160. The Soviet forces had been given to understand that their task would be the liquidation of counter revolutionary gangs. The situation in which they found themselves was that they were confronted by the unanimous opposition of an outraged people. Those elements on which they had presumably counted, with the exception of the secret police, failed to provide the expected support. The Communist Party, which had held the country in its grip during the preceding years, was rapidly disintegrating. The detested ÁVH, which had been the main instrument of oppression, found itself paralysed by the resentment of the people. Its members had been forced to seek refuge in various strongholds, where they were subjected to persistent attack, for the ruthlessness which they had themselves exercised now recoiled on them. The Hungarian Army, which the Budapest Radio announced as fighting on the side of the Soviet forces, is not known to have lent them any assistance whatever, while in at least one instance it engaged in active battle with them and in many other cases gave aid and support to the Hungarian people in their resistance to the Soviet Army.(3)
161. In combating the new enemy, people of all ages and occupations showed remarkable unity of purpose. However important the role of the students in the initial stage of the demonstrations, it was matched by equal determination on the part of the workers as the fighting grew in intensity. The fighting was nowhere more severe than in certain factory districts. The peasants lent aid and assistance by supplying the fighters in Budapest with food at little or no cost. Moreover, while there were many instances of middle-aged or elderly people participating in the fighting, the youth of the capital played a leading part.
162. Two of the first instances of the use of “Molotov cocktails” were by a man of some fifty years of age, who destroyed an armoured car at 7.30 a.m. on 24 October near the Kilián Barracks, and by children who are reported to have blown up an armoured car with its crew at 8.30 a.m. Efforts made by leaders to prevent the distribution of arms to young boys seemed in many instances to have been in vain; they readily learned to make effective use of rifles which came into their possession.
163. In the highly industrialized area of Csepel Island at the southern end of Greater Budapest, the factory workers, reinforced by police and artillery units which had come over to their side, created an effective organization of their own. Though Soviet tanks arrived in Csepel at 7 a.m. on 24 October, they made no persistent attempt to crush the uprising there. One incident was reported in which eight Soviet armoured cars, reinforced by ÁVH personnel, opened fire near the former Manfréd Weiss factory;(4) when, however, the factory workers pressed with their attack on the ÁVH, the Soviet armoured cars retreated to Budapest. The Csepel workers were thus free to go to the help of those who were fighting in Budapest. They travelled northwards in cars, on bicycles, or on foot, to the centre of the city.
164. In the middle of Pest, two of the major points of opposition to the Soviet invasion were the Kilián Barracks and the Corvin Cinema. At the Kilián Barracks - the former Mária Terézia military barracks, an old and strong brick structure on Üllői Avenue - a unit of the Hungarian Army under the leadership of Colonel Pál Maléter, took sides with the insurgents and continued to withstand successive attacks by Soviet forces. The defenders of the Kilián Barracks, including the civilian reinforcements, are said to have numbered some 2,000. When fighting ended there, sixty to seventy Soviet soldiers had lost their lives. About fifty yards away from the Kilián Barracks, just beyond Üllői Avenue, the Corvin Cinema, standing at the point of convergence of three roads, Üllői Avenue, József Boulevard and Kisfaludy Passage, was rapidly converted into a stronghold. Attack on the cinema, a strong, circular structure, was made difficult by the proximity on all sides of four-storey buildings.
165. The Committee heard a graphic account of the conflict at the Corvin Block and of the use of the “Molotov cocktail” by the insurgents. An anti-tank gun, removed from a disabled Soviet tank, was placed against the steps in front of the cinema, and a mechanism was arranged to fire it from within the building. The tanks or armoured cars came from the side streets and, on turning into the boulevard, were within range of the anti-tank gun which was able to destroy their tracks before they could train their guns on the cinema. Observers posted on the top floors of buildings on the side streets signalled the approach of Soviet vehicles. At the signal, the preparation of “Molotov cocktails” began. A bottle - perhaps a bottle of tomato preserve previously emptied for the purpose - was nearly filled with gasoline. It was then loosely corked, with towelling around the cork. At a second signal, given when the tank drew nearer to the Corvin Cinema, the bottle would be tipped downwards so that the gasoline could seep into the towelling. At the third signal, the towelling would be lit and the bottle thrown. As the loose cork fell out, the bottle would explode. A gasoline store on the premises of the Corvin Cinema provided its defenders with an adequate supply of fuel. The Corvin Block was one of the resistance groups in Budapest which successfully withstood attack during the first period of fighting.
