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In this section I outline in more detail the philosophical position which underpins this research: namely, that of critical realism. Critical realism is an emerging tradition with different (and contested) facets – too numerous to explore in depth here. Instead I outline several key aspects of this philosophical approach which have influenced my research design, the resulting analysis and claims of contribution to knowledge – namely; the relationship between structure and agency; the commitment to an objective ‘truth’; and a need to begin with agent’s perspectives as the starting point for knowledge.

Critical realism on the relationship between structure and agency

As noted in previous chapters, I share the critical realist belief that the social world is constituted by the interaction of both structure and agency. Neither structure nor agency can be ‘wholly explained in terms of the other’ as both are interdependent (Fitzpatrick, 2005; Shipway, 2011, 84). This is also a key aspect of Giddens’ (1984) influential theory of ‘structuration’:

‘Human societies, or social systems, would plainly not exist without human agency. But it is not the case that actors create social systems: they reproduce or transform them’ (Giddens, 1984, 171).

Whilst recognising this interdependence, it is important to acknowledge that structure comes before action, creating the conditions in which actions take place (Stones, 2001). As Bhaskar (2011, 60; 2014, 36) explains:

‘people do not create society. For it always pre-exists them. Rather it is an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions that individuals reproduce or transform. But which would not exist unless they did so’. Thus, whilst there is space for individual action, social phenomena like homelessness and low basic skill levels amongst the adult population are the product of enduring structural inequalities reproduced through housing, economic and educational systems. Individual actions are both constrained and enabled by these pre-existing social structures (Giddens, 1984; Fitzpatrick, 2005). However, at the same time it is important to recognise that it is possible for individual agents to make changes in the world.

Whilst critical realists like Archer (1995) critique the theory of structuration, arguing that ‘Giddens’ duality of structure is at odds with the ‘analytical dualism’ which lies at the heart of the realist approach’ (Fitzpatrick, 2005, 10), and has an ‘in-built tendency to direct one towards the micro’ and the possibilities associated with individual action (Stones, 2001, 178), I share the belief of other critical realists that structuration theory is compatible with this position (Stones, 2001; Fitzpatrick, 2005). As Stones (2001, 181) explains:

‘Whilst I think that it is fair to say that Giddens’ account of structuration theory tends to direct one to the moment of agency, in the context of structures, and that he does not spend much time on the explication of the sequencing that Archer draws our attention to, I do not think that

such an emphasis is at all at odds with… the spirit of structuration theory’.

Instead, Giddens’ ‘account of constraints upon agency makes clear that social structures both pre-exist agency and can have a causal influence on agents’ (Fitzpatrick, 2005, 10).

A number of critical realist scholars have focused their attention on organisations (Elder-Vass, 2010; Edwards et al., 2014; Kessler and Bach, 2014; Vincent and Wapshott, 2014). Organisations of various forms – including third sector organisations, businesses and state agencies - play an important role in the social world. As Elder-Vass (2010, 144) asserts:

‘No serious attempt to explain events in the social world can ignore their influence’.

Organisations are important sites of inquiry for those concerned with how structures are reproduced and individuals are able to make changes in the world. They represent sites through which social inequalities are reproduced or transformed. Similarly, Boeren (2016) identifies organisations, or ‘institutions’ (i.e. ‘training providers’ and ‘workplaces’) as a key element of her theory explaining adult participation in learning. Factors operating at an institutional level can impact on whether or not adults decide and are able to participate in learning and improve their skills. Organisations are entities which themselves can produce (and reproduce), resist or challenge social structures. However, an organisation’s activities are influenced by larger social structures, the actions of the actors working with them, and by the individuals who draw on their services (Elder-Vass, 2010). Recognising the transformative potential of third

sector homelessness organisations, with the potential to redress in some way the social and economic inequalities reproduced through homeless people’s exclusion from the formal adult education system, this research was focused on such organisations.

