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4. Results

4.8 RNA Sequencing analysis of Cdk1-null MEFs and ES cells

ARTICLE II (AND RELATED PROVISIONS), 1987 CONSITUTION I. General Considerations:

Tañada v. Angara – By its very nature, Art. II are policies and principles that may guide the Legislature in the enactment of laws and the courts in its interpretation

Hence, as a general rule, these provisions are non-self-executing BUT – a provision that is complete in itself, and provides sufficient rules for the exercise of rights, is self-executing Thus, certain provisions under Art. II are self-executing

Eg.: Sec. 16 (See Oposa v. Factoran)

The 1st sections are entitled ―Principles‖, while the rest are entitled ―Policies‖

However, there seems to be no clear distinction between what are

―Principles‖ and what are ―Policies‖.

II. Sec. 1, Art. Ii – “The Philippines I a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

This is prescriptive of the kind of government that we should have – it should be ―democratic‖ and ―republican‖. We cannot have any other kind of government

Note that in International Law, it is not concerned with the kind of government. What is essential is that there is a government, since it is an essential element of the State.

―Republican‖ – hence, we have a representative type of government – we elect our leaders.

Thus, we have Art. V on Suffrage, and Art. IX-C on COMELEC

Relate to Art. XI, Sec 1 – ―Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountabels to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.‖

Because sovereignty resides in the people, public office is a public trust. Hence, there is the sense of accountability.

III. Sec. 2, Art II – “ The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adhere to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations”

War is renounced as an instrument of national policy.

Thus, no one has the power to declare war BUT: Congress can declare a ―State of War‖

Also, the President can only use military powers in case of invasion, rebellion, etc. He has no power to declare war.

BUT, does not that when we are attacked, we cannot engage in war!

Constitution only renounces offensive war, not defensive war This is one of the Rights of States:

1. Sovereignty and Independence 2. Property and Jurisdiction 3. Equality

4. Existence and Self-Defense 5. Diplomatic Intercourse

This is constituent with the policy of the UN, of which we are a member.

―Adopt: the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land‖

Reaffirms the Doctrine of Incorporation

Examples of generally accepted principles of International Law 1. Pacta sunt servanda

2. Rebus sic stantibus 3. State Immunity from Suit 4. Sovereign Equality if States

IV. Sec. 3, Art II – “Civilian authority is at all times, supreme over the military. The AFP is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State snd the integrity of the national territory.

This is known as the “Civilian Supremacy Clause”

It is expressly stated that it is SUPREME over the military Role of the AFP:

1. Secure State sovereignty

2. Secure integrity of the national territory

Q: The provision says the AFP is the ―protector of the people and the State‖ Does this justify a coup d‘ etat?

A: NO! This clause should not be lifted out of context. Look at the 1st sentence of the provision – that the civilian authority is supreme

over the military. Thus, the AFP‘s role must be understood within the context of civilian supremacy.

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILS. v. ZAMORA

FACTS : Estrada issued an LOI deploying the marines all over Metro Manila HELD: (1) Civilian Supremacy Clause not Violated – The calling of the marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian enforcement. The limited participation of the Marine is evident in the provisions of the LOI, which provides the metes and bounds of their authority. The local police forces are in charge of the visibility patrols – the real authority belongs to the PNP, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols.

(2) Deployment of Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the PNP – the Marines render only assistance in conducting the patrols. There is no insidious incursion of the military in civilian affairs. In fact, military assistance to civilian authorities is rendered in the following actuations: elections, administration of the Philippine Red Cross, relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters, amateur sports, promotion and development, development of the culture and the arts, conservation of natural resources, implementation of the agrarian reform program, enforcement of customs laws, composite civilian-military law enforcement activities, conduct of licensure examinations, conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and highschool students, anti-drug enforcement activities, sanitary inspections, conduct of census work, administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board, assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices, and peace and order policy formulation in LGUs.

V. Sec. 4, Art. II – “The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal military on civil service.”

Q: What is the Government‘s Duty?

A: To serve and protect the people

Service to the State

Q: It states that the government may call upon the people to defend the State. Does this amount to involuntary servitude?

A: NO! This is an exception to the rule n involuntary servitude:

Exceptions to the rule on involuntary servitude:

1. Military service to defend the State 2. Penal punishment

3. Assumption of jurisdiction of DOLE in labor cases

4. Mariners and pilots

5. Minor children under the patria potestas of parents

Note that the provisions says ―PERSONAL service‖

Thus, one cannot hire mercenaries to take one‘s place.

