Rosa: Habitante estable de la plaza de Bolívar

Even though I think that the argument points into the right direction, it is not valid. The reason for this is as follows:

(P2) and (P3) lead to some kind of collapse. If every existential sentence is an ontological sentence, then every position which contains existential sentences contains ontological

sentences. And if every position which contains existential sentences is an ontological position, then almost every position is an ontological position. According to such a view, utilitarianism for instance, would be an ontological theory. Since Einstein’s theory of special relativity involves existential sentences, it would be an ontological theory. But all these theories are very far away from what we would intuitively classify as ontological positions. So (P2) and (P3) render the concept of ontology empty. So the argument (I) as it stands is too simple-minded.

This leaves two possibilities to avoid these strange consequences. Reject (P2), or reject (P3). As we will see, metaontological skeptics reject (P2).

The metaontological skeptics didn’t make the naïve claim that every existential sentence is an ontological sentence. According to them the class of existential statements must be further divided into a class of existential statements which are ontological and a class of existential statements which are not ontological.

Carnap’s skeptical metaontological position includes a paradigm example for such a distinction. As you may remember from Chapter 3, Carnap distinguished between existential statements inside and outside of a framework. The existential statements outside of a framework are the so-called external (existence) statements (which are the answers to the so-

called external (existence) questions). The existential statements inside of a framework are the so-called internal (existence) statements (which are the answers to the so-called internal (existence) questions). External statements are either pragmatic statements about which framework serves our current purposes best or meaningless statements. Internal statements are either trivial or scientific statements without any relevance for philosophy. Given that external and internal statements do not differ from their syntactic structure, that is that they are from the same type, it is better to distinguish between tokens of existential sentences. I think that Carnap’s use of the word “sentence” is rather congenial to this view. So according to Carnap, what makes an existential sentence an ontological sentence is it’s occurrence in a particular context. If it occurs within a framework it is internal, if it occurs outside of the framework it is external.

Consider for example, the existential sentence “There are numbers”. If a statement of the form “There are numbers” occurs within a framework, this context determines that it is an internal

existential sentence and no ontological sentence. If it occurs outside of a framework, it is an external existential and ontological sentence.

In his (1963a), Carnap gives us a nice illustration of this distinction when he compares the demarcation between science and metaphysics of Popper and the Vienna Circle.

I. Scientific statements

Boundary A (Popper)

II. Pseudo-Scientific statements

Astrology, magical beliefs, myths.

Boundary B (Vienna Circle)

III. Pseudo-statements

Declarative sentences devoid of cognitive meaning.

In the following paragraph Carnap describes his distinction between three kinds of declarative statements (and ipso facto of existential sentences):

“Let kind I comprise genuine scientific statements, i.e. those under which, in view of their form, would be regarded by scientists as of sound, scientific, empirical character, irrespective of whether the available evidence is sufficient for their acceptance or rejection. Under kind II we shall classify those statements which we might call, with Popper, “pseudo- scientific”. Statements of astrology, myths, ancient magic, and popular superstitions are examples of the second kind. Such statements are comprehensible and concern empirical matters, but they cannot be taken seriously from a scientific point of view. To kind III we delegate what we called “pseudo-statements” in Vienna, i.e., declarative sentences which are devoid of cognitive meaning” (Carnap 1963a: 878).

It is taken for granted by Carnap, that science contains existential sentences. These existential sentences belong to the first kind of statements.41 In contrast to that, the sentences of metaphysics and ipso facto the existential sentences of metaphysics belong to the third kind of

sentences, the pseudo-statements.42 Neither the internal nor the external statements are of any philosophical significance or value.

As will be seen from the discussion of Jonathan Schaffer’s skeptical metaontological view in the next chapter, he also distinguishes between philosophically interesting existential sentences and philosophically not interesting existential sentences. Schaffer says:

“My first answer to this third reply is that the existence questions this reply invokes are not the ones the Quinean considers. On this reply, there is still no question of whether such things as properties, meanings, and numbers exist. There is only a question of whether such beasts as ‘substantial universals,’ ‘fundamental meanings,’ and ‘transcendent numbers’ exist” (Schaffer 2008: 14).

41

“… I regard sentences with any number of universal and existential quantifiers as significant” (Carnap 1963a: 881).

42

„Popper classifies metaphysics under kind II, whereas we classify it under III… It seems to me that the books which are customarily called „metaphysical“ contain statements of both kinds II and III. To us, those of kind III seem to be especially characteristic of metaphysics; therefore, in a generalizing way, we often called all statements of the kind III “metaphysical”, even when they belonged not to the field usually called

Schaffer also distinguishes between classical philosophical, ontologically interesting existential statements (which are the answers to classical existence questions) and existence questions which are philosophically not interesting (which are the answer to existence questions which are philosophically not interesting). He calls the latter kind of existential statements “beasts”.43 So he clearly accepts a distinction between the two kinds of existential sentences. The questions can be divided into philosophically relevant and philosophically non-relevant questions.

Given that the most skeptics deny premise (P2) it cannot be shown that metaontological skepticism is inherent instable. The reason for why this couldn’t have been shown was a distinction between existential sentences that is made by metaontological skeptics.