RESUMEN DEL RESULTADO DE LA ENCUESTA

When the first professional police force was set up in London in 1829 in response to concerns of a rise in crime, it faced considerable opposition from all social classes who feared that this would undermine individual civil liberties and represented a shift towards an oppressive state (Newburn, 2007; Reiner, 2010). To allay these fears, the police were placed under the direct oversight of the Home Secretary to ensure it was directly answerable to parliament, but day-to-day control was delegated to two justices appointed as its first commissioners (one ex-military colonel, one barrister). Soon after, the

Municipal Corporations Act (MCA) 1835 and County and Borough Police Act 1856 required other local councils country-wide to also establish their own police force and a separate local watch committee of elected councillors to supervise them. However, many refused to do so (Hart, 1956) thus illustrating central government’s lack of control over local matters at the time. Nonetheless, these Acts gave watch committees powers to appoint and dismiss constables; levy a 'watch rate' upon residents to pay for the police; and set out regulations to prevent neglect of duty and enhance police efficiency. Two appointed justices were only given powers to suspend constables but also enjoyed executive powers to appoint 'special constables' to support the ordinary police if the latter were deemed “insufficient at the date of the warrant to maintain the peace of the borough” (MCA 1886, section 196(4)). Exemplary of the Home Secretary's limited influence at the time outside of London, he8 _{retained a narrow oversight role in only receiving quarterly reports from watch}

committees detailing their regulations issued to constables. Police constables themselves enjoyed broad discretionary powers to apprehend people they had “cause to suspect of intention to commit a felony” or, more loosely, “apprehend any idle and disorderly person whom he finds disturbing the public peace... and deliver him to a watch-house to be brought before a justice” (MCA 1882, Section 193).

Further, in recognition of the huge public opposition towards the police at the time, constables were recruited from the lower strata of society whose daily lives were most affected by the new police. They were also under instruction to adhere to '9 Principles of Policing' emphasising the maintenance of good relations with the public, obtaining consent in exercising the law and exercising restraint where coercion was necessary, (Jones et al.,

8 _{The Home Secretary is referred to in the masculine form as office holders were until recently all men.} Later on in this chapter and throughout the rest of the thesis, the feminine form is used as office holders since 2007 have been predominantly women.

2004, Reiner, 2010).9 _{These were later accompanied by the 'Judges' Rules', a set of}

guidelines issued to constables relating to how suspects ought to be detained and questioned, following concerns within the judiciary over the impact of malpractice in undermining the quality of evidence heard in court. Although breaches of the Rules could result in disciplinary action or evidence rendered inadmissible, and there were indeed concerns over the widely divergent interpretations of those rules (RCPPP, 1929), neither sanctions tended to be applied (Wood, 2010). Up until the 1930s, these arrangements were considered by officialdom to be operating well and police misconduct to be rare (RCPPP, 1929). Little historical research exists on how watch committees exercised their powers or sought to involve the public in the formulation of police priorities. What is clear, however, is that this early period was one where these local democratic bodies wielded “great powers of control over the police” which, as Lustgarten’s (1986:37) seminal analysis shows, was “exercised regularly, and involved sacking head constables when they resisted directions” although “such occasions of conflict were relatively rare, for the extreme exercise of power was seldom necessary” given the degree of chief constables' subordination to their committees.

By 1929, however, the situation appeared to have altered in favour of chief constables. As the previous chapter argued, the 1930s was a key transitional period during which watch committees began to lose their powers to directly control the police in relation to 'operational' matters. A Royal Commission at the time found watch committees to be “mainly concerned with matters of policy and finance and interfere[d] little, if at all, with the executive or technical control of the Force” (RCPPP, 1929: para38). Simultaneously, however, the increased autonomy of the police had also come under significant

9 _{Widely known as the ‘Peelian principles, these can be read here:}

controversy by members of the public amid claims that police powers were not subject to adequate controls, although more fundamental opposition to the police's existence had largely subsided by then (Reiner, 2010). Wood's (2010) archival research into news reports of police malpractice challenges the largely positive assessment of the Royal Commission which itself was established to investigate public concerns into how the police handled and interrogated suspects.10

3.1.1. The Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedures (RCPPP, 1929)

In 1928, what became known as the Hyde Park case evoked outrage amongst members of parliament and the British press (HC Deb 17 May 1928; Wood, 2010) leading to a Royal Commission to investigate how the rights of citizens could be balanced against the use of police powers, particularly during interrogations. This was prompted by the five-hour interrogation of a 22 year old woman for public indecency (i.e. associating with a married man) after which she claimed to have been sexually harassed by her interrogators and coerced into providing a confession. This was despite an original police investigation being dismissed by the Director for Public Prosecutions and no action taken against her more 'respectable' associate who was, helpfully for the case, a former government minister

As Reiner (2010) argues, the RCPPP (1929) conveyed a 'romanticised' view of the police by concluding that the “Policeman possesses few powers not enjoyed by the ordinary citizen” (para15) and by rejecting fears at the time that the police were “more arbitrary and oppressive in their attitude towards the public than they were before the [First World] War” (para299). As for the watch committees, the Commission merely remarked that they “interfere[d] little, if at all, with the executive or technical control of the Force” (para38)

10 _{It is notable that this is only the first of four Royal Commissions within century relating to the police, the} highest form of public inquiry in the United Kingdom.

and so ignored the longer history of greater democratic control over policing, the more contentious relationship in the urban forces, and their potential role in improving public confidence. Miscarriages of justice were deemed to be rare despite news reports at the time suggesting otherwise (Wood, 2010) and the Commission's acknowledgement of concerns that the Metropolitan Police's detective branch considered itself to be “above the law”. The Judges Rules were assessed to be working well even if the Commission recommended more guidance and it explicitly rejected proposals to move the responsibility for complaints against police officers to the Director of Public Prosecution. Instead it argued in favour of “trust[ing] the Police, in the belief that, having the responsibility for their own discipline they will discharge it more faithfully in the absence of interference from some outside authority” (para283). Clearly, watch committees had no role in complaints either.

In summary, the limited research into watch committees suggests that this early period was one where the police was robustly held to account by their local democratic bodies. These committees could even exert control over police decisions right up to the 1930s when this became increasingly circumscribed as the concept operational independence emerged (see chapter 2). Unsurprisingly, the resulting ambiguities concerning what powers these bodies retained led to a number of disputes with their chief constables, particularly in the 1950s as the Home Secretary reinstated the chief constables for Nottinghamshire and Birmingham after they were dismissed by their watch committees (Critchley, 1978; Jefferson & Grimshaw, 1984; Brodgen et al., 1988). To exacerbate this, Parliamentary conventions prevented the Home Secretary from answering questions from Members of Parliament about this or other developments outside of London because of his lack of direct supervisory powers over other constabularies (Critchley, 1978). Eventually, another Royal Commission, the Royal Commission on the Police (RCP, 1962:1), was established to

“review the constitutional position of the police”, the accountability of chief constables; how complaints can be managed more effectively; and also investigate pay and conditions. Its recommendations led to the establishment of the 'tripartite' structure of governance which survived up until the introduction of PCCs in 2012 and consisted of the Home Secretary, chief constables, and local police authorities which replaced the watch committees. The next section analyses this structure particularly with regards to successive national government legislation which limited the powers of police authorities bodies and centralised police accountability.