Segmento de mercado - Plantilla de Modelo de Negocios (Business Model Canvas)

Capítulo 2: Marco Teórico

2.2 Plantilla de Modelo de Negocios (Business Model Canvas)

2.2.1 Segmento de mercado

In order to make the immigration and asylum system tough for those claiming false asylum (without a well-founded fear of persecution), immigration and social policies aimed to ensure that foreign workers can enter only when there is a shortage in their specialist field so they can offer value to the UK economy (Policy and Strategy Group, 2010). Those who are homeless or do not have funds to buy food (so-called

‘destitutes’) may receive benefit (UK Visas and Imiigration (UKVI), 2014).

Initially, asylum seekers are expected to rely on their own resources, but if they are destitute they can apply for support from the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) (this facility was introduced following the passage of the IAA1999) (Bell and Machin, 2013a). In any case, asylum seekers are not allowed to claim mainstream welfare benefits and NASS provisions are very basic regarding the level of financial support they provide (see Table 3.1 in Appendix 2).

In addition, while asylum seekers wait for a decision on their application for asylum, they have no automatic right to work (paid or unpaid) or to seek permission to work. Asylum seekers do not have the same entitlements as refugees and those with other forms of protection to government funded training and for work programs (Carter, 2008 ).

- 105 -

The Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 discouraged employers from using asylum seekers by making it an offence to employ those who have false documents and those who have no right to work in the UK. NIAA 2002 made further controls on asylum seekers and abolished their right to apply for permission to work, on the ground that all application processes would then be sped up, and the majority of application would be finalised in three months (Phillimore and Goodson, 2006). In 2004, new guidance was issued that dictated employers have to check the documents of their employees to see if they are entitled to work. In 2005, The Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act enforced a civil penalty of £5000 (quadruple in 2014) on those employers who employed a person subject to immigration-control restriction (McKay, 2009, p 61- 62).

Legislation such as these have effectively barred employers from employing particular communities, such as those from ethnic minorities, for fear of prosecution and fine (Phillimore and Goodson, 2006). The 2008 Prevention of Illegal Working guidelines are rooted in the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. They promote migration compliance and penalize those who break the rules.

Biometric overseas border controls are introduced within prescribed categories, as well as tougher enforcement for non-compliance, including fines of up to £10,000 in 2008 (doubled in 2014) for employers who employ illegal migrant workers (Carter, 2008 , Home Office, 2009).

From September 9^th 2010, qualified asylum seekers and failed asylum seekers have been given the right to apply for a permission to get a paid job under the following conditions (Policy and Strategy Group, 2010):

- 106 -

1. The claim has been outstanding for at least twelve months 2. The delay cannot be attributed to the applicant

3. Not applying for permission to become self-employed

4. The applicant will only be allowed to take up a job, which is included on the list of shortage occupations published by UKVI

Once legally entitled to work, refugees face a range of barriers to employment. A significant barrier is that they will have been unemployed for several months, or even years. These issues are exacerbated by the government offering only small grants to the main refugee agencies to help support settlement (Sales, 2002). The limited financial support available to asylum seekers received much attention in parliamentary debates, with some MPs criticising the amount and the method of delivery (vouchers) that are in place to help the asylum seekers cover living expenses in the UK while they await their case decision (Hansard, 2001a). In a question by Anne Campbell (Lab MP) to the Secretary of State (David Blunkett):

‘… Does he (the Secretary of State) understand that asylum seekers find the process of making purchases with vouchers humiliating? In addition, they are unable to get full value for money because of shops' inability to give change on the vouchers. Will my right hon. Friend therefore make sure that any future system addresses both those problems and will he try to ensure a speedy conclusion to the review?’(Hansard, 2001a, col 1-2)

The language around asylum and refugees has changed and since become linked to issues around benefit and welfare, as a study in the Glasgow University conducted how the media covered asylum in the press and television news in 2006 and 2011 (Briant, 2013):

- 107 -

‘…the language itself, the difference between refugee and asylum seeker, you do not hear the word refugee anymore, its asylum seeker all the time’

Asylum seeker has been reconfigured as somebody seeking benefits.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the spending cuts that were being pushed through during the period, a sample of 2011 press reports revealed an increase in the representation of asylum seekers as a ‘burden’ on the taxpayer (Briant, 2013).

