This growing uncertainty at a time when the Cabinet was considering its Egyptian policy meant that the government had to keep 'one eye upon Conservative
5
constituencies' lest serious offence be given. J.A. Spender, the Liberal editor of the Westminster Gazette and a member of the Milner Mission, afterwards wrote critically of what he saw as the Coalition's fears that a 'surrender to Egyptian nationalists' might be coupled with the Irish settlement by the government's Tory
1. For example, the Observer maintained in its editorial comment that waiting for the pressure of events to force concessions in Egypt 'would be a fatal encour agement to the working of Indian extremism.' Observer, February 12, 1922. 2. Robert Blake, The Unknown Prime Minister: The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar
Law, 1858-1923 (London, 1955), p.424; and, Mowat, op.cit., p. 11.
3. Of the 484 Members of Parliament who supported the Coalition, there were 338 Conservatives, 136 Liberals, and 10 Labour and other supporters. Ibid., p.6. 4. Leopold M.S. Amery, My Political Life (London, 1953-55), II, 231. Amery was a
Conservative junior minister at the time. Also, see: £f .W. Smith], Earl of Birkenhead, FE, The Life and Times of F.E. Smith, First Earl of Birkenhead
(London, 1959), pp.353ff. Also, see: Churchill, op.cit., IV, 307. 5, Daily News, February.10, 1922.
supporter s. The fears that a liberal solution to the Egyptian problem would be considered a betrayal were kept alive by the imperialist elements of the press. The Daily Express, in particular, maintained an active campaign against con-
2
cessions throughout the period leading to Egypt's independence. Although the unorganised efforts of individual Members of Parliament or a limited press campaign could not force the adoption of a specific policy, they could have the effect of prescribing to some extent the limits within which policy was formulated.
Another aspect of Ireland's influence on British policy towards Egypt was the tremendous fear of once again becoming embroiled in 'troubles' because of a mis taken decision and having to bear the consequent cost in human and material resources. The psychological atmosphere engendered by the civil war in Ireland meant that everything - events, leaders and even institutions in Egypt - were seen in Irish terms. This was true at every level of the government from Cabinet
Minister to Foreign Office officials, as well as every shade of the press.
This factor influenced those concerned with Egyptian policy from the Milner Mission through the declaration of Egypt's independence. Milner already in Egypt wrote to Curzon on January 12, 1920 that, if British policy was not effective, he
3
feared 'it will be something like the Irish situation all over again.' Curzon dreaded the same possibility when it became evident in October 1921 that the Egyptian negotiations were deadlocked. He wrote to his wife that 'I am sure we
4
shall have an absolute rupture with another Ireland m Egypt.1 H.A.L. Fisher, the President of the Board of Education and a member of the Cabinet1s Egypt Sub committee, took the analogy with Ireland even further when he wrote that 'All I am concerned with is to send Redmond jAdli] back with a good offer for fear that we may have to deal with a Michael Collins ^aghlulj .1^ Zaghlul Pasha and the
nationalist movement in Egypt were seen in a similar light by the Prime Minister's closest aide, Philip Kerr, who wrote that he tried to convince Adli to accept the British proposals for fear that 'Zaghlul will go Sinn Fein...Zaghlul will begin
1. J.A. Spender, Life, Journalism and Politics (London, 1927), II, 99.
2. The Express was the most vocal in linking an Egyptian settlement with the Irish one. When Allenby returned to London in early 1922, the Express commen ted on his proposals: 'What terms should we have got out of Ireland under thosejAllenby'
s\
conditions? The same as we are likely to get out of Egypt. Lord Allenby carries his point - NONE.1 Daily Express, February 9, 1922. 3. Milner to Curzon, January 12, 1920, BLO, Milner Papers, Box 162.4. Curzon to Lady Curzon, October 21, 1921, in Zetland, op.cit., III, 248.
