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Psychological studies of protected values seek to describe how human beings respond to situations where they must resolve difficult dilemmas that require them to compromise on values sacred to them: What characterizes their emotional response to the dilemma? Which principles guide the decision-making process and resolution of such a dilemma? Which conditions will lead people to relax their absolute commitment to protecting the value in question? Indeed, people tend to declare that their commitment to protected values is absolute and unchangeable whatever the circumstances. In practice, however, it appears that reality poses challenges that in certain circumstances produce flexibility with respect to these values as well. These values are therefore sometimes termed “pseudo-sacred values” (Baron & Leshner, 2000; Bazerman, Tenbrunsel & Wade-Benzoni, 2008).

Studies of the psychological nature of protected values can shed light on the question of how the ideological commitment to protecting sacred values translates into unique processes of judgment and evaluation that shape individuals’ political thinking and policy-makers’ decisions.

Indeed, when psychological theories are applied to the study of political and policy phenomena, it is important to distinguish between their application for the purpose of understanding the factors that affect leaders’ policy choices and their application for the purposes of analyzing psychological processes that shape the attitudes of the general public. This distinction is particularly important when researching judgment and decision-making processes. On the one hand, it may be assumed that, in principle, leaders and policymakers make decisions on dilemmas involving protected values through a process that is fundamentally similar to that of “average citizens.” Thus, researching the psychological nature of the protected value can teach us about barriers that affect both decision makers and the public that they represent when negotiating a compromise. On the other hand, many studies have demonstrated the influence of accountability, which binds policymakers, on the way that they adopt decisions (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999, 2003). Specifically, because decision makers are obligated to deal with the variety of consequences resulting from the policy they choose to implement, their judgment and decision-making processes are characterized by greater complexity and deeper analysis and consideration of the alternatives (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997). This chapter will therefore focus on the manner in which individuals and groups in society evaluate and resolve dilemmas involving concession with respect to protected values. Because public opinion in democratic states is known to have a decisive influence on the choices of decision makers, this discussion has significant implications for the policies that a state adopts in practice as well. We will begin with a survey of existing research on this issue.

A. The Psychology of the Taboo. One of the most influential researchers who studied the psychological nature of protected values is Philip Tetlock, a social psychologist from the University of California, Berkeley. Tetlock focused on situations in which people confront dilemmas that include a “mix” of a protected value and materially mundane topics in a way that demands explicit comparison between them. An example is the dilemma of allowing trade

in human organs for the purpose of transplantation. He argued that every societal tradeoff that includes “pricing” a protected value – or even the act of raising the possibility – will be perceived as threatening the basic moral norms that define the identity of the individual or society and will, therefore, be defined as absolutely prohibited or a “taboo tradeoff” (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997). The individual who is exposed to such an exchange – even if only observing from the sidelines – will fear the challenge to his image as a moral person and will, therefore, be beset by a series of psychological reactions aimed at protecting his values and social identity from “contamination.” This experience has been termed “moral outrage” and is expressed through rage, anger, disgust, and repugnance regarding the proposed tradeoff and contempt towards those who propose it. The latter will be accused of violating a taboo and will be ascribed irrationality, immorality, and even evil. This moral outrage is usually accompanied by enthusiastic support for punishing the taboo violators and their supporters, with the aim of reinstating the moral status quo. A person who has undergone such an experience will usually seek to participate actively in activities that confirm and reinforce his commitment to the social value that has been violated (McGraw & Tetlock, 2005; Tetlock et al., 2000).

B. Homo Moralis. Another approach to protected values is based on the argument that because moral values are central elements in the self-definition of a person, human beings will aspire to reinforce their self-definition by adopting extreme and inflexible positions on specific issues that represent the values in which they believe. These issues are chosen selectively and are termed “moral mandates” (Skitka, 2002). Studies have shown that violation of a moral mandate, or even the threat of its violation, has led people to react with moral outrage (Mullen & Skitka, 2006), to become more actively politically engaged (Skitka & Bauman, 2008), to disengage, to display intolerance, or even to behave violently towards others whose positions differ from the moral mandate (Bauman & Skitka, 2009, Mullen & Nadler, 2009; Skitka & Mullen, 2002; Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005; Wright, Cullum & Schwab, 2008). The perception of a societal issue as representative of a moral mandate has