3.3.2.4 Housing pressures

The 1993 Asylum and immigration Appeal Act had reduced the right to accommodation for homeless asylum seekers, and the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 eliminated the right of being offered housing for all asylum seekers (Humphries, 2004, UKBA, 1997). The most important change was in 2000, when the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 came into force, removing existing rights to housing and all types of benefits. A new setup housing and subsistence scheme for asylum-seekers, administered by the UK Border Agency has been introduced. Since 2000, homeless asylum-seekers have been housed in specially commissioned emergency accommodation on first arriving in the UK. After this they have the option to apply for a ‘subsistence only’ package or for subsistence and accommodation (Rutter and Latorre, 2009).

3.3.2.5 Crime pressures

There are three types of crimes that have been connected to asylum seekers: bogus claims (abuse the immigration system), engaging in illegal working and potential engagement in property crimes.

- 108 -

Sales (2002), Bloch and Schuster (2002) argued that the tightened immigration policy on non-EU economic migrants made them look for other legitimate ways, such as seeking asylum, to gain access to Europe.

The motivation of seeking asylum to the UK has been suspected by many to be motivated by economic factors (Kent, 2001). Since the 1990s, politicians and the media have repeatedly circulated the word ‘bogus’ and connected asylum seekers, which has placed a burden of suspicion on all applications until proven genuine.

The British Government’s tough response to new applications can be seen as in line with the general trend across Europe of more restrictive policies towards asylum seekers (Zetter and Pearl, 2000).

The Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 aimed to deter those arriving in the UK for economic and not political reasons as they claimed (Schuster, 2003, p 62). The Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, formalized the discussion of ‘deserving’ and undeserving’ asylum seekers, and made reference to those whose claimed fear was deemed unfounded (Sales, 2002, Phillimore and Goodson, 2006).

The term ‘bogus asylum seekers’ has been used without clarity and precision, and in practice those who failed to prove their cases or had their cases considered as unsuccessful are usually suspected to be bogus or at least the considered by the public as such (Neumayer, 2005, UNHCR, 2013). This is in spite of the UN stating that the term ‘bogus’ or

‘illegal’ asylum seeker does not exist, and if an asylum seeker has not received refugee status and been deported that does not mean s/he is bogus. As Kofi Annan (UNHCR, 2013) said:

- 109 -

‘Let us remember that a bogus asylum-seeker is not equivalent to a criminal;

and that an unsuccessful asylum application is not equivalent to a bogus one’

Political rhetoric and government documents (Home Office, 2007a) reveal a lack of clarity and the random use of undefined terms like ‘bogus’ and

‘failed asylum seekers’. At first it might seem that those who cannot present their case well, or whose cases are ended because of unfounded fear are considered as ‘bogus’ (Wainwright and Ward, 2006). Even so, the few ‘bogus’ asylum seekers have dominated the general discourse around those vulnerable people who seek refuge in the UK, fleeing from torture and persecution.

Furthermore, controlling immigration policy has been stated as a necessity for preventing the nation from being subject to crime and terrorism (Hansard, 2001g, col 629, 652) There are numerous occasions when asylum seekers have been suspected of being potential terrorists or less law-abiding than the indigenous population (Hansard, 2001d, col 154). The statement of Lord John Cope (Con) named immigrants and asylum seekers as a problem that needs to be confronted strictly, through forcing them to appreciate British values and thus avoiding the horror and destruction that America has experienced; this presents a clear means of criminalising foreign nationals and connecting them to violence and terrorism.

Different MPs have placed pressure on the government to control immigration policy, especially through the asylum system and by introducing tougher measures in general, because of the perceived relationship between foreign nationals and different sorts of crimes (Hansard, 2001g, col 657, Hansard, 2001e, col 675, 681). However,

- 110 -

restrictive immigration policy and tough measures to control some nationalities mean British immigration policy can be considered essentially racist. Rejecting asylum for people with convictions for crime, or suspecting and deporting them to a country in which the deportee would be likely to suffer torture, cruel or inhuman treatment has been criticised by Lord William Goodhart (Lib. Dem). He found it as a breaching Article 3 of The European Convention on Human Rights (Hansard, 2001d, col 268).

