Sección paneles – Inversor - Operación del sistema

6 Operación del sistema

6.1 Sección paneles – Inversor

The battle of Chataldzha (Turkish: C¸ atalaca) was an important battle between the Bulgarian and Ottoman armies during the First Balkan War in 1912. The Chataldzha fortifications were the final defensive lines for Constantinople, taking their name from a village and railroad station located in the center of the positions. They were located in Thrace, about 20 miles outside the Otto- man capital, and extended about 30 miles from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora. The Ottomans had constructed the fortifications during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. They consisted of trenches, machine gun and light artillery positions, and heavy artillery to the rear. Natural obstacles, such as marshes, lakes, and arms of the seas, were also a part of the lines.

The Ottoman First, Second, and Third Corps manned the positions, with around 140,000 men and artillery pieces. Nizam Pasha (?–1913) commanded the Ottoman forces.

After their victory at Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar, the Bulgarian First and Third Armies slowly advanced to Chataldzha. The first Bulgarian patrols arrived at Chataldzha on November 9. By November 14, most of the First and Third Armies were in front of the lines. The commander of the Bulgarian Third Army, General Radko Dimitriev (1859–1918), assumed command of both armies. The Ottomans formally requested an armistice on November 12. Nevertheless, the Bulgarian commander in chief, Czar Ferdinand, was determined to enter Con- stantinople. That same day, he ordered an attack. Others in the Bulgarian command, however, were not convinced this was a good idea. A Bulgarian presence in Con- stantinople would undoubtedly aggravate Bulgaria’s traditional Russian ally. The Russians had long had their own pretensions to the ancient imperial capital. The Bulgar- ian armies were at the end of a tenuous logistical system, with the besieged city of Adrianople astride their supply lines. Finally, cholera had broken out in the Bul- garian ranks. Deputy Commander in Chief General Mihail Savov (1857–1928) traveled to Dimitriev’s headquarters on November 15 to discuss the situation. The two Bulgarian generals agreed to make an attempt on the Chataldzha lines. The czar again ordered an attack on November 16.

At 0500 hours on a foggy November 17, the Bulgarians began their attack. General Dimitriev ordered a full frontal assault all along the lines. No tactical subtlety was employed. Effective Ottoman artillery, sup- plemented by fire from Ottoman warships

in the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea, pinned the Bulgarians down. The Bulgarians did succeed in taking an Ottoman position but were unable to hold it in the face of a determined counterattack. This was the closest they came to Constantinople. At 1400 hours on November 18, General Dimitriev ordered the attacks discontinued. The Bulgarians suffered 1,482 dead, 9,120 wounded, and 1,401 missing. Ottoman losses were much lower. After the battle, the Bulgarians were ready for the armistice. After the renewal of fighting on Febru- ary 5, 1913, several engagements occurred in front of the Chataldzha lines. On Febru- ary 9, an Ottoman offensive launched in conjunction with an offensive at Bulair, succeeded in advancing 15–20 kilometers in the face of limited Bulgarian resistance. The Bulgarians then occupied strong defensive positions that blocked further Ottoman advance. Minor engagements occurred along the lines for the following month.

Additional fighting occurred at Chataldzha in conjunction with the final Bulgarian assault on Adrianople. A Bulgarian attack began on March 25. The Bulgarians succeeded in retak- ing some of the land they had lost in February, with heavy casualties on both sides. Fighting continued until April 3. On April 15, an armistice brought an end to the fighting in the First Balkan War.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Balkan War, First, 1912–1913; Bul- garia in the Balkan Wars; Dimitriev, Radko (1859–1918); Lyule Burgas–Buni Hisar, Bat- tle of, 1912; Ottoman Empire in the Balkan Wars; Savov, Mihail (1857–1928)

Cherniaev, M. G. (1824–1898)

Mikhail Grgorevich Cherniaev (Cher- nyayev) was a Russian soldier who led the Serbian forces in their unsuccessful war against the Ottoman Empire in 1876. Born into the family of a military officer family stationed at Bendery, Bessarabia, on Octo- ber 22, 1824, he embarked on a military career that took him to the fighting in the Crimean War as well as to the Caucasus and to Central Asia.

Cherniaev’s most notable military achievement was his march across the central Asian steppes and the subsequent con- quest of Tashkent in 1865. This began the process that brought most of modern Kyr- gyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan under Russian control. In 1875, Serbian peasants in Bosnia-Herzegovina revolted against Ottoman rule. This captured the imagination of Pan Slavists in Russia. They sought a means to liberate their fellow Orthodox Slavs from Ottoman rule, and in doing so expand Russian influence into the Balkans.

Cherniaev became a prominent Russian advocate for intervention in the Balkans on behalf of the Serbs. In 1876, he obtained the position of commander in chief of the Serbian army. His military efforts met with no success in the Balkans. After suffering several defeats at the hands of the Ottomans, he resigned his command in October 1876. Serbia had to conclude an armistice.

Cherniaev eventually returned to Russia. He died on his estate near Mogliev on August 3, 1898. While Cherniaev proved to be an incompetent commander for Serbia, his failures by no means diminished

the ardor of the Russian Pan Slavs for intervention in the Balkans. In 1877, they would succeed in bringing Russia into direct con- frontation with the Ottomans in the Russo- Ottoman War. This was an important step in the end of Ottoman rule in southeastern Europe.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Montenegro in Balkan Events, 1876–1878; Russo-Ottoman War, 1877–1878; Serbo-Ottoman War, 1876