Robustez a diferentes manipulaciones

“ To this awareness (about the right to self-determination), belongs the realization that self-determination is not a self-determination o f the Slovene peoples as a Nation, but self-determination o f Slovenes as individuals”309.

Slovenian independence is not a romantic story o f a national movement reaching its goal, but rather a banal story o f Slovenes not wanting to shoot Albanians in Kosovo, which is what staying within the federation meant”310.

5.2.1. Democratisation of Slovene Communists - Interviews

Interviews conducted in Slovakia in order to gain an initial grasp on the current situation could be characterized by the difference in opinions between those interviewed. The plurality o f views on the transition, the current regime, the nationhood and the new statehood was overwhelming and indicative o f the lack o f consensus about the past and the direction the country was or should be taking, by opinion makers, academics and politicians alike. In contrast, the similar method employed in Slovenia showed surprisingly little disagreement about the appropriateness o f the separation from Yugoslavia, the fast and unequivocal European integration policies o f the current government, despite the pragmatic concerns for the country’s economy and the newly acquired sovereignty, and what could only be described as a general sense o f pride in

T.Hribar ‘Slovenska drzavnost’ in Nova Revija VI:57 a seminal issue of this very important journal around which the Slovenian intelligentsia concentrated throughout the latel980’s, dedicated to national program (Prispevki za Slovenski Nacionalni Program) Ljubljana 1987 p.29 All translations throughout are by myself.

Interview 5.5.1998 Igor Luksic, academic and the vice-chairman of the United List of Social Democrats party

institutional and economic achievements so far. The issue o f independence, the pivotal point around which the Slovak political elites formed and polarised, proved the least divisive in Slovenia.

The interviews confirmed the idiosyncrasy o f the Slovenian case among other Eastern and Central European countries. The salient points could be summed up as follows. First, an interesting combination o f left-wing orientation by almost all

interviewed, combined with a strong belief in liberalism and national identity and hardly any rejection o f Tito’s rule, a period seen as conducive to the growth o f national awareness. Second, the positive role awarded to the ex-communist leadership (still in power) in the democratisation process and the formation o f the national programme, with the exception o f the representative o f the Social Democratic Party o f Slovenia, the main opposition party which bases its platform on the removal o f these people from public life. Third, the concerns about the role o f the Catholic Church (either the rejection o f its attempts to influence the education, or the lack o f its influence). Fourth, the

agreement on the main reason for the separation as that o f Serbian centralist and

authoritarian policies personified by Milosevic and proved by the tanks o f the Yugoslav army on the streets o f Ljubljana. Finally, most o f those interviewed claimed312 that Slovene nationalism is the ‘right’ kind o f nationalism, that is, the strong sense o f patriotism devoid o f romanticism future orientated and without an overtly ethnic element.

The complacency was occasionally punctured by concerns about the possibility of the future ethnic conflicts between other ethnic groups living in Slovenia and their host nation, and about the maintenance o f national identity and economic control for such a small country in the increasingly integrated European landscape. The concerns, however, were tempered by the recognition that there is no alternative to this process. A central point o f discussion related to the question o f whether independence was the logical culmination o f the democratisation process and would have happened regardless o f

3," A 1 1 interviews were conducted 21.4.-14.5.1998 in Ljubljana

One exception being I.Bemik 21.4.1998: “All is circumstantial, Slovenes are the same as everyone else if they were offered a state during the war as the Croats and Slovaks did, they would have behaved in the same way. The prime legitimacy in Slovenia is ethnic, as it is everywhere else. But, Slovenes had many advantages. Open borders during the socialist period and the guaranteed Yugoslav market, so that t e country flourished. Elite led transition which started much earlier than anywhere else and well developed and voiced national program, so that all nationalism had a chance to neutralize itself by the time the country became independent”. The ‘circumstantiality’ behind the Slovenian ‘success’ is part of the argument of this chapter.

