Sector Bancario Tradicional

As emphasized above, similar to the aims of his policies of Zionism and the Christian clergy, Cemal strove for converting the Armenians to be ideal Ottomans, instead of abandoning them to their fate in desert. Therefore, in contradiction to so-called harmony with Talat regarding the measures applied for the Ottomanization of the other

614 For an extensive analysis of Dündar’s book, see also: Ayhan Aktar and Abdülhamit Kırmızı, “Bon pour l’Orient: Fuat Dündar’ın kitabını deşifre ederken…”, in Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar, 2009:8, pp. 157-187.

615 For some examples, see: Artuç, Ibid, pp. 292-298; Hikmet Özdemir, Cemal Paşa ve Ermeni Göçmenler: 4. Ordunun İnsani Yardım Faaliyetleri, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2009; Ahmet Tetik, “4. Ordu Bölgesi’nde Salgın Hastalıklarla Mücadele ve İnsani Yardım

Çalışmaları”, Ermeni Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2008/30,

http://www.eraren.org/index.php?Lisan=tr&Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=573.

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communities, like Arabs, Christians and Jews, he clashed with Talat on the Armenian policy. Thus, Cemal’s policy of the Armenians can’t be understood in its context unless an analysis of the similarities and differences between him and Talat and the reasons behind his different treatment towards the deportees is undertaken. Indeed, Cemal and Talat represented two different cliques within the body of the CUP regarding the treatment of the Armenians during the process of the deportations. Many indications can be found about the existence of that division. Especially, the evaluations of the German officials conveyed in the following sections offer many proofs regarding this varience. Similarly, the Ottoman and German records, which will be detailed below, make it clear that the local bureaucracy in Syria was also divided as “pro-Armenians” and their opponents.⁶¹⁶

Cemal’s contemporary remarks in the telegrams, the remarks in his memoires regarding the issue, and the testimony of the diaries and memoires of the other actors offer enough data to understand the main principles of his policy and his difference from Talat’s clique. In this sense, the most elaborate analyses were made in his memoirs. Defending the necessity of the Armenian deportations, Cemal begins his assessments analyzing the reasons of the deportation, and accuses the Great Powers, principally Russia, of driving a wedge between the Turks and the Armenians giving evidence of the good relations between the two nations throughout historical periods before the intervention of those powers in the internal issues of the Ottoman Empire.⁶¹⁷ Following that, he claims that he didn’t know “on what grounds the Government saw itself to deport all Armenians” noting that he “neither took part in the negotiations at Constantinople” and nor was he consulted.

616 The liveliest description of this diversion was made by Falih Rıfkı in Zeytindağı, while he narrated the meeting of Halide Edib with Bahaeddin Şakir in the train:

“In a station up from Adana, the late Bahaeddin Şakir came to our compartment. I introduced him to Halide Hanım… After a long discussion Baha Şakir got off the train [to go his destination]. Halide Hanım detained me and said:

- You’ve made me shaken a slaughter’s hand unwittedly.

Baha Şakir, whom I’ve said goodby down [the train], whispered in my ears [that]:

- The valuable young men, who would be trained like you must be prohibited to communicate with this woman.”: Atay, Ibid., p. 78.

617 For details, see: Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 241-277.

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He claims that he first learned from the Government Proclamation to the vilayets informing

“all the Armenians were provisionally to be deported to Mesopotamia, where they were to remain until the end of the War”.⁶¹⁸ As the third man of the CUP and as a member of the acting government, it seems impossible to decide on such a crucial issue without letting Cemal to know about it. However, there is no evidence that he was informed. Presumably, before the start of decision-making, in some way they negotiated and Cemal gave his consent one way or the other to the deportation of the Armenians. Furthermore, the statements of the telegraphs sent by him, don’t make sense that he was not informed about the deportations. However, he didn’t approve the massacres that took place during the transport and always complained about the dreadful organization of the deportations.⁶¹⁹

