Segmentación objetivo del proyecto

“Do the current legislative framework, policy and plans provide an optimal basis for CDEM to be managed in New Zealand?”

This third GR question seeks to explore the current state of legislation, policy and plans, and to assess their robustness against the backdrop of a major disaster event.

5.4.1 Robustness of CDEM Framework

From an overarching perspective New Zealand’s CDEM legislative framework (Figure 2.8) and associated governance policies are in relatively good order. The CDEM strategy was recently reviewed and approved largely in its current form. The 4Rs approach remains in place at the core of the strategy, which is due for a full review in 2017. The National CDEM Plan is overdue for an update and requires immediate attention. The delay of the review can be justified by the significant magnitude of the Christchurch earthquake response. However, the plan’s update now needs be expedited in order to lay a solid foundation for future planning and procedures to be developed. Some major revisions to the document, including a logistics section, are necessary to ensure it is contemporary and equipped to deal with the next large-scale disaster event.

CDEM Group plans continue to evolve and have attracted mixed comments over the 16 Groups in relation to how robust respondents consider these plans are. This theme is also reflected in the MCDEM (2012a & b) that reported a significant range of performance across the 16 CDEM Groups. These Capability Assessment reports are an excellent auditing gauge on the performance of CDEM Groups. In addition to these reports it is critical that remediation plans are put in place to remedy areas that CDEM Groups are deficient. This follow-up reporting is a vital means to ensure that CDEM Groups continue to improve in their effectiveness.

Previously discussed in Sections 4.2 and 5.2 there is an urgent need for a logistics guide to the National CDEM Plan. Alongside this is a need to review and update the Recovery Management Plan, which has not been reissued since 2005. The recovery phase is the most complex phase of the 4Rs, and the longest in terms of planning timelines. There is currently an opportunity, in the wake of the Christchurch earthquakes and the establishment and experience of CERA, which should be taken to update the Recovery Management Plan.

One area where the CDEM Act can be strengthened is in the area of lifeline utilities. The Act requires every lifeline utility to be able to function to the “fullest possible extent” in the aftermath of a disaster (NZ Govt, 2002, s. 60). This phrase is ambiguous and as a result lacks impact. Greater clarity is required around this and other legislative wording, particularly in putting greater onus on major lifeline utilities to be involved in the readiness phase of the 4Rs strategy, whether in exercise participation or the development of joint contingency plans with CDEM. Requiring private companies to participate in this phase will increase their overheads. However an increase in overhead needs to be balanced against the bigger question of “whether this participation will put New Zealand in a better position to cope with a disaster?” If the answer is yes, then it may be justified to impose the additional overhead cost on companies, or alternatively the government could look into subsidising any increase in costs to ensure participation. Another improvement that could be made to the Act is for FMCG companies, particularly the major grocery chains, to be included in the definition of a lifeline utility.31 Noting the risk to the population of food shortages in the event of a major disaster, it would be prudent to include these FMCG companies under the lifeline utilities provisions. In reality these companies will have developed contingencies on various CDEM scenarios, and a legislative development along these lines will only strengthen CDEM ability to engage a wider range of resources and mitigate potential risks.

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5.4.2 CDEM Resources

Resources for CDEM and associated financial funding will continue to be a significant challenge as the country recovers from the GFC and the cost of rebuilding Christchurch. The funding model for CDEM is multi-layered and issues around funding are often compounded by having to provide it to a number of regional or territorial authorities, which in turn face pressure by residents to keep rates down. Ultimately the level applied to regional or local authorities should not materially matter, as long as the arrangements between parties are clear and budget reporting takes place. Another funding issue is that ‘public safety’ is seen as a ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ services expense. Generally, the CDEM functions and services are inherently invisible to taxpayers and ratepayers unlike other expenses such as the provision of physical amenities. As a result, the public demand for CDEM expenditure is low and some indications suggest that CDEM expenditure per household is dropping disproportionately to other services within some councils. This is despite the fact that the risk of hazards are rising and councils are often held accountable when these type of events occur. This approach has created the current paradox where councils prefer to spend money in the more expensive response phase, rather than invest earlier as part of the readiness phase. The aftermath of the Christchurch earthquake demonstrated how little New Zealand CDEM organisations have in the way of contingency stocks, and the need for reliance on organisations such as the NZRC.

Intelligent measures are being developed to drive resource efficiency while still maintaining an appropriate level of CDEM output. WREMO’s recent initiatives centred around integration, reduction in duplication, and promoting cost-effective disaster preparedness equipment, provide good examples of how funding can be made to go further in the promotion of CDEM. This needs to be replicated throughout the country where practicable.