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It was hypothesised in Chapter 2 that organised engagement activities or projects such as AdaptNRM can provide decision-makers with a variety of resources over and above knowledge. It was postulated that these resources may enable decision-makers to engage with science. The three most commonly cited resources valued by interviewees are discussed below.
Time
Deliberation and engagement with science undoubtedly takes time and focus. AdaptNRM provided opportunities to engage by collating draft material to comment on or by organizing fora for dialogue, deliberation and reflection.
NRM12 “…in my experience you’ve Even in a time-constrained environment, some interviewees were individually motivated by got that many other things going on in your world that you turn your attention to this for the space that the project’s created for you which is usually a meeting and when you’re bussing to the meeting...”
interest, professional standards, etc to “make the time” to engage. However, despite these opportunities and motivations two significant constraints were evident. Firstly, there was no institutional mandate to participate in AdaptNRM—in theory planners could deliver their updated plans without engaging with AdaptNRM or using its outputs. And secondly, they weren’t funded to participate and there was sometimes limited institutional capacity for
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decision-makers to spend time on unfunded activities. Some typical observations about lack of time to engage with science generally or AdaptNRM in particular are:
NRM19 “I think we had opportunities to be involved and I gotta admit I probably didn’t take up those opportunities as I was really busy.”
NRM21 [in relation to barriers to engagement with science]: “Um look a big barrier is time, really is a massive one.”
NRM15 “It’s a real luxury to be able to look at any scientific papers and things other than in your own spare time.”
So institutional capacity reflected in time available was one factor determining the level of engagement with AdaptNRM and science generally. Making time to engage was harder for people in some organisations than others.
Opportunity for in person, face-to-face interaction
A range of conferences and workshops were organized by both the project team and decision- makers (Table 8). Given the dispersed nature of participants, the project team also used tele- and videoconferencing particularly to gain feedback on draft project outputs. For many regional NRM groups, physically attending meetings required at least two days of travel over and above the actual meeting time. Several mentioned being invited to meetings but being unable to attend due to limited time, notice, or funding. Despite this, without specific prompting, 15/25 interviewees mentioned that they valued the opportunity to meet others in person, face-to-face and some wished there had been more opportunities for face-to-face interaction:
NRM22 “A disincentive [to engage with the project]? Well it’s all to do with resourcing and couldn’t be done any other way, but like a get together in a room would have been fantastic”.
A significant feature of electronic engagement mechanisms is that they attenuate social cues which can influence who exchanges information with whom and what is communicated (Rowe & Gammack, 2004). Sentiments expressed by interviewees pointed to interaction in person being necessary to “get to know” people and also to interact better regarding complex situations and information. Getting to know people might happen more effectively at a workshop than via a videoconference because people can interact in a variety of settings over and above formal sessions—such as “chatting to people afterwards” (NRM23). This may lead to a richer level of dialogue about various topics and a shared experience. These factors may be important in building trust in individual and professional relationships (discussed
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further under individual or personal outcomes). Several interviewees also noted that a relationship built after face-to-face interaction resulted in a greater commitment to the project:
NRM16 “So you’re knowing oh OK, I really gelled with that person. That person really seems to be doing a great job and you go maybe that extra mile I think in attending, taking part, providing feedback”
Face-to-face interaction was also seen to be beneficial to scope out possibilities (rather than systematically going through pre-determined items). For example, the broader program was quite complex and the science which involved modeling and predictions was also complex. Having a looser more free ranging dialogue had value in this instance because it allowed people to familiarize themselves with not only the project, but how it might contribute or link to other work they or colleagues were involved with. In this way these types of dialogue empower decision-makers to determine what information is useful and why.
3.4.6 Outputs
Interviewees were not asked directly about outputs of the project but most referred to outputs when discussing the outcomes of the project and also when discussing their institutional needs from AdaptNRM (again reflecting an information delivery perspective). One type of output which was valued in particular were the ‘case studies’ (Figure 5) or examples illustrating how a particular group was incorporating new understanding related to climate change into their planning and actions on particular issues such as biodiversity conservation and weed control. These outputs are an obvious example of knowledge co-production through AdaptNRM. Their particular value seemed to lie in their relevance—they provide concrete examples of how science has been applied by other regional decision-makers. The fact that they described on-ground activity may have also made these outputs credible.
