Greed and grievance theory goes into the motivations to start and sustain a conflict Collier & Hoeffler (2004) conclude that greed is the main explaining factor in civil war, and that there is only one significant grievance factor, ethnic dominance. Other factors, such as inequality and political rights proved insignificant according to their statistical research. Greed consists of three factors, 1) the availability of finance (mostly in the form of primary commodity exports and a powerful diaspora), 2) cost of rebellion and 3) military advantage, which is mostly about population dispersion and terrain. For the MILF case, finance is available but not abundant. There are no easy exportable primary goods such as oil or diamonds, only timber (Abu Bakar, 2015). The diaspora factor has grown stronger, as more Moros have gone oversees to work. Finance has also been made available through the Islamic ummah (see section 2.3.4). The second factor, the costs of rebellion, is relatively low in Mindanao. Economic conditions in the ARMM are bad and the prospects are similar (NSCB, 2012). The third factor, military advantage, is clearly present. Mindanao is sparsely populated and the terrain is very suitable for guerilla tactics. Still, despite some rent-seeking behavior, for example by groups like ASG with its many hostage-takings, this conflict was mostly dominated by grievances. This is illustrated by the fact that even ASG used much of its money not for greedy purposes but to help out the local population in Basilan and Sulu (Ressa, 2003).
The Moro’s grievances included the disownment of their lands and ancestral domain, erosion of their culture (kin-ship system), structural discrimination as second-class citizens, economic
112 underdevelopment (leading to continuous and large scale poverty) and restrictions on the exercise of the Islam by being subjugated to the secular Philippine law system. Some of these grievances date back to the time of the American colonization (see section 2.1.2.). Under US governance (land registration act) lands were disowned causing a deep rooted grievance. After the Philippines got independent, migration policies intensified and Mindanao, once a Muslim bastion, became dominated by a large Christian majority. Overall, the Moros had a justified cause, triggered by ethnic domination. This perhaps explains why the Jabidah massacre was no more than the fuse lighting the powder keg. When the AFP committed the Jabidah massacre, a full-scale insurgency was underway in a few years’ time.
If we look at how these grievances have developed and fed the conflict, some things stand out. Most grievances are still valid in phase four and have been admitted to by the government throughout the peace negotiations. This is not surprising because initially, the government felt it had already given a solution to the Moro problem by negotiating the FPA with the MNLF. However, it soon appeared that the FPA did not address al grievances. Particularly in the areas of the influence of Islam, credible autonomy, self-reliance and economic underdevelopment, the ARMM region fell short of addressing Moro grievances. Economic underdevelopment continued. All administrations were unsuccessful in upstarting significant structural development in the ARMM (Abu Bakar, 2015). The ARMM became a viper’s nest of corruption, failed governance and warlordism. Part of the reason was the internal revenue allotment, which was quickly pocketed by local politicians. Consequently, poverty even increased: In 2012 nearly 50 % of families in the ARMM region were poor vs 40 % in 2006. The economic development issue was also politicized as a carrot once a peace deal was struck, but not sufficiently undertaken during the peace negotiations. This was a missed opportunity because it could have given the peace process more momentum, and spoilers more irrelevant. International involvement did something to remedy this in phase 3 and 4. This failure of the ARMM undermined the credibility of the MNLF and helped the MILF to get significant popularity and carry on the struggle. Clearly, the halfhearted actions of the GRP to address grievances backfired and spoiled the peace process. The MILF cashed on this omission by addressing the grievances in their own way.
