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from a lack of a fully developed close air support doctrine, and thus initial efforts were w eak and inefficient. However, against a largely

unmotorized and qualitatively inferior Italian army in the first months of the w ar in the desert, they were surprisingly successful and out of proportion to the effort involved. The constant bombing, both day and night, even w ith a small number of British aircraft had a telling effect on the morale of the Italian army, and hastened its collapse. This success was cut short by the entry of the German Afrika Korps into the theatre, forcing the British to fight a rapid mobile w ar for which they were unsuited. Their entire approach to air support had to be re-thought, including the introduction of more efficient procedures for dealing rapidly with incoming intelligence to enable it to direct attacking aircraft.

However, these changes mattered little until the British army learned to fight effectively, and to integrate close air support into its battle plans. Developing such a system was time consuming, costly, and had to be accomplished at a time of great stress.

All of these problems stemmed from a loss of close air support doctrine between the wars, but the practical combat experience of the Air Control operations proved important to its redevelopment. Thus, the RAF was able to apply a tested template to the need for effective close air support. There were no shortage of difficulties, and it w as not until mid-

1 9 4 2 that they had been largely overcome, but when they were the power of the RAF to conduct close air support operations improved dramatically. However, close air support is by its very nature closely connected w ith the ground campaign, and failures on the ground could not be overcome by close air support alone. This chapter will trace the changes to British C^l systems in response to lessons learned during operations, and the effect of these changes on the ability to deliver close air support. It will also show the effect of RAF close air support on the ground battle.

On 2 2 June 1 9 4 0 , with the signing by the Compiégne armistice betw een France and Germany, the Italian forces near Tunisia joined those facing the British on the Egyptian frontier. The British estimated that the total number of enemy troops east of the Egyptian frontier was about

8 0 ,0 0 0 , with 1 2 0 tanks, and the total number of Italian troops in Africa was 3 2 7 ,0 0 0 .’ The British forces in the W estern Desert, consisting of roughly 3 1 ,0 0 0 men and 2 7 5 tanks, thus faced a numerically superior enemy, but one that was largely unmotorized, possessed inferior armour, and showed "little enterprise or power of m a n o e u v r e .F ie ld Marshal Erwin Rommel described the effect of unmotorized infantry as being of "practically no value against a motorized enemy, since the enemy has the

’ PRO CAB 1 0 6 /9 1 8 , Despatch on Operations in the Western Desert From 7 December 1 9 4 0 to 7 February 1941 by General A. Wave!!, p.1; B. H. Liddell Hart (ed.). The Rommel Papers, (London: Collins, 1 9 5 3 ), p .9 1 .

chance in almost every position, of making the action fluid by a turning movement round the s o u t h .Any understanding of the success of the

British advance in December 1 9 4 0 , and the role of close air support, must take into consideration the difference in composition and quality between British and Italian forces. The British were fortunate that this was so, as the operations against the Italian forces were run w ith a confused

command structure, poor communications, fe w and generally obsolete aircraft, and very little operational and tactical intelligence. Strategic intelligence, because of its longer life span, was better, but intelligence staffs at all levels were lacking in experience.

For some tim e before 1 9 3 9 , the Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park, England, had broken and was able to read the traffic of the Italian colonial and diplomatic services, that of the secret service in Spain, as well as the high-grade ciphers used by the Italian army, navy, and air force in the Mediterranean, East Africa, and Libya.^ The fact that the Italian armed forces communicated entirely by radio in ciphers they could not easily change, and on frequencies which the British were able to monitor, made the job that much easier.® Thus, the British noted the transfer of 1 7 ,0 0 0 troops to Libya at the end of M ay

1 9 4 0 , as well as the move of an additional 1 2 2 bombers to Sicily.® In the

® Liddell Hart (ed.), p .9 1 .

F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence In the Second World W ar, abridged edition, (London: HMSG, 19 9 3 ), p .62.

® Ibid. ® Ibid.

first months of the w ar, prior to the entry of RommeKs Afrika Korps, the British had virtually unlimited access to its enemy's codes and ciphers in w h at has been described as a "perfect (if rather miniature) example of the cryptographers' w a r."’

The impact of this type of access to the enem y's secret

transmissions was dramatic. Operationally useful information was often too stale to guide close air support operations, but information on enemy order of battle, supply state, and serviceability rates were helpful in planning offensives where air support would be needed. Thus, the link betw een strategic intelligence of this type and close air support was indirect, but important to success.

The exploitation of high-grade communications was not the only form of signals intelligence, and the British also intercepted low-grade Italian signals. This activity, commonly known as 'Y ', is far less well studied and understood than the exploitation of sources such as Ultra, but was beneficial to many military efforts, including close air support and interdiction, as it provided strategic, operational, and even tactical intelligence.

'Y ' operators, however, required a great deal of training and experience to function effectively. For example, 'Y ' units dealing with wireless telegraphy (W /T) "demand[ed] a sizeable, highly skilled team whose training and experience need to have been extended over a period

of at least one year before any reliable intelligence [could] be expected from them."® The majority of Axis high-grade codes and cipher traffic employed W /T , and thus the success of efforts against this traffic started w ith the proficiency of 'Y' units. Radio telephony (R/T) interception units, conversely, w ere smaller, because the material being handled was short- range voice transmissions of a short-term nature, and "codes used [were] comparatively simple and [could] be immediately exploited by linguists who [had] undergone the shorter period of training required."®

The British organization of 'Y ' was initially primitive and less well organized than its German counterpart, but by 1 9 4 2 it had become more complex and integrated into operational planning to a point where it could aid close air support operations. During operation 'Compass' in December

1 9 4 0 , one main station functioned for the RAF. This was a W /T station located in an old Museum building at Heliopolis, and incorporated Nos. 5 0 and 5 3 Wireless Units. Also housed in this building was a small Army establishment of tw o smaller units; one unit dealt w ith Italian

communication, and was later augmented by a similar unit dealing with German Army communication. The commanding officer of these tw o army formations was also in charge of the Combined Bureau Middle East, essentially a satellite of Bletchley Park.’®

®PRO AIR 4 0 /2 2 5 2 Mediterranean Air 'Y ', 18 September 1 9 4 3 , p .2. ® Ibid.

During 1 9 4 0 , army field Y' consisted of N o .2 Special Wireless