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Any discussion that I present around the epistemological and methodological justification of my own position must, I believe, be with reference to the purposes I saw for my research work and my own location within it. I have already stated the main objective for this work in my introductory chapter, which was to explain the introduction of TQM to Ilford Limited. This objective directly relates to my role as a part-time researcher, but of equal importance was

my role as a manager and the expectation that I should provide information for other

managers and myself, which could be used to support our corporate aims for the introduction of TQM in the organisation.

In considering these purposes two questions arise, firstly on what grounds should my

explanations be listened to and secondly with what degree of confidence can the information that I have produced in this thesis be regarded as a valid account of what occurred?

My attempts to answer these two questions will provide the structure for my review of the epistemological issues raised by this thesis. In answering the first question I shall be presenting interpretations of a reality which I experienced. This reality was socially

constructed in part by me and by my colleagues, so that my explanations will draw upon my immersion in Ilford, participating in actions which I attempt to rationalise and explain. In Sayefs (1984) terms I will be using a language of organisational theory which is

'intersubjectively intelligible' to my target audience of other managerial practitioners. I will also need to expose the relevant issues of realism and relativism that surround questions of a researcher's justification of their position.

The second question addresses the problem of useful knowledge or knowledge that was 'practically adequate' (Sayer ibid) in enabling me to work within the cultural environment of Ilford. The validity of such knowledge rests on its relevance in helping to solve the problems facing us as a management community in the context of Ilford Limited. In this respect it is clear that as a researcher, I do not occupy the 'centre ground' of the full-time and perhaps more orthodox research position. Hammersley (1992) presents an excellent contrast between the work of orthodox ethnographers and 'practitioner ethnographers' (p135), who are more concerned with useful or 'applied knowledge' than the 'pure' theoretical interests of traditional and orthodox ethnography. By virtue of my biography and the context of my research work, I occupy a position of greater alignment with that of the practitioner

ethnographer, at least in the epistemological sense, since my work cannot be regarded as an example of a classic ethnographic account.

The interplay of my manager and researcher roles over the period of this study may be seen as producing two distinct forms of knowledge, empirical or useful knowledge (Gustavesen 1979; Louis 1983) and normative knowledge (Morrow 1994). The former relates to the practical interests of members in a social group who seek to achieve particular ends. Useful knowledge is a central justification for strategies such as 'action research' (Susman 1983; Gill 1986; Johnson and Gill 1991) and to Hammersley’s notion of practitioner ethnography. The latter form of normative knowledge applies a value or personal orientation in contrast to the 'value free' aspirations of the traditional forms of scientific knowledge. Normative

orientations are commonly associated with the traditions of critical theory and ideological critique. Again there is a departure in my own work from the orthodox assumptions of

'emancipation' which underpin approach of 'pure' critical theorists. My critical analysis of events in Ilford cannot be seen to be emancipatory, but perhaps more of experiences which were collusive with the dominant management group of which I was a member. Here the interpretation of emancipation could be stretched to its limits where the hegemonic forces changed in a way that could be shown to serve the interests of the broader management group as well as the 'top' managers in the company.

Associated with each form of knowledge there are to be found a number of philosophical debates that have relevance for my own discussions and it will be helpful to consider them in the examination of my methodological position. A position which as I have indicated, does not neatly fall into neither the orthodox 'camp' of ethnography nor that of traditional critical theory, yet as a practitioner I have been able to usefully draw upon the ideas and principles of both academic traditions.

Knowledge and the 'real' world

In research that is 'managerial' in its orientation, the question of usefulness warrants special attention. The early distinctions between 'episteme', that is theoretical knowledge for itself and 'doxa' which is practical knowledge that informs activity, still exists in the minds of many managers as if there is 'atheoreticaP practical knowledge. This distinction gave way to the concerns of natural science for developing knowledge that could be used to predict and control events in the environment. However, many managers are, in my experience, acutely aware of the difference they perceive between organisational theory or academic interests and the 'real world' of practical conduct. An indication perhaps that the worlds of the organisational scientist and the manager are still some way off from integration; but more importantly, it is indicative of an ideology that places great significance on 'doing things' clashing with an ideology that places value on 'understanding things'. There is however more to this debate regarding the nature of knowledge and the reality of which it informs.

My own primary position and socialisation as a manager in what we sometimes curiously refer to as the 'real' world and my academic ties and allegiances bring these difference into greater relief. This particular manifestation of role conflict places demands upon me to try and deal with the 'imagined' dichotomy between theory and practice. I have to argue that my work has practical relevance in the world of management and credibility in the world of the academic. Is this possible within two apparently different belief systems? At the root of these

issues is the question of what does constitute a 'real world' and why should my particular version of knowledge regarding its understanding and interpretation be listened to?

