Having examined state and society relations at the national scale, this section analyses these relations from the point of view of ethnic minorities. Vietnam has 54 ethnic groups (Sterling et
al., 2006). The relations between the majority ethnic groups and the ethnic minorities, and
between ethnic minority groups and the state, are relatively healthy in Vietnam, with different ethnic groups living side by side or even together within a single village (Shanks et al., 2004; World Bank, 2009). Each ethnic group in Vietnam has its own language, lifestyle and cultural heritage. Ethnic majorities are often defined as the Kinh and the Chinese, and ethnic minorities as the ethnic groups other than these (van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; Baulch et al., 2002; Imain and Gaiha, 2007). The most dominant group is the Kinh (or Viet), concentrating in lowland areas and accounting for 85% of the total population (Baulch et al., 2002; Shanks et al., 2004; Sterling et al., 2006; Imai and Gaiha, 2007). “Hoa” or Chinese is another relatively affluent group that also inhabits lowland and coastal areas. Meanwhile, ethnic minority groups often live in uplands, where most forests are (or used to be) located (Tran et al., 2005; Baulch et
al., 2007).
The residence of ethnic minorities in Vietnam is not, however, without problems. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Đổi Mới process has brought economic development and contributed significantly to poverty reduction26 in Vietnam. However, ethnic minorities seem to be largely
25
This characteristic is also shared by Chinese NGOs, as discussed in Chapter 2.
26
The poverty line in Vietnam is defined as the cost of a basket of goods allowing a daily intake of 2,100 calories per person per day (World Bank, 2007). Because a majority of the very poor are net buyers of rice, falling rice prices since 1996 have increased the amount of rice they can afford, thus helping to reduce the incidence of recorded poverty in Vietnam (UN Country Team Vietnam, 2005). However, recent economic difficulties (high inflation of 27%, compared with 3% of 2004 (BBC News, 2007), and the global financial crisis) and adverse climatic conditions for agriculture in late 2007 and early 2008 in many provinces in Vietnam, have worsened poverty levels in Vietnam.
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left in poverty, untouched and marginalised by economic development (Jacquemin and Bainbridge, 2005; United Nations Country Team Vietnam, 2005). Mountainous provinces, home of most ethnic minorities, account for nearly 70% of extremely poor households in the country, and this figure is expected to increase to more than 80% by 2010 (United Nations Country Team Vietnam, 2005). In 2006, Kinh and Chinese households experienced a poverty rate of only 10%, while the rate among other ethnic groups averaged 52% (World Bank, 2009). Apart from poverty, life expectancy, nutritional status, and other living standard measures remain stubbornly low among Vietnam’s ethnic minorities (Baulch et al., 2007). In 2004, only 4% and 19% of ethnic minority people, compared to 36% and 63% of the Kinh and Chinese had access to improved sanitation facilities and clean water, respectively. Even in regions considered remote, the Kinh majority group has improved its living standards remarkably, while minority groups still do poorly (Vietnam Academy of Social Studies, 2006).
To help improve the living standards of ethnic minorities, the government of Vietnam enacted a large number of policies and programs specifically designed to tackle a wide range of socio- economic issues related to ethnic minority development (Dang, 2010). By 1998, there were 21 different national policies and projects aimed at driving development in ethnic minority and upland areas (Bonnin and Turner, 2012). Among the most far reaching are the Programme for Socio-Economic Development of Extremely Difficult Communes in Ethnic, Mountainous, Boundary and Remote Areas (Programme 135), and the Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction Programme (HEPR, or Programme 143). These two programmes support the expansion of infrastructure in remote areas, agricultural extension, provision of healthcare and education, so that ethnic minorities can access social services and market opportunities (Baulch
et al., 2007). In terms of poverty reduction, these programmes aim to increase agricultural
production and improve local food security through encouraging the use of high-yield wet rice varieties near springs in the uplands, as opposed to the use of dry rice and other types of staple food and vegetables in hilly terrain (Bonnin and Turner, 2012).
The government of Vietnam’s development policies regarding ethnic minorities have been criticised for being premised on biases and inaccurate assumption and models (Baulch et al. 2007). Critics observe that, ethnic minority people are often stereotyped negatively as backward and superstitious, with low capacity and low intellectual level (Jamieson et al., 1998; Asian Development Bank 2002, McElwee and Ha, 2006). Their agricultural practices and knowledge
The World Bank (2008) recently estimated that about 50% of households in Vietnam have become worse off because of the high inflation rate.