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Figure 5: An example of a case study appearing in The NRM Adaptation Checklist (Rissik et al., 2014)
3.4.7 Outcomes
Funder vs decision-maker view of success
When decision-makers valued the project in terms of impact resulting from implementation of plans (e.g. conserving biodiversity while promoting sustainable agriculture), it was generally thought too early to judge its success.
NRM09 “I still have no idea what I can do within the current funding constraints which are, you know, basically no money and no time, that would actually make any difference on the ground ecologically”.
While the evaluation literature tells us there is no single definition of success for projects (Guba & Lincoln, 1989), the disconnect between funder and participant expectations raises questions about who sets the goals for science push types of engagement and what are realistic goals. The above quote highlights three issues with evaluating AdaptNRM according to physical impacts: 1. The project funded the planning process but not plan implementation i.e. focused on bridging the science -policy gap but not the implementation gap. This means that a range of factors over and above the effectiveness of the AdaptNRM project can influence plan implementation; 2. Even if climate change adaptation actions are incorporated into regional plans and these are implemented, this doesn’t guarantee improved biodiversity outcomes (given the complexity of natural and human systems) and 3. Even if the desired impacts are observed could a causal link be drawn to AdaptNRM?
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In contrast, evaluating what influence the project had on regional plan development (an outcome at an institutional level) which was the stated goal is a more reliable indicator of the merit and worth of the AdaptNRM project. For example: “I’ve quoted them I don’t know how many times, probably 30 or 40 times in our draft strategy” (NRM20). This outcome is also easier to determine.
Individual or personal outcomes
A range of individual outcomes from AdaptNRM were also valued by decision-makers and these aligned with those identified in communication theory—i.e. changes in attitude, knowledge and behaviour (Neresini & Pellegrini, 2008). A variety of comments were made that related to individual learning through the project for example:
NRM01 “I’ve been able to interpret the science a lot easier and, and feed it back to other staff in a way that makes a lot of sense”
NRM06 “it has helped me understand the challenges and just some of the processes that we recommend to people to manage climate change.”
NRM14 “I was really happy to get involved with them and share our ideas and learn from other people’s experiences and bring that back to [region X] and input into what we might talk to with our NRM Board. And that then flows on to how we’ve changed the way we’re doing our regional NRM plan”
Learning from colleagues was commonly valued, for example with fifteen out of twenty-five interviewees describing learning through interacting with colleagues during the project. This is significant given that initial scoping of the project only considered sources of scientific knowledge from research institutions (although decision-maker knowledge was tapped into later particularly through the ‘case studies’). In contrast, only six out of twenty-five stated specifically that they had learned about the science of climate change or how they might engage with their stakeholders about it. It is likely, however, that the degree of learning was under-reported because interviewees didn’t necessarily frame the benefits of the project in this way. It is also likely that learning took place through people reading and thinking about written content.
Some also mentioned that engagement had helped them develop the way they thought about or conceptualized climate change adaptation which may also be considered learning. This conceptualisation is about decision-makers being able to determine the implications of science through developing a deeper understanding of the issue and what they can do to respond to it. As one decision-maker noted:
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NRM25 “I think that what they did really well was sort of their conceptual approach was quite clear and useful. So it helped sort of structure your thinking around climate change and the potential impacts of climate change and what we should be doing in response to that.”
This capacity to apply science according to their institutional mandate is likely why applied knowledge from colleagues was so highly valued by decision-makers.