Useful knowledge

A number of writers (Kilmann, Slevin and Thomas 1983; Louis ibid; Gustavsen ibid) have examined the problems as they see them, of doing research that produces useful knowledge particularly in the field of organisationally based research work. I suggest this is with good reason, if it is the case that most research in organisations is sanctioned and funded on the grounds that there will be some practical application of knowledge that is produced. This situation whether we like it or not raises debates between 'academic' researchers such as ethnographers, who are seeking to produce knowledge through their work that is

generalisable and practitioners who may also aim to contribute theoretical knowledge, but in a form that will be of more immediate practical value.

Louis (1983), has discussed the generally ambiguous use of the term, 'usefulness'. To help to clarify the concept of the usefulness of knowledge, she has developed two important distinctions. The first distinction is actual events and potential to produce events. So that knowledge use is a descriptive form and knowledge effectiveness an evaluative form that relate to actual occurrences and can be assessed after the fact. Usability and usefulness are judgements made about the capabilities of knowledge before the fact. The second distinction

between descriptive and evaluative relate to the values against which knowledge will be judged. So whether a piece of knowledge is effective will depend on for whom or what the

knowledge is to be Used.

Using Louis' analysis we may be able to operationalise our research knowledge if we have a clear view of the likely acceptability of that knowledge in a particular situation. Knowledge that is operationally dependent for its usefulness on the values and purposes to which it refers will be easiest to manage in 'real time'. This is because in the longer term, values or situations may change and therefore modify the relevance and usefulness of a particular knowledge.

Louis' approach is largely positivist in its orientation. Positivism is a word used to describe a particular type of epistemology. In the social sciences it represents efforts to use the methodologies which have dominated the natural sciences. The positivist either implicitly or explicitly, assumes that it is possible for the observer or 'subject' to be separated from the reality observed or 'object' by rigorous scientific method. There is therefore seen to be a 'dualism' between subject and object. By adopting this approach it is believed that 'theory neutral' knowledge can be acquired and knowledge would be uncontaminated by the observer who adopts the positivist methodology. The application of this epistemology has dominated a large proportion of organisational theory, but has also been the target of a considerable amount of criticism. Not least this criticism is validated on the grounds that positivism is contradictory (Hindess 1977; Gill and Johnson 1991), in that it rejects the

metaphysical view of ail subject - object relationships which form the basis of epistemologies, including the epistemology of positivism.

The reactions to the wide ranging critiques of positivism has led social scientists to explore alternative epistemologies for their work. The basis for these alternatives has been referred to by Giddens (1982) as the 'double hermeneutic'. Here, the social scientist studies a social world in which causal law like relationships are implausible because all human acts are imbued with meanings and interpretations, quite unlike inanimate objects in the natural science world. Also, the world of the social scientist is itself full of concepts and meanings through which it attempts to make sense of the broader social world. Thus two hermeneutic tasks appear, one to understand the social object of study and the other to be aware of how the understandings of the subject affect these studies. The notion of theory-laden

observation has thus become a central tenet in the philosophies of science. For example Kuhn (1970) explored the idea of scientific paradigms or world views through which scientists project their prior beliefs and associated disciplines upon their work.

Emerging from these and other debates is the idea of relativism, where truth itself is a relative commodity. If knowledge and truth is relative and bound to be contaminated, how can these problems be resolved with respect to the need for 'useful' knowledge? To make some progress I shall need to examine more closely the nature of the 'reality' which I am attempting to observe and out of which I need to generate knowledge that has utility. Sayer (1992) offers a interesting approach to knowledge that develops the theme of usefulness and he does so from the methodological perspective of a realist.

Sayer is concerned to examine the context of knowledge and particularly to de-bunk as he calls it, the 'intellectualist fallacy' or 'prejudice', that makes the relations of social science to society a problematic one. It may also reflect upon the 'manager - academic' split to which I referred previously.

There is an implication that science both social and natural, represents the pinnacles of knowledge, through its articulation in writing and language. It is propositional or referential knowledge of objects by subjects who in the positivist sense strive for rigor and

uncontaminated observation. He claims that practical knowledge which ordinary people may possess that enables them to live does not count as valid knowledge. Scientists from whatever discipline reinforce the subject-object relationship, whenever they as subjects are observing and recording information about the object under study. The scientists project this propositional knowledge back onto society as if it is possible for 'users' to live on it. Sayer believes that they "underestimate the extent to which social behaviour is guided by vague and unexamined practical consciousness", (Sayer 1992, p15). There is a privileging of this intellectual form of speaking and writing or 'knowledge of something above the 'knowledge- how' to do something or communicate with others successfully.

Sayer develops the notion of practical adequacy based on the assertion that we can never discover absolute truth nor foundational knowledge upon which absolute truth can be based. Practical adequacy is defined as knowledge which must:

"....generate expectations about the world and about the results of our actions which are actually realised". (Sayer 1992, p 69).