Cemal’s attitude about the deportation from Zeytun, Dörtyol, Haçin and Adana also demonstrate his different attitude from Talat Pasha and his clique. According to the conveyance of Grigoris Balakian, who was also deported to Zor, Cemal made the following expression about the deportations from this region to the catholicos of Cilicia, Sahag II, in a train station when he was returning from Istanbul to Syria:

“During the deliberation over this matter in the council of ministers, I tried very hard to argue that instead of deporting and exiling the entire Armenian population only the writers, intellectuals, and Armenian political party leaders –say fifteen or twenty people from each town- should be exiled. I felt that the helpless common people should be spared, but I am sorry to say that I was not able to make my voice heard”.⁶²⁰

When his military concerns are taken into account, this speech seems to make some sense.

Cemal’s primary concern regarding the Armenian deportation was the emergence of “any interference with the line of communications” that “might have the gravest consequences for the Canal Expedition”. Therefore, According to his memoires, he was opposed to the deportation of the Armenians of Anatolia into Syria, and proposed “to settle the Armenians

618 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 277.

619 According to the remarks of a German official in Istanbul, Cemal was among those, who ashamed what the Armenians happened to: PA-AA, Türkei 183, Bd.40, Wolf-Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 9 December 1915, in Serdar Dinçer, Türk-Alman Silah Arkadaşlığı ve Ermeniler, CD Supplement, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012, p. 774.

620 Grigoris Balakian, Armenian Golgotha: A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1918, Alfred A Knopf, Newyork: 2009, p. 51.

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in the interior of the provinces of Konia, Angora, and Kastamuni than to send them to Mesopotamia”. However, he claims, he couldn’t oppose to an Act of Parliament.⁶²¹ His claims regarding the military concerns seem to be true, when his meticulous attitude towards the Canal Expedition and his contemporary telegrams are taken into account.⁶²² In the same vein, in a telegram, he urged Enver ending the deportation of the Armenians from Anatolia as fast as possible to keep the railroad open for the military transport.⁶²³

As for his attitude towards the deportation of the Armenians, Cemal’s remarks regarding the decision-making process in his memoires demonstrate that he was not an opponent of the decision to deport the Armenians:

“If I had been in Constantinople at the time and taken part in the discussions, knowing what was happening in the rear of the Army in East Anatolia, should I not have supported the deportations ? This question I cannot now answer. But I assume that my friends, in reaching such a drastic decision as this wholesale deportation which roused the indignation of the whole civilized world, must have been actuated by weighty reasons. I have no doubt that in the publications which are shortly to appear they will satisfy our doubts and curiosity.

I am certainly firmly convinced that the Armenians planned insurrections which endangered the rear of our Army in the Caucasus and which might under certain circumstances have completely destroyed it. Consequently my friends held it moreexpedient to transfer the whole Armenian nation to another region where they could do no harm, than to expose the whole Ottoman Empire to a catastrophe which would have involved Russian occupation of the whole of Asia Minor.”⁶²⁴

His contemporary remarks also show that he saw concentration of the Armenians dangerous in any region of the Empire. In a telegram sent by him to the Governor of Aleppo, Cemal explicitly expresses his concern about the concentration of large number of

621 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 277.

622 In February 1916, in Adana-Aleppo line the transfer of the Armenian refugees had to be interrupted due to the intensity of the military consignment: Talat to Enver, 3 Şubat 1331 [16 February 1916], in Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri 1914-1918 Vol III, ATASE Yayınları, Ankara: 2007, p. 554.

623 He advised Enver to increase the number of the trains allocated to the Armenian refugees to complete the transport of the deportees as much as possible. For details, see:

Cemal to Enver, Aleppo, 27 Teşrin-i Evvel 1331 [9 November 1915], in Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri Vol IIIV, p. 475.