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(linked to swidden cultivation) are seen as a primitive and destructive. As a result, development programmes, like Programmes 135 and 143, seek to replace their complex, centuries-old farming systems and indigenous practices27 and knowledge, which are often adapted to their agro- economic environments (Baulch et al., 2002). For instance, the introduction of high-yield rice varieties by these programmes can do more harm than good, if they pay little attention to local biodiversity or diversified livelihood strategies and agriculture (see Rambo, 2004; Fox et al., 2009). This has effectively taken away ethnic minority groups’ opportunities for using their indigenous knowledge to help them be assertive and confident in improving their livelihoods, which effectively disempowers them in the contemporary development process. In addition, the implementation of the fixed cultivation and sedentarisation activities28 under Programme 135 assimilates ethnic minority groups into mainstream culture of Kinh majority and breaks down their traditions and customs (McElwee, 2004a; Sowerwine, 2004; Writenet, 2006; Turner and Michaud, 2009). Ultimately, once it is accepted that the culture of one ethnic group is somehow more advanced than the cultures of others, there is less incentive to include the views of the latter in decision-making processes. In this regard, ethnic minority groups in Vietnam have little opportunities to participate in development programmes intended to help them, other than as passive recipients of support (Turner and Michaud, 2009).
The Vietnamese education system also appears to be premised on Kinh lowland cultural norms (see van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; Baulch et al., 2002). After reunification in 1975, Vietnamese became the only official language. Although more than 2,200 teachers are teaching and learning ethnic languages (SRV, 2005), there is still a lack of ethnic minority teachers and bilingual education for ethnic minorities (World Bank, 2009). At two of my research sites, the Kinh teachers could not speak the Van Kieu (ethnic minority) language, making primary education more challenging for Van Kieu children. In addition, the education system follows a national curriculum that, it has been argued, is largely irrelevant to the realities and needs of ethnic minority students (van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001). As such, opportunities for knowledge production by ethnic minority groups (thus their power in relations with the state) have been seriously reduced.
27
These practices are adapted to lower human population densities than found today – influx of lowlanders into the highlands and improved health care have pushed many agricultural systems from sustainability into destructive cycles (see de Konick, 1999.)
28
The “Fixed Cultivation and Sedentarisation Programme” (FCSP) was established in 1968, with objectives of reducing poverty, promoting access to education, arresting forest destruction and promoting national security. After 1990, the FCSP activities were integrated into a number of national programmes, including the first phase of Program 135.
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In NRM, similar attitudes towards ethnic minorities can be seen. Explanations of the impact of agricultural activities upon forests often depict ethnic minorities as “not thoughtful to forest
protection, preservation and development ....[and responsible for] uncontrolled exploitation of forest resources to respond to economic benefits without understanding about biological values of these resources” (Ngo, 2005:6). This accusation, seen through the lens of political ecology
(see Chapter 2), might not have strong justification but often gains support from higher-level authorities (McElwee and Ha, 2006). Influenced by these views, policy makers do not often recognise the traditional land and forest-use rights of ethnic minority groups in the formal legal system (Nguyen and Le, 1999).
In the view of the above evidence, the fact that many ethnic minorities live in remote and mountainous areas only partially explains their high poverty level. Biased policies and differences in endowments, characteristics (such as possessing less productive land, poor infrastructure and lower accessibility to the market, education and off-farm work) and returns to these are the main factors that differences in living standards and poverty levels between ethnic minorities and the Kinh and Chinese majorities (van de Walle and Gunewardana, 2001; World Bank, 2009). In this sense, although there is official interest in maintaining and developing cultural identities of ethnic minorities, such as dances, folklore and modes of dress, government policy is not universally supportive of ethnic minorities, leading to very limited participation in policy processes (Baulch et al., 2002). These factors are stoking dissatisfaction among ethnic minority groups, which led to the unrest in Central Highlands in the 2000s.