As managers in Ilford our efforts to introduce TQM moved us into very unfamiliar territory, without the direction or guidance of our management consultants we were on our own. We had no alternative that we could see other than to reflect upon our situation, decide on a plan of action and then see whether or not it worked. In this sense useful knowledge was that which enabled us to make a prediction about the nature of something and then apply what we thought we knew, through our decision making, to our activities. Knowledge that is practically adequate will therefore vary according to the context in which it is set and used. This suggests that ’useful' knowledge is variable and likely to be updated or revised as the contexts change or those engaging with the world differ over time. As we made progress in Ilford our knowledge grew and we adopted a variety of views which appeared to help with our work at various times.

Sayefs realist approach rejects the positivist dualisms between subject and object by asserting that 'knowing' is a theory laden endeavour based on a duality of an external reality which is separated as a real object from our thought objects (Sayer 1992 p.47). Our

knowledge of reality is a social construction and through the notion of practical adequacy, it retains a linkage with the external reality. That is, we may regard knowledge as useful if it enables our expectations to be actually realised through our application of it to the 'real world’. This link with external reality is viewed by Johnson (1995) as an escape from the relativism into which the debates and alternatives brought about by a rejection of positivist subject - object dualisms and their severances, have propelled us.

The subjectivist - objectivist debate has presented researchers with 'either/or1 choices. Whilst models such as the one proposed by Burrell and Morgan provided a useful heuristic, its two dimensional mutual exclusivity has caused some difficulty for those interested in multi­ paradigm research. Hassard (1993) has considered ways of dealing with the 'frontier1 problem discussed by Pondy and Boje (opcit), whereas Willmott (1990) has argued for ways of 'denying' the mutual exclusivity brought about by the subject - object dualism and its restrictiveness.

For Hassard, organisational theory contains a 'plurality' (p.88) of competing perspectives and that a methodology for research should be somehow compatible with this view. He argues that multiple paradigm perspectives of organisations provides a much greater potential for understanding organisational activity and problems than does a singular and monological

approach. He concludes that epistemological variety in studies of organisations would further contribute towards greater democracy in organisational research.

Although the multi-paradigmatic approach to research quite clearly raises issues of relativism, there is a potential benefit of such a 'multiple lens' through which to analyse organisational problems. Different facets of analysis presents opportunities for practitioners and researchers to move way beyond the restrictions of single paradigms and to broaden their understanding of organisations.

Willmott (1990) argues for a way out of the subjective - objective dimensions that limit organisational theorising. The retreat by many organisational theorists into the subjective dimension and the associated discredit of positivist approaches in social science has tended to move thinking away from the need to understand reality as possessing both subjective and objective aspects. I have already indicated that the exclusively subjective orientation raises problems of relativism because of its divorce from an 'objective' reality. To mount an escape from this dilemma, Willmott cites three theorists who have provided insights into

transcending these dualist traditions: Berger and Luckmann (1967) with their analyses of the social construction of reality, Giddens' (1979) theory of structuration and finally Freire (1972), who critically argues for the existence of a different and more practical problem for a

subjective / objective dualism. Freire explores the dynamics of oppression, which he sees as being structured by the division of subjectivity and objectivity between oppressors and the oppressed. This division maintains and reconstructs these 'dysfunctional' relationships. These writers have presented arguments for the re-integration of the objective and subjective theorising and in doing so, they stand in contrast to the two dimensional paradigmatic model presented by Burrell and Morgan.

Returning to the perspective of usefulness, which is my main theme in the managerial perspective, I believe that Sayer does offer a more satisfactory approach to the

epistemological problems that I have encountered than does either Habermas' ideal speech situation (1972;1974) or Rorty's pragmatism (1979). Both these philosophers argue for a 'consensus theory of truth' in which realism is confused with a correspondence theory of truth (Johnson 1995) and so presenting a different ontological basis for knowledge.

In discussing some of the key issues for me in producing useful knowledge, I hope that I have been able to go some way towards resolving the conflicts which I originally felt between my concerns for multi-paradigmatic work and the more positivist orientations initially present in the research setting of Ilford Limited. I believe that during my work as manager and researcher in Ilford, I was able to bridge some of the gaps I encountered between the research philosophies and methodologies and what I was actually doing in Ilford. Part of my role as a researcher incorporated not only trying to contribute towards the production of useful knowledge in the everyday sense of managing with TQM, but trying to understand and

interpret events. This hermeneutic task was supported through a form of practitioner

ethnography (Hammersley 1992) and through this process, I was able to discern the themes of change that permeate this thesis. In the next section I shall briefly explore the practitioner orientation to the ethnographic elements in my research.