Displacement is the most disturbing aspect o f India’s experience o f large dam projects. Oliver-Smith (2001) described displacement as one o f the central experiences o f modernity and this is certainly the case for the millions displaced by dams - the ‘modem temples o f India’. There is no official record o f the number o f people displaced by large dams, although there is an official rejection o f the figures quoted in the report o f the W orld Commission on Dams (Central Water Commission 2000). One estimate places it at between 16-38 million people (Fernandes and Paranjype 1997 cited in WCD 2000).^^ Using a more modest figure o f 21 million people displaced by dams in India, Fernandes, Das and Rao (1989 cited in Cemea 1999: 17) go on to claim that 15 million o f them were not properly rehabilitated. In other words, three out o f every four people were left impoverished after displacement.
The main problem has been the lack o f (adequate) resettlement policies and legal safeguards for those displaced. The Land Acquisition Act o f 1894 is India’s only law on forced eviction (or involuntary displacement). Under the Act the government has the power to compulsorily purchase private land for development projects for the public good. Although the Act was amended in 1984, the principle o f eminent domain (whereby the state has the right over all territory in its domain) was re-enforced. Critics question, firstly, who decides and defines a particular project as being in the public interest? The lack o f transparency and inability to participate in the planning process is a growing source o f discontent in India. Second, under the Act the government is not legally bound to provide a displaced person with anything other than cash compensation and then only to landholders. However, the evidence suggests that merely providing eash to those who are not experienced in dealing with the market (as is often the case) is a recipe for disaster (Viegas 1992). The problem is particularly acute when the compensation received is at market and not replacement value.
In some states the Land Acquisition Act is supplemented with a state-wide resettlement policy, but these are rare. Only 3 out o f the 14 states in which the W orld Bank financed projects with resettlement components by 1994 had state-wide ‘resettlement and
rehabilitation’ policies and five had government orders regarding resettlement (Cemea 1996). Resettlement and rehabilitation packages are usually determined by individual project authorities.
Up to 1978, there was no assessment o f the rehabilitation package o f people displaced by dams. The Ministry o f Environment and Forests then initiated a process by which all major dams had to obtain environmental clearance before their constmction. As part o f the Environmental Impact Assessment, the rehabilitation packages o f people being displaced by dams were also to be assessed. Recently, resettlement and rehabilitation plans have also to be submitted to the Ministry o f Social Justice and Empowerment (Rangachari et al. 2000). However, neither M inistry can specify the content o f a rehabilitation package, and their assessments remain legally non-enforceable.
To summarise, ‘50 years o f planned development in India have entailed large-scale forced evictions o f vulnerable populations, without the countervailing presence o f policies to assist them to rebuild their lives’ (Hemadri et al. 2000: v). However, Cemea (1996: 1521) sardonically argues that ‘the absence o f domestic public policy [on resettlement] is a policy by default’. The result is a catalogue o f resettlement and rehabilitation failures. Hemadri et al. (2000) have identified eleven dominant trends in the Indian experiences o f displacement and resettlement as a result o f large dams. A few (notorious) examples will illustrate some o f the problems identified.
First has been the failure to inform and consult those affected. For example, the ‘Fact finding Committee on the Srisailam Project’ (1984) reported that villagers displaced by the Srisailam dam knew little about the resettlement plans when required to move in
1981.
Second, inadequate planning for rehabilitation. Two well-known cases o f displacement without advanced and comprehensive planning for rehabilitation are the Bargi and Ukai dam projects. In the former, most o f the displaced were not even resettled. Only 10 per cent o f the population were resettled, primarily due to the failure to prepare an adequate
resettlement and rehabilitation plan (Hemadri et al. 2000 cited in WCD 2000: 106). Part o f the problem is that resettlement is determined by the construction schedule rather than the other way round. The pressure to move people as the dam wall rises, without well worked-out plans in advanced, leads to a form o f resettlement that can only be described as ‘crisis management’ (Chakraborty 1986 cited in Hemadri et a l 2000). ‘Making things up as one goes along’ was also evident in the Ukai dam project as observed by M ankodi (1992) and earlier Chakraborty (1986) who said the final policy consisted o f about 20 different resolutions made by different departments o f the Gujarat Government over a five-year period.