In this context, protests have surfaced in the Central Highlands, the home of many ethnic minorities. Similar to the unrest in Thai Binh province, the demonstrations in the Central Highlands between 2001 and 2004, which involved thousands of people, were motivated by tensions over land rights and anger towards corruption among local government officers (Shanks
et al., 2004; Writenet, 2006). The underlying causes for conflicts over land can be traced back to
the government’s policies in the region. First, the flux of migrants to the region dramatically increased demand for land. The establishment of New Economic Zones, for example, was intended to bring 4 million people to the region during the period 1976 to 1980 (CPV, 2004). In addition, the suitability of the soil and climate of the Central Highlands for the cultivation of cash crops has also attracted many people to the region (Writenet, 2006). As a result of these factors, over the course of only 30 years, the population in Central Highland tripled (Writenet, 2006). Under this pressure, land has become scare. According to a government survey, less than 4% of migrant households coming to the Central Highlands received land from the state, 47%
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purchased land privately from ethnic minority people, and 46% obtained land through clearing forest or claiming “unclaimed” forest land (Do in Writenet, 2006). This leads to a situation where the land distribution between migrants and indigenous people tilts towards the former. A study of one district in Gia Lai province in 1997, at the height of the coffee boom, found that ethnic minority people had average landholdings of 0.25 hectares per household, while newcomer lowlanders had between one and two hectares per household (Iagrai Project Management Board, 1997). This statistic seems to suggest that ethnic minority people, the original owners of the land, have been marginalised in the land-ownership landscape. Moreover, the nationalisation of natural resources, including land, that occurred after 1975 has taken away ethnic minority people’s traditional ownership of land and placed it under the management of either state farms (SFs) or state-own forestry enterprises (SFEs). In the Central Highlands, this process saw the establishment of 83 SFEs by 1988, managing 70% of the land area (Asian Development Bank, 2002). When many of these entities were dissolved because of their insufficiencies, land was not returned to the original owners (i.e. ethnic minority people) but to SFEs workers (i.e. lowland migrants in New Economic Zones). When ethnic minority people requested the return of their lands from SFEs and SFs, they have received only silence from local authorities (Tran, 2005). The refusal to return land to its original owners has become another source of distrust and frustration among ethnic minority groups.
Apart from land issues, grievances over poverty also contributed to the outbreak of demonstrations among ethnic minority groups in the Central Highlands. For many years after
Đổi Mới, ethnic minority people in the region stood out as some of the worst off in the country.
In 1998, 91% of the Central Highland’s ethnic minority population lived in poverty, compared to 73% of the minority population in the northern uplands (Poverty Task Force, 2002). From 1998 to 2002, while every other group in Vietnam was reducing its poverty rates, the poverty rate among minorities in the Central Highlands actually rose (World Bank, 2003). In this regard, reduced land ownership or landlessness has diminished the livelihood prospects of many ethnic minority people in the Central Highlands, thus contributing to the frustrations of many who took part in the demonstrations of 2001 (Baulch et al., 2002; Writenet, 2006).
In response to the unrest in Central Highlands, the government of Vietnam employed similar approaches to those used to resolve the unrest in Thai Binh province. Again, policy changes were introduced to address problems leading to the protests, confirming the claim that rural population has certain influence in politics in Vietnam. For example, Programme 135 was adjusted to include the provision of electricity, irrigation, television and telephones and reduction of
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education fees to ethnic minorities in Dak Lak province (Shanks et al., 2004). Most importantly, recognising the seriousness of land rights in these protests, Decision 132/2002/QD-TTg on the “Allocation of farming and housing land for ethnic households in the Central Highlands” was passed in 2002 (WriteNet, 2006). Accordingly, land funds were created in each of the Central Highlands provinces, to be allocated to landless ethnic minorities under principles of equality, transparency and compatible with each ethnic groups’ customs (Article 3). This new policy highlights the willingness of the Party-state to make policies to address a problem once it appears to threaten the social order and Party legitimacy (Shanks et al., 2004).
So far, I have attempted to analyse state and ethnic minority relations in Vietnam. In my view, the government’s approach to different ethnic minorities in Vietnam is also applicable to the Van Kieu minority group in Quang Tri province. As writing on the relationship between the state and Van Kieu people is still limited, the following quick introduction to the topic is mainly be based on my experience and fieldwork. In Vietnam, members of the Van Kieu ethnic minority reside in the Annamite Mountains (Truong Son in Vietnamese), mainly in Quang Tri, Hue and Quang Binh provinces. Their total population is around 40,000 in Vietnam (Luu, 2005), with other Van Kieu communities living in neighbouring areas of Laos. The relations between Van Kieu people and the Vietnamese government are generally positive. It is well known among Kinh people (of which I am one) that most Van Kieu people do not have any history of being rebellious towards the government, unlike some of other minority groups in the Central Highlands in 2001 (as discussed earlier) or during different wars in Vietnam (see Refworld and UNHCR, 2003). Instead, Van Kieu people have a reputation for loyalty to the government and for contributing their human and financial resources to help the Party during the Second Indochina War. According to Van Kieu people interviewed at my study sites in Quang Tri, during the war in the 1960s and 1970s, CPV officers often contacted them to ask for help due to their strategic position along the demilitarised zone separating North and South Vietnam during the Second Indochina War. Accepting their plea, Van Kieu people were enlisted to smuggle food and medicines to SRV soldiers past security checkpoints set up by the government of South Vietnam government. Their contribution is recognised and highlighted in the various military history museums in Quang Tri. Furthermore, their loyalty to the Party-state has been demonstrated by their celebrated collective act of changing the family name of the entire ethnic group to “Ho”, after Ho Chi Minh, the founder of SRV. On this account, many Van Kieu people in villages in Quang Tri often proudly stated that Ho Chi Minh and the Party gave the family name to them.
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