Autonomy and self-reliance come together in the control of land and the power to govern and collect resources. The MILF wanted to set an example of how a new Bangsamoro homeland would look like. They therefore developed a strategy that very meticulously addressed grievances like autonomy and self-reliance. MILF claimed control over large swaths of lands, created camps from which areas were made economically self-reliant and could be governed according to Islamic laws, undermined local government control. This is a strategy which fits with Duyvesteyn & Fumerton’s
113 (2010) insurgency category. The political, relational and organizational features of the MILF were very much directed at the local population. The MILF took this lesson from the MNLF, which had a more international focus, but became very dependent on the OIC. Naturally, the MILF needed finances and the group used its connections with the global jihadi network, wider Islamic ummah and the kidnap-for-ransom groups under its protection. However, the MILF’s primary goal was to address the grievances and gain legitimacy for it. Especially on ancestral domain (which includes control of natural resources), Islamization, and the rehabilitation of Moro pride, the group had success. On economic development, also the MILF could not succeed. This can be attributed to the threat of war, or the necessity for guerilla tactics after 2000. By addressing these grievances, the conflict can take another shape, with parties and their followers more inclined to follow a path of peace and reconciliation. Despite the fact that the conflict was mainly motivated by grievances, as Mats Berdal (2005) has noted, there can be interactions between political and economic agendas (Berdal, 2005).
Discrimination got worse after the war on terror was declared in 2001. This triggered further antagonism between Christians and Muslims. The national Philippine media strengthened this antagonism by framing Mindanao as lawless, chaotic and uncivilized (Chen Yuan Woon, 2014). The rhetoric coming from the MILF, desiring an Islamic state and emphasizing Muslim identity, was similarly contributing to this. This clearly hampered the peace process.
The erosion of Moro culture was very much tied to Islamism and the kin-ship system. The kin- ship system was not embraced by the MILF, because it would undermine their position and fostered economic stagnation. This was clearly demonstrated by the corruption and clan-feuds in the ARMM, which fostered enduring underdevelopment. Therefore, the MILF tied the loss of culture completely to a lack of Islam. Consequently, the Moro struggle got very much connected to a worldwide Muslim struggle. Since the 1980s, Hashim Salamat had integrated the MILF in the global jihadi network. Many MILF fighters underwent training in Pakistan. Lessons in Wahabism were part of the compulsory training of foreign fighters in Pakistan. Later, in the MILF camps, similar schools were established. Because of this connection, the outbreak of the war on terror would internationalize the Moro secessionist struggle. Only when they were forced to choose for their secessionist aspirations, the MILF cut ties with their terrorist connections such as Al-Qaeda, JI, ASG and RSM.
The last true grievance had a long history and has continued throughout the centuries. This was the element of arbitrary and excessive violence against the Moro civilians, and violations of the ceasefire against combatants. Such acts triggered cycles of violence. It also provided the MILF a strong frame for new recruitment. Both parties sometimes broke the ceasefire unilaterally. The GRP committed extra-judicial killings, either by the AFP, CAFGU or private armies. The MILF would
114 respond, with conventional warfare and bombings and after 2000, when the group adopted guerilla tactics, with raids and bombings. These developments turned out to be true spoilers for the peace process. When atrocities became too great or when grievances were still ‘fresh’, parties lost their mandate to negotiate. Violence could be used as a part of politics, but excessive and too arbitrary violence, like the Estrada all-out war and Hashim all-out jihad campaigns, were not successful. Abrahms came to a similar conclusion about the effectiveness of excessive violence (Abrahms, 2006). This breakdown of trust prolonged the conflict considerably. Both parties used the threat of violence as a bargaining tool within the negotiations. However, this only works when violence can be controlled. Until the summer of 2005, the parties were mainly occupied with troop movements and violations of the ceasefire. After this, AHJAG proved an effective mechanism to create trust and low- intensity conflict. This turned out to be an essential precondition for discussing non-military affairs during the negotiations.
In summary, grievances played a very important role in extending or ending the armed conflict between MILF and GRP. Repression and lack of economic development continuously eroded trust in the GRP and helped MILF in rallying local support and continuing their struggle. Addressing these grievances was key for the MILF in lifting its standing, both with the local people as its image of a legitimate benefactor and trustworthy party grew, and with the government as a party with staying power. Also, by lowering grievances such as the level of violence and discrimination, mutual distrust could be overcome. This was significant for reaching a peace deal.