RM CIRUGÍA SENSIBILIDAD RM CIRUGÍA ESPECIFICIDAD

Almost two decades into democratic governance of schools expected to be fuelled by the SASA envisaged three-cornered SGB-HoD-SMT participative partnership, the desired SGB-SMT programme benefits expected to accrue from the implementation seem to be elusive (Mafora, 2013). Findings from recent studies on South African (SASA/SGB-SMT) school improvement reform suggest that different members of SGBs still experience some marginalisation (Heystek, 2004; Van Wyk, 2004; Magadla, 2007; Mncube, 2008, 2009b), which subverts not only the spirit of SASA- envisaged stakeholder partnership vision but also creates conflicts between the major stakeholder partners (SGBs, SMTs and HoDs). Steyn (2010) and Mafora (2013) have asserted that the individual group implementation outcomes of SGBs, SMTs and HoDs either subtract from (Purkey and Aspy, 2003) the benefits expected to accrue from the school improvement reform process or enhance the growth of the SASA participative partnership essential for successful school policy implementation. The aim of this section is to review the following thematic issues: (1) SASA’s composition of the SGB-SMT framework, (2) SASA’s allocation of functions, (3) the SASA stakeholder partners’ attempts to perform their functions, (4) how the unintended consequences of these interactions have created conflicts between SMTs (principals) and SGBs, particularly the parents serving in the school governing bodies, and (5) how to create a conducive climate for the management of the SGB- SMT boundary spanning conflicts.

Contrary to the undesirable SASA policy implementation outcomes revealed by the existing literature, the SASA envisaged stakeholder partnership is expected to create an enabling school-based environment that aids the school and community in achieving school improvement intervention programmes, including improved teaching and learning (Xaba, 2004; 2011; Rossouw, 2013; P.K. Mokoena, 2013). The basis of the SGB-SMT partnership derives from two important stipulations in the SA Schools Act. The first objective is to focus on a relationship of mutual trust between the SGBs and SMTs. The second objective is to ensure that the two major partners support not only each other but also to support the school and the school

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community as complementary role players. The SASA framework mandated the SGBs to be in a position of trust towards the school (Republic of South Africa, 1996: SASA section 16). While the principal (SMT) is expected to support the members of the SGB in their governance functions (SASA, 1996: section 19), the SGB members are expected to support the SMT and educators in their professional functions (SASA, 1996: section 20).

What are the policy implications of the SASA-envisaged partnership as stipulated by the SASA legislation? According to section 19(2) of the Schools Act, 1996, the principal has to assist the SGB in the performance of its functions. The SASA section 20(1e) also stated that the SGB should support the principal and educators in the performance of their professional functions. Sometimes the interpretation of this stipulated policy leads to different perceptions by parental governors and school principals regarding the specific support action of their mutual support roles. The SGB parent members may well think they are supporting the principal by `taking over’ some of his responsibilities, such as discussing problems that occur in the class directly with the educator concerned. They may just want to help because they feel the principal is very busy and has too much to do, but in their eagerness to support, they tend to intrude into the principal’s professional line of responsibility – creating SGB-SMT conflicts (Xaba, 2004; Heystek, 2004; Mafora, 2013).

The findings of Hystek’s study (2004) reveal that SGB parent members tend to feel they are relieving the principal of extra problems and stress, when they interfere in school professional management of schools allocated to principals. On the contrary, the SGB parent members’ interference in the professional management of schools worsens the professional school management burden of principals. If such situations are not handled with great care, they can lead to permanent frictions or conflicts between the principals and parental governors, derailing the overall vision of SASA/SGB-SMT school improvement reform process. This scenario provides a classic example of how the SGB-SMT boundary spanning conflicts originated from the struggles to control school finances.

Research (Serfontein, 2010; Baffour and Arko-Achemfuor, 2014; Bagarette, 2014) argues that, as the functions and duties of the SGBs and SMTs are stipulated in the

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South African Schools Act (1996) and in provincial policies and regulations, one would think it should be clear to all what SGBs and SMTs may and must do. In practice, however, the majority of SGBs and SMTs (principals) can neither interpret correctly the SASA policy and the functions allocated to them, nor perform their functions successfully. In the school, the management and governance functions and duties are often not delineated clearly, and the resultant uncertainty about each SASA stakeholder’s exact functions often creates friction between principals and SGB members. As a result, there is a tendency in every school to work along its own interpretation of the legislation and to try to make the partnership relationship work. The above explication illuminates how SGB-SMT boundary spanning conflicts are created.

Members of the school management teams – school principals and educators – are also plagued by professional school management challenges. Many principals have long years of experience. However, the participative and democratic management partnership, which was introduced by the SASA framework, was new, not only to the majority of school principals, but also completely outside the real-life experience of the SGB members located in township and rural schools. The novelty and lack of experience problem was intensified by the fact that the additional passage of SASA- related Acts, which clothe the SASA framework in complex legal language that defies easy interpretation by both non-legal-persons and legal experts. This postulation is confirmed by the large number of the SGB-SMT-DoH conflicts that have continued to appear before the South African courts (Beckmann, 2009; Beckmann and Prinsloo 2009; Serfontein, 2010; Bathon, Beckmann and Bjork, 2011; Rossouw, 2013). The next section focuses on the SGBs’ and SMTs’ failure to work as partners