624 Djemal Pasha, Ibid, p. 279-280.

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Armenians in Marash.⁶²⁵ He warned the governor of Marash that the first Armenian uprising against the State emerged in that province and, therefore, the accumulation of Armenians in such a great number there, would be dangerous militarily.⁶²⁶

However, Cemal was opposed to the massacres perpetrated against the Armenian convoys. According to Wolff-Metternich, a German official in Istanbul, Cemal expressed to him that the directives about the deportation of the Armenians in the beginning of the process were right, but later the implementation of them was badly organized.⁶²⁷ Cemal’s own statements were also in this direction. One of his telegrams regarding the transfer of the deportees from Aleppo to Zor, Cemal gave voice to the following concerns:

“… The dispatch of the Armenians [accumulated] in Aleppo to Zor is impossible due to the provisioning and habitation concerns…if those were sent [there], a very crowded Armenian colony will be created in Rakka [Zor]…Therefore, there is no solution, but to send those Armenians to Mousul. [After that] the followıng problem will arise; the transfer of about 20.000 Armenians [located] in Aleppo to Re’sülayn by train in winter season, and to organize their transport from there to Mousul humanely [will be tough]. The needed trains for that must be reserved till Re’sülayn, and from Re’sülayn transport means, consisted of cars and pack animals [mekkari] must be prepared, and in between Re’sülayn and Mousul, it is a must to create places for [temporary] accommodation and to provide in those places provisioning and tents… I beg to ask [istirham etmek] to start the transport of the first convoys of the Armenians following [my] inspection that will convince my humble self to the completion of those preparations…”⁶²⁸

Cemal regarded the Armenians as the citizens of the Ottoman Empire.⁶²⁹ As touched in the previous chapters, he ascribed great importance to create a feeling of strong state among the citizens. Therefore, his frustration can also be interpreted in terms of his concern to Constantinople, 7 December 1915, In Dinçer, Ibid. [CD], p. 772.

628 BOA, DH.ŞFR. 541/120, Cemal to Talat, 21 Teşrin-i Sani 1332 [4 November 1916];

for similar evaluations by Cemal, see: BOA, DH. ŞFR, 528/38, Cemal to Talat, Aleppo, 28 Temmuz 1332 [10 August 1916]; BOA, DH.ŞFR. 553/115, Cemal to Talat, Jerusalem, 9 Mayıs 1333 [9 May 1917].

629 “Every Armenian is our citizen as separate persons”: Cemal to Enver, 27 September 1917, Arşiv Belgeleriyle Ermeni Faaliyetleri VII, p. 698

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Quite the opposite of Cemal, Talat connived at the dispatch the Armenians to the Desert, although he knew the dangers of it. In one of his speech at the Ottoman Parliament, regarding the settlement of the Muslim refugees from the Balkans to the Ottoman territories Talat opposed the suggestion of the Aydın deputy Emanuelidis Efendi on settling these people in the “empty lands from Üsküdar to Basra”. He expressed “If we had sprinkled those refugees sending them, as they [Emanuelidis] said, to the Desert, all of them would die thereabouts”.⁶³⁰ Judging from this speech Talat had an opinion about the destiny of the Armenians, when they were exiled to the south of Aleppo.

As for the political reasons behind Cemal’s lenient treatment of the Armenian deportees, it is claimed in the studies made by Bloxam and Kevorkian that Cemal Pasha planned to establish an independent state in Syria, and he wanted to gain sympathies of the Entente states. Therefore, he treated with affection towards the Armenians. As stated above, when considered Cemal’s activities to integrate the Syrian realm, this argument seems irrelevant. This claim was largely due to his way of administration in Syria. During his governorate in Syria, Cemal was quite independent from the Central Government. But his policies were somewhat concordant with those of the Center. Indeed, as the third man of the ruling party, the CUP, and as a member of the Cabinet, the Central Government did not need to check him, and supported many of his actions for the sake of the re-formation of the state in Syria. He enjoyed full confidence of the CUP leaders in İstanbul. However, it seems that, the independent character of his rule caused some debates among the Entente states on the persuasion of Cemal to a rebellion against the Ottoman Empire. Especially the documents in the British archives on this issue made some sholars think that Cemal wanted to establish an independent state in Syria rebelling against the Ottoman Empire.⁶³¹ According to these documents, the Entente states discussed to offer independence to Cemal Pasha in Syria in return for his rebellion against the Ottoman Empire.⁶³² There are no

