezbollah in the Lebanese theatre from 2004 until its prevail in the 2018 parliamentary elections. Hezbollah sensed that a quite war is being waged against it by external and internal actors threatening its interests in the Lebanese theatre. Therefore, it explained the conditions that pushed Hezbollah to participate in the cabinet in the post-Syria withdrawal era, marking its second engagement in the Lebanese system.
Consequently, it unpacked the important agreement called “Memorandum of Understanding” that Nasrallah signed with Aoun, representing the strongest party among Christians, in 2006. This was few months before the cross-border raid that Hezbollah orchestrated against the IDF and culminating in the kidnap of 2 soldiers. Nasrallah sought to exchange these prisoners for the Lebanese inmates in the Israeli prisons who Nasrallah promised earlier to release. Unexpectedly, Israel launched a full-scale war that proved to be a fiasco. Tel Aviv failed to accomplish its earlier claim of annihilating
Hezbollah and therefore the latter declared itself triumphant at the end of the conflict. The chapter examined the domestic split after Hariri’s assassination between pro- and anti- Syria coalitions, 8 march and 14 march, consecutively. In 7 May 2008, Lebanon disintegrated into chaos as clashes erupted between both sides. Hezbollah overran its opponents and captured Beirut, further exacerbating the Sunni-Shi‘a tensions. The conflict was sealed by the “Doha agreement” which took place in Qatar.
This chapter scrutinized the presidential elections that brought Aoun to presidency and the military operation conducted by Hezbollah on the Lebanese-Syrian borders against ISIS and HTS, it dubbed “En ‘Odtom ‘Odna”. Finally, it underscored the 6 May parliamentary elections and the triumph of Hezbollah and its allies by securing the majority of the seats. This triumph in the legislative council posed a new challenge for Hezbollah, as it “would have to seek to improve state services, stabilize government finances, spark regional development, and spearhead administrative reforms.”98 Now, more embedded in the system, they will have to fulfil the voters’ expectations or risk losing supporters. Further afield, by 2018, Hezbollah had clearly become a regional ANSA operating for the benefit of the axis that extends, from Beirut to Tehran, via Damascus and Baghdad.
98 “Hezbollah’s Journey from Syria’s Battlefield to Lebanon’s Political Minefield”, by Ali
Hashem. On 28 August 2018. Carnegie Middle East Center. Retrieved from:
5 The Regional Geopolitical Contest: Hezbollah’s Operations beyond