166. At times the Hungarians met with sympathy from Soviet troops. Soviet forces normally stationed in Hungary or in Romania had been affected by their surroundings. Many a Hungarian had learnt some Russian - either at school, where it was a compulsory language, or in a prisoner-of-war camp. They we able to reproach the Soviet troops, when occasion offered, for their interference in Hungarian affairs. The Soviet soldiers were, indeed, in a situation of some embarrassment. The civilians whom they fought included women, children and elderly people. They could see that the people were unanimous in their fight against the ÁVH and foreign intervention; that the men whom the Soviet Army was fighting and the prisoners who were captured were not fascists, but workers and students, who demonstrably regarded Soviet soldiers not as liberators, but as oppressors. It was also an unusual experience for the Soviet soldiers, as for the Hungarians themselves, to hear people speaking openly on subjects hitherto banned in conversation. Some Russian officers and soldiers appear to have fought and died on the Hungarian side.
167. Confronted by opposition in Budapest which they were unable to master, the Soviet forces were in no position to control the provinces. The concentration of forces in Budapest seemingly left certain parts of the country, particularly the region between the Danube and the western frontiers - Transdanubia - practically free from Soviet forces. In such centres as Pécs, no Soviet troops arrived until the beginning of November. In some other centres where Soviet garrisons were present but isolated, relations with the local inhabitants were amicable enough. On 28 October, Free Radio Győr announced that the Soviet military commander had denied any intention of interfering “in your internal political affairs”, adding that “the rising of the
Hungarian people against oppressive leaders is justified”. The Soviet commander thanked the population for supplying milk to the children of the Soviet garrison and requested the people to notify him of any violation of regulations by Soviet soldiers. In conclusion, he assured the people of Győr that the Soviet troops were not preparing to attack the city.
168. In Veszprém, the Revolutionary Council, hearing of rumours on 28 October that Soviet troops at the Hajmáskér barracks were preparing to attack the city in order to reinstate the former officials, sent a three-man delegation to the Soviet commander. The commander deplored that at Várpalota, in the county of Veszprém, three Soviet citizens had been killed, but he recognized the right of the Hungarian people to choose their own form of government and to remove leaders who did not perform their tasks properly. He gave the assurance that, if the Hungarians refrained from attack, the Soviet troops would make no attack on Veszprém. The same Soviet commander refused to give asylum to members of the ÁVH who had sought refuge with Russian troops. At Jászberény the Soviet commander took the initiative of calling on the Revolutionary Council. Accompanied by two Soviet officers, he promised the Council that he would not interfere in Hungarian internal affairs and that the troops would not leave the barracks on manoeuvres. Jászberény was later the scene of a serious incident, but not until 4 November, when Soviet policy had changed. In Debrecen the Soviet forces withdrew from the city to the countryside. Soviet tanks had arrived there on 24 October, but, after negotiations between the Revolutionary Council and the Soviet commander had begun in the afternoon of the 26th, the commander agreed to withdraw the Soviet troops from the city and to lift the curfew, and Soviet withdrawal from Debrecen began on the 27th.
169. In the provinces, the evidence suggests that the Soviet forces were concerned rather to avoid conflict with the Hungarian people.
170. In Budapest the fighting continued from the 24th to the 28th, as Soviet armour sought to eliminate the resisters’ strongholds. The massacre in the square by the Parliament Building(5) exasperated rather than terrified the people, and the severe Soviet attacks of 27 October were unsuccessful. Not until the cease-fire of 28 October did a lull ensue, and the fighting had, in effect, come to an end by 30 October.