Commitment to an objective ‘truth’

In line with critical realism I also share with positivists the ‘ontologically bold’ belief that an objective ‘reality’ or ‘truth’ exists (Shipway, 2011). As such, this research was concerned with identifying the real nature of the literacy and numeracy support available in homelessness settings along with the real factors shaping this learning provision. In terms of what constitutes ‘knowledge’ and what is needed to uncover the ‘truth’, my overall standpoint is an ‘epistemologically inclusive’ one. In understanding any social phenomena, I believe that our knowledge of it is more complete if we draw on different kinds of knowledge from different sources. This is reflected through previously discussed aversions to sharp dichotomies such as those between structure and agency, skills and social practices, and through the presentation of both qualitative and quantitative evidence in preceding chapters. In selecting a methodological approach for this study, however, I deemed a qualitative approach to be most appropriate to answering the questions at hand. A qualitative research methodology enables exploration of the wide range of factors constituting and impacting upon the social world and has an ‘unrivalled capacity’ to develop convincing arguments about ‘how things work in particular contexts’ (Mason, 2002, 1).

However, whilst committed to the existence of an objective reality, I accept that the extent to which this ‘truth’ can be known is limited. Whilst ‘epistemological inclusivity’ is important, ‘epistemological caution’ is also required. Unlike positivists, and in line with critical realist positions, I reject the notion that the world can be limited to observable, empirical ‘facts’ (Bhaskar, 2008; Shipway, 2011; O’Mahoney and Vincent, 2014). This is because, in contrast to ‘closed systems’, where a particular stimulus always results in a particular effect (such as in the controlled, scientific laboratories), social phenomena always occur in ‘open systems’, such as societies or organisations (Shipway, 2011, 76). The complexity inherent in such open systems means that it is not possible to produce ‘universal statements or ‘laws’ about the world’ (as positivists seek to do) (Shipway, 2011, 76). Instead, research can only make tentative claims and identify ‘potential’ explanations for social phenomena in any given context. Beginning with agent’s perspectives as the starting point for knowledge

Whilst there is a need for ‘epistemological inclusivity’, the reasons and accounts individuals give for their actions ‘form the logically indispensable starting points… of social scientific inquiry’ as it is through these actions that structures are reproduced or transformed (Bhaskar, 2014, 156). Though constrained by pre-existing social structures (Fitzpatrick, 2005), it is possible for individual agents to make changes in the world. Where such actions are intentional, these are triggered by an individual person’s ‘beliefs and desires’.

‘Intentional human behaviour is caused, and…is always caused by reasons’ (Bhaskar, 2014, 80)

Particularly given the scant detail currently available about the nature and extent of literacy and numeracy provision across the homelessness sector and the factors shaping this, a qualitative approach exploring the perspectives of key actors in these settings was deemed not only appropriate, but necessary, to uncover the varied practices and range of complex processes through which such provision is shaped in these organisational contexts (Miller et al., 2004). To better understand this issue, there was therefore a need for an inductive approach based on the explanations of key actors in homelessness contexts.

Homelessness practitioners are key actors embedded in these specific ‘learning provider’ contexts, and have at least some degree of power over the extent and nature of support provided in these settings. They are uniquely placed to provide an illuminating account of the range of factors impacting on the day-to-day work of their organisations, and specifically the literacy and numeracy support provided within that (including both the needs of individual homeless people they are seeking to support and wider structural factors shaping provision in their settings). As Giddens (1984, 281) makes clear: ‘all social actors know a great deal about the conditions and consequences of what they do in their day-to-day lives’. As such, they are also in a good position to appreciate factors operating at individual, institutional and national policy levels as identified by Boeren’s (2016) model. Their accounts can be used to identify the structures and mechanisms which shape their actions (Corson 1998, in Shipway, 2011). A focus on practitioners is also important in identifying potential solutions to enhancing the support on offer. As agents with a pivotal

role in enacting change, they are arguably best placed to offer insights into what could enhance the support available in their organisations.

Again, reflecting the ‘epistemologically cautious’ approach outlined above, there are indeed limits to what critical realists believe can be gleaned from agents’ accounts of any social phenomenon. As such, whilst ‘indispensable starting points’, it is important not to award ‘unconditional supremacy’ to the agent’s reasons for acting over other data (Shipway, 2011, 165). This has implications for the ‘contribution to knowledge’ made by this thesis, which is considered in the section on validity later in this chapter and in the concluding chapter following the presentation of the research findings.