Another outcome of AdaptNRM mentioned by some interviewees was the building of trust with individuals and institutions. Some scholars view trust as a pre-requisite for dialogue and the adoption of science (Taylor & Kent, 2014; Wynne, 2006) and the degree of trust interviewees had for colleagues and participating research institutions prior to AdaptNRM can only be speculated upon. It seemed that some of the key ingredients for decision-makers building trust in others were: spending time with people who had transparent motivations; were knowledgeable and respectful of their expertise; were competent; and could help them do their job. This closely mirrors Renn & Levine’s (1991, p. 179) definition of trust in risk communication: “the generalized expectancy that a message received is true and reliable and that the communicator demonstrates competence and honesty by conveying accurate, objective, and complete information”.
One of the values of building trust through engagement is that a trusted individual or institution may be sought out for information or knowledge – a trusted source. This may be advantageous to both the research institution who wants to demonstrate impact and the decision-maker who can obtain quick advice. This is illustrated by two decision-maker comments
NRM05 “if you’re in a bit of a hurry you’ll go to the person that you trust and that you’ve used before, and who delivers information quite quickly”
NRM07 “Like if you’d said to me a year ago you know CSIRO, NCCARF, AdaptNRM, you know it’s like “what”? (short laugh) You know, but whereas now we have established networks and contacts within all of those organisations”
Trust (and respect) may also be part of developing professional relationships. Interviewees valued both professional relationships with experts in science institutions and contemporaries in other NRM groups. One decision-maker described the value of AdaptNRM this way: “I actually think it’s more about relationships than accessibility” (NRM04). Relationships built the capacity of the organisation to do their work with interviewees citing a range of instances where relationships lead to collaboration in research and other projects, sharing of knowledge
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and resources, etc. For example one interview notes benefits from the broader climate adaptation program:
NRM02 “through the [X] cluster we got brought together and were discussing things and realised there was a lot of shared problems to be solved and that there was a lot of potential to share the resources. And probably deliver a more efficient and a better project by doing that. And so basically those three NRM regions: [A, B and C] pooled our resources and basically funded the project together.”
The value of trust was also illustrated by comments regarding individuals or institutions that weren’t trusted. “they’re the experts in their ivory towers. They’re not dealing with the people on the ground” (NRM22). In this instance scientists were perceived as being detached from decision-makers (no relationship) and so were sometimes mistrusted in terms of their knowledge or understanding about practical issues of interest to decision-makers.
Institutional outcomes
One of the key insights that emerged when asking interviewees about the value of science is that—in the climate adaptation context at least—regional NRM decision-makers value science for giving legitimacy to their decisions. The logic of this is that “good” science is seen as a credible and unbiased source of knowledge so decisions based on science are legitimate and therefore defendable. For example:
NRM09 “the value [of science] is I guess that it’s trying to move beyond just being some opinion that I hold, to trying to get an outcome that is not political but real”
NRM17 “if we were doing things that weren’t based in science then we’d lose our credibility, so quickly.”
While interviewees all felt “good” science was a credible form of knowledge on which to base decisions, there was acknowledgement that climate change presented some unique credibility issues for their stakeholders—from landholders to State government.
NRM06 “So you have a group of people who strongly believe in climate change, a group that’s sort of unsure and then you have of course the sceptics.”
NRM01 “there was a Liberal government at State level and... they weren’t allowed to even mention the two words ‘climate change’ ”
The politicization of climate change and the associated skepticism related to the science that underpins its definition, description, and management responses may have had a number of
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influences on the implementation of the AdaptNRM project. One may have been a greater demand for science by decision-makers as a “single point of truth” to give decisions legitimacy in a contested management space.
NRM12 [in relation to the importance of science]: “Its critical role is that it provides a single point of truth for what we know about a natural asset. And you can’t do a negotiation without everyone having access to that single point of truth and being able to trust it. And the only way to get the trust usually is by scientific rigour and method. So in my mind, you can’t operate in NRM without science. If you do, you’re gonna come a cropper”
The idea of science as a single point of truth in a complex and contested decision-making context with competing demands and values could be appealing. However this technocratic view of science contrasts with perspectives from Science and Technology Studies that science is socially situated and is rarely objective (Jasanoff, 1990). It also assumes the relevant stakeholders (landholders, board members) will indeed trust the science.