The third problem has been inadequate compensation. This can apply to a number o f assets from land to compensation for housing. For example, resettlement policy often compensates for demolished shelters at assessed rather than replacement value. This occured in seven projects researched by Pandey (1998) in the state o f Orissa.
The fourth problem is the inability on the part o f those displaced to handle cash compensation.
Fifth has been a failure to acquire alternate cultivable land, central to restoring livelihoods. Failure to do so results in economic marginalisation. In the Upper Krishna Irrigation project, which displaced a minimum o f 300,000 people, only a fraction (13 per cent) o f the households that lost land eventually bought alternative land. Yet even these households only managed to replace about 21 per cent o f the land they lost (Parasuraman 1999: 171).
Sixth has been the effects o f traumatic forced and delayed relocation. For example, Pong Dam oustees experienced hurried and traumatic relocation when project authorities released water into the submergence zone (Bhanot and Singh, 1992; McCully, 1996).
Seventh, problems at the resettlement sites. This can include a whole range o f problems from inadequate housing to poor drainage resulting in flooding. Some o f the sites where
people displaced by the Srisailam dam were expected to live did not even have water provision.
Eighth, multiple displacements. Some oustees endure displacement not just once, but twice as a result o f faulty planning. In the case o f displacement caused by the Bargi Dam - the first on the Narmada river - oustees had to be moved a second time in 1990, when the authorities realised their surveyors had miscalculated the extent o f the submergence zone, which now included the resettlement sites (McCully 1996).
Ninth, failure to provide alternative livelihoods, as was the case when people were displaced by the Bargi dam in the early 1990s (Billorey undated; Roy 1999).
Tenth, problems with host communities. For example, Verghese (1990) describes the clashes that occurred in 1984 when land was being allotted to project-affected people in the Sabarkantha District in Gujarat, resulting in the death o f five people.
The negative consequences o f large dam development are not, moreover, distributed equally, as highlighted in the final category identified by Hemadri et a l , referred to as special vulnerabilities. Certain sections o f the population are affected disproportionately
by development-induced displacement and resettlement. Tribal people are
disproportionately represented. At least 40 per cent o f those displaced by dams in India are tribals (Hemadri et a l 2000), although they only make up 8 per cent o f the India population (Patwardhan 2000). Including the scheduled castes within these calculations, who make up 16 per cent o f the population (Census o f India 1991), the figure rises to 62 per cent o f those displaced (Rangachari et a l 2000). See also Singh (1997) for a detailed break down o f social compositions o f displaced people.
Although India has signed up to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) convention calling distinct measures to protect the rights o f indigenous and tribal people, it is forcing rapid change on them, which may annihilate their culture.
We have seen that tribal people are a marginalised section o f society evident from the fact that displacement is most likely to be forced on them. The threat o f further marginalisation arises because tribal groups are often ineligible for compensation as they lack documented legal rights to the land they cultivate and because they rely heavily on common property resources for which the Land Acquisition Act does not provide compensation.
One issue that has been the subject o f much recent discussion is the effect o f
displacement on specific groups within the population affected. Women are
disproportionately disadvantaged by displacement and resettlement. As women are usually responsible for collecting food, fuel, fodder and water, ‘any loss o f access to traditional sources o f livelihood - land, forest, sea, river, pasture, cattle or saltpan land - marginalizes women ... It is only when land and other sources are replaced that women at least partially regain their economic status’ (Parasuraman 1999: 226). Existing social inequalities in India are reinforced or even exacerbated by insensitive resettlement and rehabilitation policies, such as giving replacement land in the name o f the male family members. Displacement for women is said to be a multiple attack on all fronts. For example, Indian women are generally much less mobile than men, hence the breakdown o f village and social units affect them much more severely (Dhagamwar et a l 1997).
Thus a more radical critique o f large dams has developed recently, labeling this type o f development as profoundly inequitable. Critics such as Dhagamwar et a l (1997: 281) deem the doctrine o f ‘greatest good for the greatest num ber’ inappropriate, especially in a country where massive inequalities already exist:
In the game o f numbers played by the government to justify its development projects, the ... utilitarian assumption seems to be quite valid at first glance (and even on second and third glances). But how far does it work when the society is not homogeneous?