VI. Sec. 16, Art. II – “The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”

Q: This refers to a right of the people. Why is this found in Art. II and not in Art. III (Bill of Rights)?

A: This right belongs to a different category of rights!

– Oposa v. Factoran (224 SCRA 792, 1993)

HELD: While this right is found under the Declaration of Principles and State Polivies, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the c ivil and political rights under the Bill of Rights. This right belongs to a different category of rights, since it concerns nothing less than self preservation and self- perpetuation, the advance of which may be said to predate all governments and Constitutions, since they are presumed to exist from the inception of humankind.

This is self-executing provision! (Oposa v. Factoran) Thus, its violation gives rise to a cause of action.

In relation to the Preferential Right of Subsistence Fishermen to the Use of Communal Marine and Fishing Resources

Art. XIII, Sec. 7 – ― The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore.‖

TANO v. SOCRATES (GR. 110249, 21 Aug. 1997) FACTS: The Province of Palawan and City of Pierto Princesa enacted ordinances prohibiting the catching and exportation of live tropical fishes. Some fishermen were apprehended for violating said ordinances, They now challenge the constitutionality of said ordinances, invoking their preferential rights as subsistence fishermen to the use of our communal marine resources.

HELD: The preferential rights of subsistence fishermen to the use of marine resources is not absolute. Marine resources, per the Regalian Dontrine and under Art. XII, Sec. 2, belongs to the State, and their exploration, development and utilization shall be under the State‘s full control and supervision. It is a policy enshrined in the Constitution that the State has the duty to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. The ordinances are meant precise to this, so that the enjoyment of our resources may be guaranteed for the present and future generations. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

VII. Provisions on Economic Policy

1. Art. XII, Sec. 10(2) – ―In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos‖

This is known as the ―Filipino First Policy‖

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS (GR. 118295, 02 May 1997, 267 SCRA 402)

FACTS: The Manila Hotel, which was previously owned by a US Corporation, was then owned by GSIS. Pursuant to the policy of Privatization, the GSIS held it up for bidding. The Filipino Corporation lost. However, it offered to match the bid of the winning foreign corporation.

HELD: (1) Art. XI, Sec. 10 (2) is a self-executing provision. It is a mandatory, positive command that is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement, it does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

(2) The word ―patrimony‖ means heritage.

Heritage includes not only natural resources but also our national and cultural heritage. While the Manila Hotel was not originally Filipino, it has become truly Filipino, with its own history. It is a mute witness to our history.

2. Art. II, Sec. 19 – ―The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos‖

TAÑADA v. ANGARA (272 SCRA 18, [1997])

HELD: This economic policy does not rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods, and services, nor does it contemplate ―economic exclusion‖ or ―mendicancy in the international community‖. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on ―equality and reciprocity‖, the fundamental law encourages industries that are

―competitive in bothe domestic and foreign markets‖, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign market.

VIII. Provisions on Education

Academic Freedom – Art. XIV, Sec. 5 (2) – ―Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.‖

Note that the provision says ―institutions of higher learning‖

This refers to the tertiary level only!

Q: What is ―academic Freedom‖?

A: This is the right of the school or college to dictate for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them – free from outside coercion or interference save possible when the overriding public welfare calls fro some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy. (University of San Agustin v. CA [23 SCRA 761])

Subsumed in the tern academic freedom is the freedom to determine, on academic grounds, the following:

1. Who may teach?

This refers to the faculty 2. What may be taught?

This refers to the subject and courses to be offered

3. How it shall be taught?

This refers to the method of teaching 4. Who may be admitted to study?

This refers to the students

Right of the School to Determine Who may be Admitted to Study Thus, mandamus would not lie to compel a school to accept a student

BUT: once the school admitted the student, there is now a contract between them – this a contract with PUBLIC INTEREST

Thus, the school may not arbitrarily dismiss or expel a student – it should be based on either:

1. Failure to meet minimum academic requirements prescribed for the school or for the subject;

2. Violation of the school‘s rules of discipline

Also, the school must conduct an investigation – it must observe due process to establish the culpability of the student

UP BOARD OF REGENTS v. CA (GR. 134625, 31 Aug. 1999) FACTS: Aroklaswamy Willuan Margaret Celine was given a masteral degree and was allowed to graduate.

Subsequently, however, it was discovered that her thesis was plagiarized. Thus, UP revoked her degree.