Moreover, it is argued by some that individuals rationally choose between criminal and legal activity by comparing the expected net benefit from each activity (Becker, 1968), Ehrlich (1973) found that there is a positive relationship between income inequality and crimes against property. In their qualitative report Burnett and Whyte (2010) indicated the occupational risks faced by undocumented workers in the UK, describing the immigration and social policies asylum seekers are subject to (including those who are in the process, failed asylum seekers, and those who could not go back to their home country for various reasons). The report found there are hundreds of thousands of ‘refused’ asylum seekers in the UK who will not voluntarily return home through fear of torture, regardless of whether their claim has been accepted or not. Forced into destitution, working is the only way through which they can obtain the means through which to exist on the margins of society. Yet, unable to work ‘legally’, they are forced into the ‘black market’ as undocumented workers. Banned from working for the first twelve months after arrival, and subject to very restricted conditions under which they have the right

- 111 -

to apply for a permission to work, this forces many asylum seekers to engage in illegal activities, including working illegally (Sales, 2002).

The consequences of abolishing the right to work for asylum seekers has been questioned in Parliament, and the immigration policy abolishing the right to work for asylum seekers does no favours to either them or the British public, as it will drag some asylum seekers to engage in illegal working. As Tony Banks (Lab MP) (Hansard, 2001d, col 743) stated:

‘…I am also looking forward to proposals to allow refugees and economic migrants to work. It is scandalous how we treat these people. They want to work but are told that they cannot. We are forcing them into areas of uncertain employment and we are inflicting poverty on them. It is unacceptable. I look forward to a proper immigration policy…’

However, the Secretary of State has not replied properly on the raised issues (Hansard, 2001a, col 3), as he said:

‘I am aware of the strong feelings—how could I not be?—about the operation of the system generally and the perception of vouchers in particular. That is precisely why my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary initiated the voucher review, why we have taken our time to take the suggested changes on board and why I want to make any change part of a much broader package of measures’

There was concern that continuing the immigration policy would lead asylum seekers to commit crimes and engage in illegal economic activities, shown when Tony Banks asked of the junior minister for the Home Office (Angela Eagle) in the House of Commons:

‘There are many thousands of asylum seekers in my constituency. I do not sneer at economic migrants, who have come to this country to try to make

- 112 -

a contribution. Thousands of them have nothing to do. If that position is allowed to persist, they will enter the unofficial economy, as they undoubtedly already do. It is demeaning to individuals who want to work not to be able to do so. I therefore ask my hon. Friend to think about the policy again’(Hansard, 2001a, col 7).

Nevertheless, the minister’s reply seemed to misunderstand the point of helping asylum seekers, with many of them having fled dangerous situations in order to found a better life in a new country. The reply of the minister was (Hansard, 2001a, col 7-8):

‘If those people have applied for asylum, they have come to this country because they are fleeing torture. For those who are economic migrants, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will have something to say about organising the way in which we will deal with them in a more coherent way in the future. My hon. Friend should not mix up the two’

it is hard to determine the exact population of asylum seekers who are working illegally in the UK, due to the secretive nature of this phenomenon and the lack or recorded data. However, researchers have used data in accordance with Public Service Agreement 3 Indicator 4 (Increase the proportion of ‘higher harm’ enforced removals and voluntary departures) by the UKVI. The harm of those working illegally in the UK, or making dishonest claims for asylum support and identity fraud is assessed as ‘medium’ (see table 3.2 in Appendix 2).

It needs to be taken into consideration that the numbers in the table do not show the precise number of illegal workers, and even where the illegal worker population is included it does not refer to how many asylum seekers are working illegally because of the limited (or complete lack of)

- 113 -

financial support for failed asylum seekers. However, the numbers are used to provide an illustration of the large number of ‘known’ illegal workers, and it is predicted that the number of those not found exceeds that published in table 3.2.

In addition to the accusation of being bogus, asylum seekers have been connected to property crimes. The relationship between asylum seekers and property crime has been widely covered in the studies by Bell, Machin and Fasani. They developed an economic model to explain motivations to commit crimes, and they recognized that the economic situation of British and EU workers is better than foreign nationals. The authors found a one percent increase in the asylum seekers share of the local population is associated with a 1.1 percent rise in property crime, but no change in violent crime (Bell et al., 2010, Bell and Machin, 2013a).

