RESUMEN DE LOS PRINCIPALES INDICADORES

An interpretation along these lines may also account not only for loud Rus- sian opposition to a prominent role for NATO in general, but also for some intriguing shifts and ambiguities in Russia’s policy during the subsequent

96 The military doctrine adopted in 1993 expresses deep concern about the potential deterio- ration of Russia’s military-strategic position. And although NATO enlargement is not mentioned explicitly in these sections, it is difficult to imagine that references to ‘some states and coalitions of states’ and to a potential ‘stationing’ and ‘build-up’ of armed groupings closer to Russia’s border do not involve the Western alliance. See ‘Osnovnye polozheniya voennoy doktriny Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (1993).

years. For instance, when NATO launched PfP in January 1994, both Presi- dent Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev signalled Russia’s willingness to join the program (Zagorski 1997:534). The new framework proposed by NATO envisioned individual security agreements with (potentially) all states in the European region. Thus, PfP did not imply a strengthening of NATO’s role per se. Seen from Russia, an individual partnership agreement with NATO might in fact contribute to a realisation of shared interests and pro- duce mutual benefits for Russia and the West in the security sphere (Kozyrev 1994:61).

However, it appears that Moscow initially regarded PfP as a substitute to NATO enlargement (Zagorski 1997:534; Kugler 1996:62). As it became clear to the Russian government that the program was designed to prepare potential NATO members for future accession, two factors contributed to Russia’s hesitation with regard to joining PfP. First, the program did little to alleviate a feeling in Moscow that Russia was being pushed to the rim of the European heartland as a consequence of NATO’s enlargement plans (Mi- halka 1994). Yet perhaps equally important was the fact that PfP treated Russia as equal in status to all the other states in Europe that were not mem- bers of NATO. Although the program envisioned individual partnership agreements, it contained no formal recognition of Russia’s role as a great power. PfP essentially put Russia in the same category as Lithuania and Georgia. Accordingly, participation in the program hardly conformed to Moscow’s view of Russia as a great power or to the role envisioned for Rus- sia in European affairs.97

Nevertheless, Russia joined PfP in June 1994. Kjølberg (1999:46) sug- gested that this decision came about through something of a package deal with the West. Within few days, Russia signed the PfP program with NATO, a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU, and received access to the G–7 forum. The latter point, and the fact that NATO formally acknowledged Russia as a ‘major European power’, may certainly have eased Moscow’s reservations.98 _{Signals from Washington that CSCE would}

be given a greater role were perhaps also part of Moscow’s analysis (Kugler 1996:63). However, the development of an individual partnership program (IPP) was to a great extent hampered by unwillingness in the Russian mili- tary to engage in close cooperation with NATO. Also, the backing to PfP from the political elite remained ambiguous (Kugler 1996:63-66; Bluth 1998:332).99

Thus, Russia’s attitude to PfP can be derived from a reading of Russia as a great power and from the related security logic of institutional power bal-

97 In an elaboration on Russia’s attitude to the PfP program, Kozyrev (1994:61) explicitly argued that Russia’s ‘status and significance as world power’ needed to be recognised by the West.

98 In a Ministerial Communiqué from the 22 June 1994 meeting between NATO foreign ministers and Russia’s Foreign Minister Kozyrev, NATO’s recognition of Russia’s status and role as a great power is reflected in several passages. For instance, the document states that NATO and Russia have agreed to develop an individual PfP program ‘corre- sponding to Russia’s size, importance and capabilities’. Russia’s potential contributions are also viewed in light of ‘its weight and responsibility as a major European, internatio- nal and nuclear power’. See www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940622a.html (2002-04- 29).

99 Sourness in Russian–Western relations resulting from Russia’s military campaign in Chechnya from December 1994 may also have hampered implementation of Russia’s in- dividual partnership program (IPP).

ancing vis-à-vis the West. Seen from Russia, NATO enlargement was per- ceived to strengthen the Western alliance, whether this was regarded as an aggressive military ‘enemy’ or as a security institution that was not directed against Russia. Yet if PfP was not an alternative to enlargement but rather a step on the way to preparing particular states for future accession to the alli- ance, the partnership program had the potential of undermining the signifi- cance of two other security institutions: NACC and CSCE (Zagorski 1997:533). In other words, PfP might contribute to limiting the weight and functional scope of collective security arrangements to which Russia was herself a member, and which represented consensus arenas where Moscow’s voice would be heard. This, together with the absence in PfP of a special status for Russia, may largely explain Moscow’s hesitation with regard to joining the program, and also a general unwillingness in the political and military elite to substantiate Russia’s individual partnership program.

However, PfP presented Russia with a formal link to NATO in a situation where US policy showed emerging signs of ‘soft containment’. By 1994, the Western alliance was de facto recognised as the central security institution by both the West and the CEE states aspiring for NATO membership. To Russia, PfP was in one sense a potential answer to the threat of isolation (Mihalka 1994). In terms of political orientation, PfP supplemented NACC and was perceived to contribute to the overall goal of developing good rela- tions with the West. In terms of security, PfP also went beyond NACC. Moscow would now have an individual arena for cooperation and interest mediation with the West on important security issues, which might poten- tially evolve into a strategic relationship. PfP could potentially be used to in- fluence decisions and developments in the West. Thus, when faced with an emerging threat of isolation from decision-making processes on European security altogether, PfP was in the end seen by Moscow as a lesser evil or as a viable, but far from ideal, solution.