to political and judicial decisions on this issue. Specifically, the prevailing stance is that proper judicial and policy-making processes (for example, through courts or equal representation) increase the likelihood that people will submissively accept decisions that conflict with their preferences (because of what is termed “procedural justice”). In contrast to this approach, however, it has been found that if the judicial or political decision involves violation of a moral mandate, the propriety of the process does not affect the perception that the decision is unjust. Moreover, when a judicial or political decision has consequences that violate a moral mandate, it leads people to devalue the ruling system (Skitka, 2002; Skitka & Mullen, 2002; Bauman & Skitka, 2009). Experimental studies have even shown that when issues were perceived as moral mandates, people were not even able to reach an agreement as to the type of process that could be considered just for resolving the issue or the person with legitimate authority to lead such a process (Skitka et al., 2005).

C. The Ends Do Not Justify the Means: Protected values as a rule of thumb for guiding judgment and decision making. The reaction to violation of protected values is described, and not without cause, as a reaction to violation of moral principles. Many studies have found a recurrent link between perception of a value as protected against any compromise or tradeoff and its perception as a moral value, that is, a value with universal, objective validity that commits every individual, independent of personal preferences, and should even be imposed on every individual (in contrast, for example, to a social norm or convention) (Baron & Ritov, 2008; Baron & Spranca, 1997; Skitka, 2002).

Many theoreticians have explored how moral perception affects decision-making processes, relying on the assumption that moral principles are not subject to the cost-benefit assessments that are customary when deciding on other issues. One of the most salient arguments holds that people tend to resolve moral dilemmas on the basis of predetermined dichotomous rules regarding appropriate and inappropriate modes of behavior (“deontological rules”) and not on the basis of results (that is, whether the action led to the best or most moral possible outcome – what is termed “consequential rules”). In the context of protected values, it has

also been argued that because commitment to them is absolute, the judgment and resolution of dilemmas relating to them must be based on a rule of thumb that absolutely prohibits participating in activities that impinge on that value (such as “thou shalt not murder”) and cannot be based on considerations of outcomes (or utilities). The reason for this is practical: if the significance of commitment to a protected value is the commitment to achieve an “absolute” outcome – that is, to a “perfect” realization of the value in reality – then those who adhere to this value would be obligated to devote their entire lives to working for it, and even then, presumably, they would not succeed in achieving their goal (Baron & Ritov, 2008; Baron & Spranca, 1997).

It follows that adhering to a protected value means refusing to violate the prohibition on compromise under any circumstance, even if such compromise leads to a better result in terms of the protected value itself (and thus, “the ends do not justify the means”). Indeed, psychological studies have shown that those with protected values regarding various issues have tended to object more than others to activities that undermine the protected value, even if this means more impingement of the value itself as a result of not engaging in the activity (this phenomenon is termed “omission bias,” Ritov & Baron, 1990; Baron & Ritov, 1994). For example, when 20 species of fish would have become extinct as a result of changes in currents, people objected to the building of a dam if they were told that the dam would save those species upstream but would also cause the extinction of six other species downstream. This tendency was especially strong among those with protected values on ecological matters (Ritov & Baron, 1999; Baron & Ritov, 2008). Because the preference for non-action, as we saw above, could lead to a choice that does not bring about the best possible result (in this case, saving more species from extinction), it is defined as an irrational or biased choice.

According to rational theories, a person will tend to choose the option that will yield the greatest benefit for him, at the lowest cost, and with the highest degree of certainty of actualizing the tradeoff. If the decision involves principles linked to the absolute prohibition on violating a protected value, then these two “outcome-related” elements will have no relevance for the decision.

Because the prevalent approaches to conflict resolution and to negotiations are based on the assumption that the players are rational, the above-described

psychological aspects of reaction to compromise on protected values will have significant implications for the possibility of conducting negotiations using the generally accepted tools for such situations (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002). In fact, one can anticipate an absolute veto on any compromise arrangement that would include concession with respect to a protected value, even if the concession is minimal and involves a substantial compensation. Thus, in disputes of this sort, the protected values themselves become a barrier to resolution of the conflict.