Rangachari et a l (2000) highlight the different kinds o f impacts on equity that need to be considered. These include: equity between those who gain and those who lose; equity among those who lose; equity among those who gain (irrigation and power
benefits accrue mainly to the richer urban and rural population, and those at the head reach rather than tail end o f canal systems); equity across generations (sustainable development); and finally equity between species, which is given the least attention in India.
To encompass all these various concerns, cost-benefit analysis on which the decision to proceed with large dams is made, should be replaced, not simply by a class-benefit analysis i.e. one that considers who benefits and who looses and to what degree (Singh
et al. 1997, Kothari 1997), but with a fuller equity impact assessment (Reddy cited in Rangachari et a l 2000). Currently the Ministry o f Environment and forestry is required to consider social costs and benefits under the Environmental Impact Assessment, but this should be, instead, an explicit evaluation with equity as a primary yardstick.
However these sorts o f changes in decision-making procedure have not been forthcoming, neither has been a National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy, demonstrating for many a lack o f commitment on the part o f planners to safeguard the interests o f the weakest in society, including people affected by the p r o j e c t s . B y invoking the rhetoric o f sacrifice for the greater common good, India’s decision-makers imposed their policies on marginalised communities and then exonerated themselves o f the responsibility to counteract the adverse effects o f displacement. The result: a dearth o f examples o f sensitive and successful resettlement - ‘the evidence ... found for “rehabilitation” suggests that only partial, late, and segmented rehabilitation has taken place’ (Cemea 1999: 18).^^
In India and elsewhere, the debate about large dams had become so polarised in the last decade that an impasse has been created by pro- and anti-dam activists. This divide in thinking has found physical expression, in standoffs between pro and anti-dam activists at dam sites, including the Sardar Sarovar. The Indian anti-dam movement has linked up successfully with other anti-dam groups around the world and with a broad array o f groups engaged in human rights, the environment and the rights o f indigenous people, as well as those calling for greater democratization and increased participation o f local
populations in the decisions and projects affecting them. They have combined to form an impressive and effective ‘transnational civil society’ in a process labeled ‘globalization from below ’ (Brecher, Costello and Smith 1999 cited in Oliver-Smith
2001). By coming together (aided by the spread o f modem communication
technologies) these groups have been able to establish international movements, which are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore, notably the anti-dam movement.
To demonstrate the impact o f this movement. The International Rivers Network (2001: 1) refer to a speech made by the President o f ICOLD in 1992, in which he said the industry faced ‘a serious general counter-movement that has already succeeded in reducing the prestige o f dam engineering in the public eye, and it is starting to make work difficult for our profession’. His warning was justified. The First International Meeting o f People Affected by Dams took place in 1997 in Curitiba, Brazil. It was seen by the IRN as the first step in building and strengthening a global network o f the dam- affected. Since this meeting there has been an ‘International Day o f Action Against D am s’ held every year on 14^^ March, with campaigning events all round the world.
In between these events regional organisations have been working with larger organisations, for example the Narmada Bachao Andolan with the IRN, to halt or frustrate destructive river development projects and ‘revive’ rivers and their watersheds. The movement cites the shelving o f the Bui Dam project on the river Volta in Ghana and the agreement by the Thai government to open (at least temporarily) the flood gates o f the Pak Mun dam, seven years after its completion, as two o f their recent successes. They have also had considerable success in pressurising multilateral development banks and export credit agencies from supporting large dams.
At the launch o f the World Commission on Dams’ final report in 2000 (see section 2.6) the President o f the W orld Bank was keen to emphasize how their involvement with large dams has been decreasing. Between 1970-1985 it is estimated that World Bank financing was involved in about 3 per cent o f new dams projects, now reduced to about 1 per cent. However, just because donor agencies start to change their policy on large
dams (stop funding new ones or withdraw funding from existing projects) it does not mean that they will cease to be built; the Sardar Sarovar dam being a case in point.
2.5 Sardar Sarovar Project case study