HELD: If an institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it can also determine on whom it can convey the honor and distinction of being its graduates. If the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university can revoke or withdraw such honor or distinction. This freedom does not terminate upon a student‘s graduation, since it is precisely the ―graduation‖ that is in question.

Art. XIV, Sec. 4(1) – ―The State recognizes the complementary role of public and private institution in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions‖

This deals with the State‘s power to regulate educational institutions

MIRIAM COLLEGE FOUNDATION v. CA (348 SCRA 265, 15 Dec. 2000)

HELD: The power of the State to regulate educational institutions is subject to the requirement of reasonableness. Moreover, what is allowed is only the regulation and supervision of educational institutions not the deprivation of their rights.

IX. Rights of Indigenous Peoples

CRUZ v. SECRETARY of DENR (GR. 135385, 06 Dec 2000)

FACTS: The constitutionality of RA 8371 (Indigenous Peoples Reform Act) was quesrioned. The SC en banc voted 7-7, hence, since the presumption is for constitutionality, such presumption was not overthrown, and the law was declared unconstitutional. Each justice wrote a separate opinion, and all opinions form part of the decision.

SALIENT POINTS

1. Nature of RA 8371(Separate Opinion of J. Puno) RA 8371:

(1) Recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities (ICCs) or indigenous peoples (IPs) as a distinct sector in the Philippine society

(2) Grants them the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains,

(3) Gives the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.

2. Definition and Distinction ICCs/IPs (Separate Opinion of J. Kapunan)

Sec. 3, RA 8371 – IPs/ICCs ―refer to a group of people or homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription of others, who have

continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions, and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos.

NOTE: There is really no difference between the 2 terms, except:

ICCs – the term used in the Constitution IPs – the term used in the international community and the UN

NOTE: The terms are always used in the plural form

3. Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands, Definition and Nature (Separate Opinion of J. Puno)

Nature:

These are private property of indigenous peoples – it does not constitute part of the land of the public domain

Definitions:

(1) Ancestral Domain – Sec. 3(a), IPRA

Ancestral Domain all areas belonging to ICCs/ IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by

force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations It comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, including ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural and other lands whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources.

(2) Ancestral Land - Sec. 3(b), IPRA These are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and that these land are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by them under claims of individual or traditional group ownership.

Thus, Ancestral Domain is a broader concept – it includes Ancestral Lands

4. Acquisition by ICCs/IPs of their Rights to their Ancestral Domains and Lands (Separate Opinion of J.

Puno)

2 ways:

(1) By Native Title – over both Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands

(2) By Torrens Title under the Public Land Act – over Ancestral Lands only.

5. Native Title, Concept (Separate Opinion of J. Puno) This refers to the ICCs/IPs pre-conquered rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches.

Theses lands are deemed NEVER to have been public lands and are presumed to have been held privately since before the Spanish Conquest.

This right of private ownership is peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their Ancestral Lands and Domains.

Formal recognition of this right is embodies in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT)

A CADT is just like a Torrens Title – it is evidence of private ownership of land by native title.

6. Ownership by Acquisitive Prescription v. Ownership by Native Title (Separate Opinion of J. Kapunan)

Ownership by Acquisitive Prescription Involves a conversion of the property‘s character from alienable public l and to private land

Thus, there is a transfer for title from the State to a private person

Meaning, the land is originally public land, which is converted to private

Note: This requires that the land is alienable

Public Land – Art. XII, sec. 3 –

―Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks‖

Of these, only agricultural lands are alienable Requirement for Acquisitive Prescription – the private individual must have possessed the land open, continuously, exclusively, adversely, and notoriously, in the concept of an owner, for either of the following periods:

(1) 30 years – bad faith (2) 10 years – good faith

Ownership by Native Title

Here, the land has been held by its possessor and his predecessor-in-interest in the concept of an owner since time immemorial

Thus, the land is not acquired from the State – there was no transfer from the State

The land is private in character as far back as memory reaches.

7. Jura Regalia – requires that private title to land must be traced to some grant – express or implied – from the Spanish Crown or its successors – the American Colonial Government and after, the Philippine Government.

Q: Does jura regalia negate native title?

A: NO!

In Cariño v. Insular Government, the SC has held that when as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.

Native title is an exception to jura regalia.

Art. XII, Sec 2. – ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forest or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and other natural resources are owned by the State‖

This is the recognition of the Doctrine of Jura Regalia

ELECTION LAW