Serbian policies, or the only option left to safeguard that process given the

circumstances. The majority o f those interviewed, most o f whom participated actively in bringing about the reforms o f the late 1980s, agreed with the latter313. One person argued that the process was hijacked by nationalists and therefore not the culmination of

democratisation314. Another, maintained that Slovene communists had always been nationalists (unusual and possibly only comparable to Poland), going back to the

tradition o f Social Democrats o f the early century and that therefore, the reformers from 1988 onwards, knowing well what was becoming o f Yugoslavia, formed an alliance with nationalists and sought a significant autonomy in various proposals o f a loose

confederation. Being aware that a small nation cannot exist without lull international support, the declaration o f independence had to be timed carefully, so as not to be seen as responsible for the break-down o f the state315.

What can be observed in these interviews is the extent to which the previous regime affected the nature o f the present-day Slovenia, from the rise o f national

awareness, the Slovene social, political and economic existence, the formation of national programmes, the character o f transition and the timing o f independence itself.

5.2.2. Yugoslav Communism

It has been implied a few times that politics in the former Yugoslavia differed

considerably from the political system in Czechoslovakia. It therefore seems appropriate to question the use o f the adjective ‘postcommunist’ in connection to the Slovak as well as Sloveman transitions. How communist was Slovenia, considering that Yugoslavia enjoyed “most favoured Communist”316 state status, precisely because o f the differences between the Warsaw Pact countries and Tito’s regime, non-aligned to the Soviet bloc, wavering between West and East. The system o f worker self-management, the lower degree o f coercion o f the population, the significant degree o f liberalisation - in particular

Y o u t w l ? 1(QQ8 ^ niSte!i ° fEducation 111 the last two administrations, the activist o f the ex-Socialist

it is not tin th • Independence was the culmination o f democratisation, which started in 1981, but

314 T ° at indePendence was an integral part o f that process at the beginning”

315 T • ' r z<™anlC’ academic(the Peace Institute) the left-wing political activist o f the 1980’s 13.5.1998

o f the Vlce'Cha,rman ofthe National Assembly 1991-1994(parliament), the founder

° 6 dissident student movement in the 1970’s) 4.5.1998

1 , JnL','1Z ^ ;Stepan Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation Baltimore London, The

travel, some private ownership, the possibility o f study abroad, the availability of Western goods and media broadcasts - was seen, if not as democratic, but nevertheless as a form o f democracy, which always held the premise that it could evolve into more democracy. I f the West saw it as an attempt to conform to Western liberal democratic values, the domestic population believed it to be their unique ‘third way’, with Slovenia leading the push towards more pluralism.

However, and here is the crux o f the matter, Yugoslavia was not democratic. The fact is that Yugoslav communists never won a free election in any part o f Yugoslavia, nor did the regularly proclaimed sovereignty o f the republics ever stop the Communist party from using the threat o f force whenever it deemed it necessary (Croatia 1971, Kosovo 1981 and Slovenia 1991)317, and that it was the communist leadership o f Serbia which resisted democratisation by the most brutal o f methods - a war (1991). The

Yugoslav political system, despite offering its population more rights than the systems of other Eastern and Central European countries, was nevertheless an authoritarian system, merely a different type o f communist regime, possibly, as often argued by Yugoslavs318 nearer to Marxism than Stalin’s revision o f it. A semblance o f democracy does not stand for democracy which cannot folly develop in one-party rule. The variations in the degree o f tolerance within a one-party state are rather a question o f ideology adopted by the party bureaucracy itself in order to secure the party’s hegemony than they are a question o f adopting “pluralist policies”319. Therefore, this study continues to view the Slovenian transition to democracy as a postcommunist one, whereby the distinctiveness o f

communism in Slovenia (and the former Yugoslavia) will be explored only as a qualitative factor o f that process.

5.2.3. The Genesis of the Yugoslav Political System

The communists’ accession to power under Josip Broz Tito after 1945 followed a period during the war which only served to exacerbate ethnic and political divisions within the country. The Croatian state (whose dominion included most o f Bosnia) openly

317

S.Ramet Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991 2nd. edition Bloomington and