Bell and Machin (2013a), found that property crime rates are significantly higher in areas in which asylum seekers are located, but there is no significant relationship between foreign nationals (asylum seekers in particular) and violent crime. They reached this conclusion after controlling for the location choice and crime trends within the Police Force Area. The same picture emerges when the time-series evolution of incarceration rates are explored, which suggest a rise in the rate of incarceration of foreigners from asylum seeking countries as the asylum wave arrived in the UK.

The strong economic opportunities that foreign national groups have, and their intention to work in the UK, explained their significant negative impact on property crime and their lack of effect on violent crimes. Those

- 114 -

who do not have labour market access after coming to the UK and face restriction on their engagement with the labour market are more prone to involvement in criminal activities than other foreign nationals and the indigenous population. In other words, the motivation of asylum seekers was different, they are not allowed to work in the UK upon arrival, and they also have reduced access to welfare benefits. Given the lengthy process involved in deciding asylum applications, this restriction is likely to have increased the relative returns to crime (Bell et al., 2010, Bell and Machin, 2011).

Similarly, Ochsen (2010) has looked at European immigration policy and the limited labour market opportunities for asylum seekers. She confirmed the ‘indirect relationship’ between immigration and social policies via unemployment and asylum seekers engaging in crime.

However, an increase in the share of foreigners decreases assault and drug offenses signiﬁcantly, which is incompatible with the social disorganization theory.

Many asylum applicants have been waiting for more than a year for their decision, and the appeal process can often elongate this wait. The outcome of such legislation reflects an immigration policy that leans towards exempting asylum seekers from the labour market, and as a result exacerbates socioeconomic problems for asylum seekers. This therefore increases the likelihood of their involvement in crimes, property crimes in particular (Phillimore and Goodson, 2006, McKay, 2009, P 61).

Although they provide some useful insight, the application of economic theories does not account for other factors. For example, the awareness

- 115 -

of the consequences of committing crime in a foreign country and the implications on their residency or legal status in that country may be a deterrent from engaging in criminal activity. The awareness of the cost of crime and being caught differ between British nationals and foreign nationals (Bell et al., 2010). For asylum seekers, being caught for committing a crime means a high likelihood of being deported (in many cases) from the country, this is exactly the situation most asylum seekers would not want to be in. Moreover the methodology of (Bell et al., 2010, Bell and Machin, 2013a) identifies the asylum wave effect using nationality, even though the majority of such nationals were unlikely to be asylum seekers. Their study is thus prone to criticism in terms of its ability to control the data and allow firm conclusions to be drawn from such researches.

A report published by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) confirmed that there is no evidence for a higher rate of criminality among refugees and asylum seekers. In fact, according to ACPO, asylum seekers are more likely to become victims of crime. There have been countless attacks on asylum seekers around Britain, including the murders of an asylum seeker in Glasgow in 2001 and in Sunderland in 2002. The murder in Glasgow prompted the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to condemn the British media for provoking racial hatred (Salford City Council, 2012).

Despite the unfortunate absence of data describing the level and the type of crimes that asylum seekers are engaging in (HM Prison Service, 2008), research still shows sympathy for the argument that proposed links to the black market and engagement in property crimes. This

- 116 -

perspective leaves vulnerable foreigners with little choice and a probability to engage in illegal activities to meet their daily needs.

Due to the poor economic situation of most asylum seekers caused by their lack of working rights, and the limited resources they can access in the UK (which cease after their cases are rejected), it is easy to see why they can be ‘Invariably and inevitably… sucked into the black economy’, as Tony Baldry said (Hansard, 2006b, col 14). The Conservative MP criticised the Labour Government and their management of the asylum system, which essentially encourages asylum seekers to commit immigration crimes – either through being in the UK illegally or working

In document DESARROLLO DE BIODIESEL A PARTIR DE ACEITE RECICLADO DE FRITURAS PRESENTADO POR: MÉNDEZ MEDINA, FERNANDO ENRIQUE PARA OPTAR AL TÍTULO DE: (página 23-0)