630 Dündar, Ibid, p. 257.

631 Bloxam, Ibid, pp. 139-143; Kevorkian, Ibid, pp. 683-686.

632 For these documents, see: PRO, FO 371/2492, Grey to Cabinet (Transmitting Russian Embassy in London), “Internal Situation in Turkey”, London, 29 December 1915;

For the British refusal of the proposal, see: PRO, FO 371/2492, Grey to Buchanan,

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remarks or documents in the mentioned files belonging to Cemal Pasha. It is rather a discussion of the option of Cemal’s rebellion. They negotiated the issue and decided that Cemal was not ideal to support for their designs in the Arab Middle East. Presumably, Cemal was not informed about those plans. The German officials were cognizant of those rumours. However, all the German officials in Syria witnessed the loyalty of Cemal Pasha to the Ottoman Central Government and to the ideals of the Turco-German alliance.⁶³³ When the German Consul in Damascus showed the news of le Temps that Cemal was cooperating with the Entente Cemal interpreted that those rumours were deliberately produced to drive a wedge between the Turks and Germans and added: “should my countrymen and yours read them carefully and they open their eyes well”.⁶³⁴ The most reasonable explanation was made by Erden in this issue. He explained in his memoires that:

“Cemal Pasha thought that the role of Enver Pasha would come into an end after the war.

For Sadrazam Talat Pasha, he [always] said ‘he [Talat] can best be the leader of the Party’.

Thus, the most suitable one, to be Grand Vizier, was nobody, but himself.”⁶³⁵

Cemal’s memoires also supports this allegation. In such a way that Cemal devoted a chapter of his memoires to the Armenian Question and his activities to assist the Armenian deportees and published it at a time that the fate of the Empire was drawing to an end. He adopted a defensive language and answered the claims of Mandelstam and the American

“Internal Situation in Turkey”, London, 29 December 1915; for the refusal of the French Government the proposal of Cemal’s rebellion, see: PRO, FO 371/2492, Buchanan to Grey, “Internal Situation in Turkey”, Petrograd, 31 December 1915; some other documents for the same discussion, see: PRO, FO 371/2767, Grey to Buchanan, London, 30 December 1915; PRO, FO 371/2767, FO to Buchanan, “Internal Situation in Turkey”, Petrograd, 31 December 1915; PRO, FO 371/2767, Buchanan to Grey, Petrograd, 2 January 1916; PRO, FO 371/2767, FO to Cambon, London, undated; PRO, FO 371/2767, Hirtzel to FO, 17 January 1916.

633 For the remarks of Von Kress in this direction, see: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 27 November 1915; for the opinion of the German Embassy in the same way, see: PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Metternich to Bethmann-Hollweg, Constantinople, 21 January 1916.

634 PA-AA, Türkei 177, Bd. 12, Löytved to Bethmann-Hollweg, Damascus , 2 January 1916; in the same telegram, the Consul states that he agrees with Cemal.

635 Erden, Ibid., p. 285.

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Ambassador Morgenthau. Although, he did not publish all the chapters of his memoires in foreign languages,⁶³⁶ he had the Armenian chapter to be translated to both English and German. Taking these remarks into consideration, it can be concluded that Cemal’s political ambition for future was to take over a significant role in the creation of the new Turkey. Presumably, he was quite aware during the wartime that after the conclusion of the hostilities the treatment of the Armenians would brought to the table both by the Germans and the Entente powers even if the Ottoman side won the war. Therefore, not to contaminate his name, Cemal showed an extra sensitivity towards the problems of the Armenians.