•4?
to create a Pan-Islamic-Sinn Fein machine.'1 Finally, in writing of the risks of a repressive policy even John Murray and Duff Cooper of the Foreign Office
Egyptian Section resorted to the Irish metaphor and worried that 'we might end by creating another Ireland without an Ulster, which would be a storm centre in
2
the Mediterranean and a perpetual menace to the Suez Canal.1 The press was equally alive to the Irish analogies and Egypt was constantly referred to as 'that other
3
Ireland'. Demonstrations became the precursors of an oriental version of the 'troubles’, and in 1922 a leader was sought who might become 'Egypt's Michael
4 Collins.'
The cumulative effects of Ireland's influence left the British government on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, the political pressures precluded the easy acceptance of a compromise solution in Egypt. On the other hand, the fears of a recurrence of the 'troubles' worked in the direction of a conciliatory solution.
The Foreign Office and Curzon
The role of the Foreign Office, directly responsible for Egyptian affairs, was extremely important. The Office's position, interests and structure set it apart from the British establishment in Cairo. This was particularly significant in view of the increased authority of the High Commissioner and the Residency in the early post-war years.
Although the Cabinet as a whole approved general policy, it was the responsi bility of the Foreign Office to formulate and recommend, through the Secretary of State, specific policy on foreign affairs and to oversee its implementation. The situation, however, was not static. The relations between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, between other ministries and the Foreign Office, depended as
1. Kerr to Lloyd George, October 28, 1921, BLL, Lloyd George Papers, F/32/2/9. 2. Memorandum by A. Duff Cooper and John Murray, October 14, 1921,
FO/371/6305.
3. Manchester Guardian, January 2, 1922.
4. Daily News, February 3, 1922. The labour movement also adopted this terminolo gy. The Egypt Parliamentary Committee presented the Labour Party Conference in June 1921 with a tract entitled Another Ireland (Text in? FO/371/6298), while the Daily Herald, January 13, 1922, reported that 'the formation of an Egyptian Dail is a new possibility of the political situation.'
much on personalities and circumstances as they did on constitutional theory and practice.'*' This was very much the case in the war years and immediately after wards. At the same time that Cairo was becoming a rival focus of power, the Foreign Office was undergoing a period of transition and a relative decline in influence.
The change in the position and structure of the Foreign Office began with its pre-war re-organisation and continued in the early war years under the then
Secretary of State Sir Edward Grey. Given the nature of wartime decisions and the presence of powerful figures such as Kitchener, Churchill and Lloyd George in the Service Ministries and Treasury, the Foreign Office did not enjoy an unchallenged position in foreign affairs. Eventually, it shared much of its authority with the War Office and Admiralty, functioning primarily in a technical and advisory capa city. This trend was confirmed when Lloyd George became Prime Minister in 1916 and the War Cabinet of Six was established to the exclusion of Arthur Balfour, the Foreign Secretary.2
The difference in age and temperament between Lloyd George and the older Balfour accelerated the decline of the Foreign Office position. Balfour felt that the Prime Minister had a right to intervene in the management of foreign relations
3
and willingly gave 'a free hand for the Little Man.' Organisational change in the government also contributed to the diminution of Foreign Office authority. The re-organisation of the War Cabinet Secretariat gave it wide powers of liaison and responsibility for memoranda and papers relevant to the Cabinet's activities, in cluding foreign affairs.
The establishment of the Prime Minister's private secretariat in the garden of his official residence was also an important development. The 'Garden Suburb* or the 'Downing Street Kindergarten', as it was known, became the means by which the Prime Minister was kept informed of all matters pertaining to the war effort
1. Leon Epstein, 'British Foreign Policy,' in R.C. Macridis (ed.), Foreign Poli cy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N. Jer., 1958), p. 15; and, Ronald G. Bishop, The Administration of British Foreign Relations (Syracuse, 1961), pp.3-5, 134, 160; also, Zara Steiner, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy,
(Cambridge, 1969), p assim.
2. According to Balfour's niece and biographer, this did not diminish his autho rity since he could attend Cabinet meetings whenever he wished. This does not, however, take into account the effects of formal exclusion. Blanche E.C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, First Earl of Balfour, K.G., P.M., F.R.S.
(London, 1936), II, 241-2. 3. Idem.
45
and through which he could circumvent normal departmental channels. The private secretariat and its leading figure, Philip Kerr, were particularly resented by the officials of the Foreign Office where it was believed that they assisted Lloyd
1